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Abstract 
 
Media and communications engage in social power relations. This thesis aims to 
investigate the “power value” of media and communications, focusing on the private 
communication practices of economic elites. The main argument is that, in the age of 
hyperglobalization, elite private communication plays no less important a part than 
mass forms of communication in shaping and maintaining economic elite power that 
operates in a far from transparent and accountable manner. This detachment of media 
and communications from the public is a symptom of the shrinking of democracy, 
which sanctions the massive transfer of resources to the organized interests.  
 
For the purpose of empirical study, his thesis investigates the sites or networks of the 
national and transnational market forces within the historical context of the neo-
liberalization of the Korean economy and society since the 1990s. The research 
shows, via in-depth interviews and qualitative case studies, how increasingly broader 
areas of the economy are becoming discursively de-politicized and how the closed 
communicative processes of economic elites are replacing democratic structures. 
Think-tanks, epistemic communities and policy networks, with their practices of 
private communication, lobbying and “brain sharing”, often make policy decisions 
that have a significant impact on the masses. The discrete culture and exclusive elite 
communication networks which are prevalent in the global-national investment web 
of intermediaries allow the growth of “invisible power”, which almost completely 
blocks the vigilance of the public. In the financial market, the cohesive culture, 
combined with the reflexive and intensive communication environment, generates a 
system of preferences and evaluations as well as one-sided expectations that have a 
tremendous impact on corporate management and the whole of society. 
 
The study suggests that we should attend to the growing tendency of the mediation 
of power that is taking place with minimum reference to the public. This research 
contributes to the understanding of the “power value” of media and communications 
by providing an alternative or complementary explanation. 
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1.1 Background and Research Agenda  
 
This thesis documents the socio-economic changes that have taken place in 
Korea over the last two decades under the influence of neo-liberal 
hyperglobalization. The point of departure is the uneasiness about the hardship 
of the general population, which has been continuously exacerbated as a result 
of Korea‟s ever deeper integration into globalization. The research attempts to 
grasp the situation within the framework of the ingrained rivalry between 
liberalism and democracy, where the exigencies of globalizing market forces 
have restricted the egalitarian expansion of Korean democracy. The research 
then aims to elucidate the attributes and processes of economic power that 
sanction ever-widening inequality, through the lens of media and 
communication studies. 
 
Since the early 1980s, the belief in the market has been the spirit of the times. 
Until the global financial meltdown in 2008 which dealt a decisive blow to its 
validity, the expansion of the market principle was the salient trend in many 
parts of the globe. The politico-economic paradigm that promoted the 
liberalization of the economy in the context of globalization has been variously 
labeled “neo-liberalism”, “market-fundamentalism”, “turbo-capitalism” or 
“market-driven politics”. This paradigm has forcefully directed and reshaped 
the institutional, stratal and cultural settings of our life. 
 
From the early 1990s, Korea has undergone a neo-liberal transformation of its 
economy and society, replacing its previously successful East Asian 
development model. The change was fuelled not only by the external 
constraints of the global diffusion of the neo-liberal paradigm, but also by the 
internal imperative to establish a more effective socio-economic paradigm. This 
transition has been particularly radical since the Korean economic crisis in 1997, 
under the auspices of the “Washington - Consensus” authored by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Wall Street. The transformation was 
comprehensive to such an extent that the international community dubbed 
Korea a „model student of the IMF‟ (Dong-A, 28 Nov. 2001). 
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In line with this change, it has become increasingly clear that a majority of 
ordinary Koreans have been suffering a reduced standard of living, in both 
psychological and material terms. In particular, after the all-out liberalization of 
the economy in the late 1990s, the number of Koreans living beneath the 
poverty line has soared, while the income disparity among the people has 
sharply worsened. The widening socio-economic polarity has dampened the 
social dynamics of class mobility, as the poor were discouraged from daring to 
climb the ladder of success. Amid the social pressure of “national 
competitiveness”, “business restructuring” and “casualization of labour”, people 
are racking their brains about the dismaying future. The hardship of the people 
was alarmingly demonstrated by statistics indicating, for instance, that Koreans 
had the highest rate of suicide and the lowest rate of birth among the OECD 
countries (Ministry of Health and Welfare 2011)
1
. 
 
The Korean experience of neo-liberal transformation, i.e. the expansion of the 
market and the increase in the uneasiness of people, reminds us of the instances 
that Karl Polanyi (2001[1944]: xxvii) referred to as the „double-movement‟ 
between market and society. In short, market systems inevitably generate 
commoditization and inequality. When the „laissez-faire movement to expand 
the scope of the market‟ reaches the verge of disrupting a society, a protective 
countermovement emerges to resist the „disembedding of the economy‟. The 
essential role of the modern capitalist state has been to remedy the dysfunction 
that the market system generates. Thus, the harshness of the market is eased by 
„redistributions of money and resources authorized by the democratic state‟. 
And it is politics that determines the scale and nature of these „social transfers‟ 
(Curran 2006:143, see Chang H-J 2010: 261-262 also).  
 
Globalization, however, has promoted the expansion of the market while 
                                           
1
 The number of Koreans dying of suicide among 100,000 people was 28.4 in 2009. This was 
the highest among the OECD countries, followed by Hungary (19.6 people) and Japan (19.4 
people). The suicide rate in Korea has doubled in ten years since 1999, supposedly because of 
the intensified competition between people, the high rate of unemployment among the younger 
generation, and uneasiness about the future after the economic crisis in the late 1990s. 
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weakening democratic politics that is basically bound to the nation state. As 
politics is subsumed into the imperatives of borderless competition and global 
standards, the state silently abandons its duty to remedy the harshness of the 
market. This was noted by Dani Rodrik (2011: 189, emphasis in the original) as 
a „fundamental tension‟ in which „hyperglobalization does require shrinking 
democratic politics and insulating technocrats from the demands of popular 
groups‟. Thus, politics in the age of neo-liberal globalization became 
increasingly „market driven‟ (Leys 2001: 1), generating a shift of power to  
economic elites (Strange 1996).  
 
In Korea, since the „dual liberalization‟, i.e. democratization and economic 
openness in the late 1980s (Cho H-Y, Kim D-C and Oh Y-S 2009: 35), there has 
been a growing sense of “paradox” about the widening gap between formal 
democracy and substantial democracy, or between political democracy and 
economic democracy (ibid; see Choi J-J 2005 also). What this perplexing 
situation implies is that the institutionalization of democracy over the last few 
decades has failed to deliver the egalitarian ideals of democracy. The sense of 
paradox was heightened in the 2000s, when the socio-economic polarity was 
markedly exacerbated, while the allegedly democratic governments, the leaders 
of which have long fought for democratization, were in power.  
 
The “mere shell of democratic politics”, that was unable to improve the welfare 
of people, coincided with the shift of social power relations, characterized by 
the advance of the transnational market forces in the globalized industries and 
in finance. The observation that Korea, since the late 1990s, has turned into a 
„corporation society‟ (Kim D-C 2007: 17) or a „management society‟ (Hong D-
R 2008: 68) demonstrates the establishment of business hegemony. In this 
regard, „democracy after the democratization‟ of Korea (Choi J-J 2005: 19), as 
with many Asian and East European countries that joined „democracy‟s third 
wave‟ (Huntington 1991: 12), was crisis-ridden and was greeted with 
skepticism. 
 
In the face of the reality that hyperglobalization has engendered in the nation, it 
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is significant to ask how market liberalism and transnational market forces have 
limited the scope and scale of democratic politics in Korea. Considering their 
„power value‟ (Watson 2003: 13), it is reasonable to assume that media, 
communications and culture have played critical roles in the exercise of 
economic power to generate a massive shift of resources towards small, seldom 
accountable economic elites. Accordingly, the objective of this thesis is to 
investigate the role played by media, communications and culture in the 
„downsizing‟ of democratic politics (Crenson & Ginsberg 2002: xii) that 
accredited inequality and social polarity. By doing so, this study should be able 
to enhance our understanding of the mediation of economic power in the age of 
„liberalism aut (against) democracy‟ (Bobbio 1990: 49). Hence, the overall 
research agenda is: 
 
What part did media and communications play in the exercise of economic 
power that sanctioned a sharp increase of inequality and social polarity in 
Korea? 
 
 
1.2 Summary of the Approach and the Research Questions 
 
The existing research with a similar research agenda to this thesis may be 
grouped into two categories in terms of its theoretical orientations and 
approaches. The first is the „constructivist approach‟ (McGrew 2005: 229) 
which focuses on the role of ideas and discourse in the establishment of the 
global-national hegemony of neo-liberalism. This approach normally asks such 
questions as: what kinds of discourses emerged, who actively partook in these 
discourses, for what purpose, in what context, and how did those discourses 
contribute to constituting reality. 
 
The second is the political economic approach, which explores the structural 
constraints in the media industry that have led to overtly pro-market and pro-
capitalist media texts. In Korea, this line of research has paid particular 
attention to the distortions of the media production processes by the ruling 
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alliance of chaebols -- mainstream media -- economic bureaucrats. 
 
Although these schools of thought are grounded on divergent interpretative 
frameworks, they share one overarching assumption: that influence is exercised 
when economic elites succeed in persuading, inculcating or indoctrinating the 
public through the mass media and communications. In other words, it is 
assumed that the “power value” of the media and of communications is located 
in their influence on mass audiences. This assumption is very familiar in the 
tradition of political communication studies, and it still has significant 
explanatory power for the relationship between the media, power and 
democracy. 
 
But there are unconventional attributes and processes of neo-liberal market 
power which compel the researcher to look beyond approaches that rest on the 
norms of state-centered politics as well as the institutionalized forms of media, 
communications and culture. Firstly, in line with the neo-liberal transformation, 
the economy has become increasingly “disembedded” from the society and 
from political control. This was deliberately promoted by various discourses of 
de-politicization and by the „market-driven politics‟ of each government (Leys 
2001: 211). Drawing on the Finnish experience of neo-liberal socio-economic 
change in the 1990s, Anu Kantola (2001) has pointed out that an anti-political 
and anti-public discourse that favors economic expertise and bureaucracy 
negated or narrowed the public sphere and the scope of public discussion. 
 
Secondly, there have been growing mismatches between power and its 
legitimacy and accountability. In line with neo-liberal economic globalization, 
the locus of power has shifted considerably towards multinational corporations, 
global financial capitalists and transnational institutions. Unlike state-bound 
political power, it is difficult to expect that the agents of liberal market forces 
will seriously value political legitimacy and public accountability in the way 
that they operate. Generally, they even operate in a manner that is unnoticeable 
by the public as they are shielded by lofty expertise, exclusive networks and a 
distinctive culture and practices.  
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In this regard, power and resources are continuously placed at the discretion of 
experts and institutions that function with little public accountability, 
transparency, or engagement with ordinary citizens. In this instance, the 
application of the elite-media-public paradigm to the incumbent research 
agenda may result in insufficient explanations. 
 
In order to understand the research topic better, this research seeks for an 
alternative or complementary explanation for the “power value” of media and 
communications in the era of hyperglobalization. This approach engages with 
the organized interests of economic elites and their communicative strategies, 
which have increasingly replaced the democratic process of consensus-
formation. In practice, this research should be a communication-oriented study 
of the actual site or network where the powerful dwell, paying particular 
attention to the variant modes and processes of power that these market liberals 
exercise. 
 
In particular, it is assumed that private forms of communications play 
significant roles in economic elite‟s sites or networks, something which most of 
the existing research on this topic often ignores. Considering the unaccountable 
and exclusive attributes of the neo-liberal market forces, the private actions of 
the powerful and the private communicative activities that mediate these actions 
seems important in the shifting and maintaining of power relations. Such 
private communicative activities or organs as lobbying, think tanks, and policy 
planning organizations, though they are the least visible and the most exclusive, 
may constitute significant spaces of contemporary power.  
 
By reflecting the overarching research agenda against the Korean experience of 
“dual-liberalization” as well as the theoretical discussion, the researcher can 
formulate the following research questions: 
 
1) How did the market liberals discursively dwarf the public domain of Korea 
and allow its economy to be, in effect, colonized by technocrats and economic 
8 
 
elites? 
2) What kind of organized interests of market forces have evolved in Korea as a 
locus of power in line with Korea‟s deep integration into hyperglobalization? 
And what different modes of power are observed in action in elite sites or 
networks?  
3) How have the media, communications and culture, not just in their mass 
forms but also in their private forms, engaged in the process of exercising 
power? 
4) What are the socio-economic consequences and the significance of the 
communicative processes of market forces in terms of democratic politics and 
power relations in Korea? 
 
 
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
 
Chapter 1 introduces the study. 
Chapter 2 addresses the transformation of Korean society over the last three 
decades, focusing on the dynamic relationship between democratization and 
economic liberalization. 
Chapter 3 reviews the literature and contextualizes the research. 
Chapter 4 explains the research approaches and methodology.  
Chapter5 explores the discursive process of the de-politicization of the 
economy after the Korean economic crisis. This chapter especially pays 
attention to the role of Korean economists in constructing a specific economic 
and political reality. 
Chapter 6 documents the advance of the corporate elites to a dominant position 
of economic, social and political power in line with the neo-liberal 
transformation of Korean society. The focus will be placed on the way that the 
chaebols, Korean conglomerates, influence government policy within the elite 
communication network. 
Chapter 7 documents how the financial elite and their specific financial 
rationale became dominant in the Korean economy after the late 1990s and 
what changes they have brought to corporate management and household 
9 
 
behavior. 
Chapter 8 explores the operation of global-national networks of alternative 
investment that have emerged as an important channel of influence. The 
emphasis will be placed on the lack of visibility of the specialists who inhabit 
this site of power, and the implications of this for the wider society and 
democracy. 
And, finally, chapter 9 summarizes the findings and concludes the thesis. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Hyperglobalization and the Paradox  
of Korean Democracy 
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„We cannot have hyperglobalization, democracy, and national self-
determination all at once. We can have at most two out of three. …. If 
we must keep the nation state and want hyperglobalization too, then we 
must forget about democracy‟ (Dani Rodrik 2011: 200). 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter addresses the transformation of the Korean economy and society 
over the last three decades. Focusing on the adoption and deepening of the neo-
liberal paradigm, the research locates the change within the frame of “dual 
liberalization”, i.e. the interplay between democratization and economic 
liberalization. 
 
Korea, one example of the „condensed growth‟(s) of the East Asian economies, 
was noted for its splendid economic development in the 1960s and the 1970s 
(Chang H-J 2007:17). As the economy grew, so did the people‟s desire for 
political liberalization. By the late 1980s, the Koreans had achieved 
democratization. This political change was accompanied by the ever- growing 
momentum of neo-liberal economic globalization. 
 
The period of the 1990s and the 2000s in Korea was characterized by a 
symbiosis on the one hand or clash on the other between the neo-liberal 
momentum and the people‟s longing for the egalitarian expansion of the 
democracy. Economic liberalism, having once been received to be a friend of 
democratization, had limited the scope of democracy after the economic crisis 
in 1997, hindering its egalitarian expansion. Along the way, the power relations 
between social groups had changed. 
 
With this framework in mind, this research sought answers to such questions as, 
how the political liberalization and economic liberalization were intertwined 
with each other in the change of the socio-economic paradigm; how the relative 
strength of power between the business circle, the bureaucrats and organized 
labour changed over the period; what consequences did the change bring for the 
12 
 
living conditions of people; and what were the implications for Korean 
democracy. 
 
 
2.2 The East Asian Miracle and its Limitation  
 
During the 1960s and 1970s, Korea achieved splendid economic development 
under the leadership of the President, Park Jung-hee
2
. The Korean economy was 
undeniable evidence of the “East Asian miracle”, the term used to describe the 
rapid economic growth in this region, including Japan, Taiwan, Korea and Hong 
Kong. The “catch-up” strategy of the region, which successfully orchestrated 
the growth of export industries and the development of a market economy, was 
dubbed the “developmental-state” model by Western scholars (Johnson 1982; 
Woo-Cumings 1999).  
 
In the model, the state had strong control over the economy and the civil society. 
Resources were normally allocated according to the master plan for investment, 
production, and distribution, which the government drew up. The financial 
sector was practically controlled by the government officials, providing them 
with effective means of intervention (Chang H-J 2003). The strategy for the 
condensed growth was so successful that Korea, which had once been one of 
the poorest countries in the world, became an emerging market country within 
just 20 years. The per capita income increased 14 times in 44 years, between 
1963 and 2007, while it took 200 years for the U.K. and 150 years for the U.S. 
to achieve similar increases (Chang H-J 2007: 17). 
 
Around the turn of the 1980s, however, it became increasingly clear that the 
model was no longer efficient because of the backlash of its own success (Lee 
B-C 1998). The growing sense of political and economic crisis had undermined 
the credibility of the model. Politically, the developmental state, which was 
authoritarian, conflicted with the growing demand from the people for 
                                           
2
 He seized power by a coup d‟etat in 1961 and was assassinated by Kim Jae-kyu, a follower, in 
1979. 
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democratization. This was a consequence of the economic development, which 
had facilitated the growth of an educated middle class as well as benefiting 
social groups like the workers, the farmers and the intellectuals. In this sense, 
the design of the economic miracle „unwittingly planted the seeds of their own 
destruction‟ (Dahl 2000: 170). The Chun Du-hwan 3  government which 
succeeded the Park Jung-hee government in 1980 was marked by escalating 
resistance from the people and ever-increasing oppression by the police. 
  
The developmental state model also revealed its limitations as a paradigm of 
economic policy. From the early 1970s, the Korean government ambitiously 
promoted massive investment in the heavy industry and chemical industries. 
But these industries suffered hugely when the “oil shock” generated a global 
economic recession in the late 1970s. The government was compelled to 
restructure the industries by providing subsidies as well as merging them, a 
process lasting until the early 1980s. After this came another round of 
government-driven restructuring in the debt-ridden industries, such as the 
overseas engineering and shipping industries, which continued until the mid-
1980s (Cho Y-C 1998:149).   
 
The consecutive breakdown of government investment projects was enough to 
cast doubts about the viability of the developmental strategy. It was the market 
that emerged as an alternative to the state‟s leadership. Increasingly many 
economists ascribed the economic hardship to the distortion of the market 
mechanism caused by state intervention. Around the mid-1980s, the shared 
wisdom among economists and policy-makers was that the market should play 
a heavier role in the advanced Korean economy. The liberalization of economy 
through such policies as deregulation, privatization and trade openness was 
gradually introduced in order to facilitate the advance of the market mechanism 
(Lee B-C 1998; Ha Y-S 2003). 
 
This shift in policy paradigm also conformed to the preference of the business 
                                           
3
 He was the President from November 1980 to February 1988. He was the military right hand 
man of the former President Park Jung-hee 
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world, which at that time was seeking independence from the “visible hand” of 
the government. The rapid economic growth led by the state was mirrored by a 
massive consolidation of capital. As the government strategically encouraged 
the growth of big conglomerates, the major Korean industries, including 
automobile, ship building, electronics and oil refinery were appropriated by 
dozens of chaebols
4
. In some senses, the remarkable take-offs of the Korean 
economy, according to Alice Amsden (1989), can be attributed to the 
partnership between the state and chaebols, in other words, a balance between 
support and discipline. By the 1980s, however, the chaebols no longer wanted 
government intervention, as they became huge in size and their business 
interests expanded beyond the national borders. In their pursuit of raising 
cheaper overseas loans, for example, chaebols continually requested, from the 
mid-1980s on, that the government ease financial regulations; these were the 
main lever of the state‟s control over the business. 
 
International pressure, or coercion, also played a significant part in the 
liberalization of the economy. From the mid-1980s, the U.S.A. phased out its 
lenient trade policy stance towards the emerging economies, and increased the 
pressure for opening up markets at multilateral or bilateral negotiations, such as 
the Financial Policy Talks (Ha Y-S 2003). Also, the governments of the G7 and 
the transnational corporations repeatedly asked the emerging market countries, 
including Korea, to liberalize their financial markets.  
 
 
2.3 The Momentum of Globalization and the Crisis 
 
In the early 1990s, another politico-economic momentum had emerged in the 
Korean economy. Beneath the slogan of the „end of history‟ (Fukuyama1989: 3), 
globalization and neo-liberalism had penetrated into the ruling discourses and 
policy agendas of the government. The business circle and the economists 
promoted neo-liberal ideas, such as the supremacy of the market and limitless 
                                           
4
 Korean huge conglomerates run by the chairman‟s family (See chapter 6.). 
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competition, seasoned with the fear of possible defeat in the merciless global 
economic battlefield. But the hurried relaxation of financial regulations, in 
response to the demand of the business world, led to the economic crisis in 
1997.  
 
Globalization, a national agenda 
 
It was with the “globalization campaign” of the Kim Young-sam5 government 
in the early 1990s that the Korean economy embraced the neo-liberal paradigm 
in earnest. President Kim proclaimed in late 1993 that his government would 
prioritize “internationalization” as a supreme policy agenda. A year later, he 
placed even stronger emphasis on the political campaign by upgrading the 
slogan to “globalization” 6 . The campaign for globalization aimed at 
disseminating the belief that there was „no alternative‟ other than embracing the 
global trend of openness and economic liberalization (Ha Y-S 2003:12). The 
discourses of privatization, deregulation and competitiveness were mobilized 
by the government and the business circle as an ideological device. A political 
scientist put it like this:  
 
„As it is necessary to strengthen competitive power in order to survive 
limitless global competition, the demand for wage increases by labour was 
criticized as a culprit for the excessive increase of production costs. The 
request for the reform of the chaebols system was also turned down with the 
excuse that it may damage the advantage of scale that the chaebols had. 
Moreover, in the discourse of globalization, the main objective of the 
government was to be business-friendly‟ (Choi J-J 2005:205). 
 
In terms of specific policies, the globalization campaign was marked by the 
aggressive abolition of financial regulations. The five-year financial liberation 
                                           
5
 He was in the office from February 1993 to February 1998. 
6
 Kim Young-sam government‟s main slogan evolved from “Building a New Korea”, to 
“internationalization” and, finally, “globalization”. There are some differences between the 
concepts of internationalization and globalization. According to the government, globalization 
suggested that the state‟s boundaries no longer matter while internationalization basically 
presupposed the national state (Maeil Business Newspaper, 22 Nov.1994). 
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plan was drafted in 1993. This plan comprised such policies as the deregulation 
of interest rates; giving managerial autonomy to the banks; and reducing entry 
barriers to Korean financial market for foreign capital. The plan targeted, 
among other things, the abolition of “policy loans”, which was the nucleus of 
the power of the developmental state in controlling the corporate world (Choi B 
1993). What facilitated the liberalization of finance was President Kim‟s desire 
to see Korea join the OECD, a club of wealthier countries, during his term of 
office (Chang H-J, Park, H-J and Yoo C-G 1998; Ha Y-S 2003).  
 
The road to the economic crisis 
 
In line with the relaxation of financial regulations, in the mid 1990s, Korean 
industrial and financial firms rushed to the global financial centers looking for 
cheaper credit. The frenzy for borrowing resulted in the mushrooming of 
Korea‟s overseas liabilities from $ 44 billion in 1993 to $ 120 billion in 1997. 
The rapid increase in foreign debt was also the result of the investment boom in 
Asia, facilitated by the upsurge in optimistic economic outlooks from foreign 
financial institutions (Krugman 2009). What was notable about the debt held in 
foreign currencies was its maturity structure. The short-term debts with less 
than a year of maturity had inflated to 58.3% of total debt in 1996 from 43.7% 
in 1993. Korean firms even raised capital for facility investment with short-term 
credit and rolled it over. The underlying calculation of the borrowers was that 
Korea‟s credit rating, hopefully, would keep rising and the cost of borrowing 
would go down (Chang H-J, Park, H-J and Yoo C-G 1998). But the massive 
inflow of short term financial capital and a mismatch of maturity had made the 
Korean economy vulnerable to the whims of global financial capital. 
 
Until the crisis hit Korea in late 1997, however, relatively few economists 
forecasted that the domino of financial collapse which started in Thailand 
would infect much bigger economies in the Far East. Before the crisis, scholarly 
debate was dominated by the “Asian miracle thesis” that stressed the efficient 
institutional networking underlying economic development (World Bank 1993). 
The macroeconomic indicators, the barometer of national economic 
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fundamentals, had shown few signs of trouble. Over the first half of the 1990s, 
Korea recorded impressively high growth rates (real GDP growth was 7.83% 
per annum between 1990 and 1995), high savings (gross saving was 35.6% of 
GDP annually over the same period) and investment ratios (gross fixed capital 
formation was 36.7% of GDP annually over the same period), stable inflation 
rates (7.0% per annum over the same period ), and a balanced national budget 
(the fiscal balance was minus 0.26% of GDP between 1990 and 1995). The only 
indicator that raised caution was the relatively small but growing current 
account deficits (the current account balance was minus 1.25% of GDP over the 
same period and minus 4.75% in 1996 mainly due to the drop in price of 
semiconductors, which was the key exports) (Demetriades and Faffouh 1999: 
782). 
 
But the increase of non-performing loans in the financial sector, mainly due to 
the continual failure of massive investment projects affecting several chaebols, 
was the epicenter of the concerns of foreign lenders. The non-performing credit 
of 26 commercial banks in Korea was 6.0% in 1997. But there was widespread 
suspicion that the actual number would be 20.85% of the total claims (ibid: 
787). Once the confidence of global financial capital had evaporated, partly due 
to the poor management of the foreign exchange rate
7
, Korea could not help 
asking the IMF for an emergency loan, less than four years after the start of the 
ambitious globalization (internationalization) campaign. 
 
 
2.4 The Structural Reforms after the Crisis 
 
The economic crisis that broke out in November 1997 was the biggest event in 
the modern economic history of Korea. The crisis caused a psychological 
trauma for many Koreans because it was followed by the most painful 
economic recession ever experienced. The GDP growth rate plummeted, for the 
                                           
7
 The Finance Ministry and Bank of Korea‟s decision to defend the Korean currency, the won , 
against speculative attacks resulted in the loss of international reserves as well as a loss of 
credibility (Kim D-W 1998: 240).  
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first time in decades, to minus 6.9% in the following year, and more than 1.2 
million employees lost their jobs. Accordingly, the unemployment rate rose to 
7.0% in 1998 from 2.6% in 1997 (Kostat)
8
. Amid anger and frustration, the 
opposition party won the Presidential election in December 1997. Korea was 
compelled to undergo several years of painful socio-economic transformation 
from then onwards. After carrying out the stringent structural reform programs 
imposed by the IMF and the Wall Street, Korea became a considerably different 
society from the pre-crisis one.  
 
Following the crisis, the policy paradigm of the developmental state was 
discredited and virtually discarded with an accusation of “crony capitalism”. 
Instead, the Anglo-American style neo-liberal paradigm became the dominant 
interpretative framework of policies in the name of a “global standard”. The 
policy recommendations of the IMF were based on the “Washington Consensus” 
that reflected the interests of the U.S. Treasury and Wall Street. The U.S. 
Treasury, the invisible hand behind the IMF, had revealed some signs that it had 
a keen interest in the neo-liberal transformation of the crisis-ridden East Asian 
economies, including Korea. The U.S. urged the IMF negotiators not to permit 
Korean government any choice other than “going to the IMF” immediately after 
the crisis broke out. This was confirmed several years later by some memoirs of 
the Korean team that negotiated with the IMF (Kang K-S 1999; Chung D-K 
2008). 
  
But the adoption of the neo-liberal paradigm was not solely an imposition by 
the U.S. Treasury and the IMF. It was also a voluntary espousal by the Korean 
government, corporate world and economists, who viewed it as a new 
interpretative framework of socio-economic policies. The U.S. treasury officials 
later said that they were please to find that the President-elect Kim Dae-jung 
basically shared them a desire for the structural reform of Korean economy 
(Rubin 2002). Some researchers argued, thus, that the Korean government tried 
to make use of the anguish of people, as well as the authority of the IMF, to 
overcome any resistance to the painful reforms (Hong S-Y et al. 2006). 
                                           
8
 Statistics Korea (http://kostat.go.kr/portal/korea/index.action, retrieved 6 May 2010). 
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The restructuring program was carried out in four core areas; finance, 
corporations, labour and government. Amongst other things, the changes in 
financial policy and labour policy had a huge influence in the economy and the 
living conditions of people. The Korean government introduced all-out 
financial liberalization immediately after the crisis, partly due to the shortage of 
foreign currency. As a consequence, foreign investments as a form of direct or 
portfolio investment flooded into the Korean financial market and industries. 
For example, the foreign ownership of shares in the KOSPI, the main stock 
exchange in Korea, soared from 18% in 1998 to 30.1% in 2000 and 41.9% in 
2004 (Money Today, 29 Oct. 2007). Most significantly, foreign investors came 
to hold more than 50% of the shares of the ten biggest Korean corporations, 
including Samsung Electronics., Hyundai Motors, POSCO and Kookmin Bank 
(E-Daily 24, Nov. 2005). As the financial market was increasingly integrated 
into the global market, it had emerged as a central actor that regulated the 
expectations and the preferences of economic agents (Cho Y-C 2007). 
 
On top of that, the macroeconomic policies of the government became exposed 
to the scrutiny of the global credit rating agencies, the investment funds and the 
financial media. The firms, faced with “shareholder capitalism” that prioritized 
the maximization of shareholder value, successively adopted a new 
management strategy that made the “bottom line” their first concern. After the 
investment fund boom in 2003~2007, that converted considerable portions of 
household assets into stock investment, the influence of the financial market on 
households and firms became even stronger. It was a process of 
„financialization‟ (Froud, Johal and Williams 2002: 5). 
 
Another important change was the introduction of the flexibility of labour, that 
gave the employer stronger discretion in the layoff of employees and the hiring 
of casual workers. In fact, this was a long-cherished demand of Korean business 
circles, rather than a core policy recommendation of the IMF. Chung Deuk-ku, 
a high-ranking officer at the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning who 
participated in the negotiations with the IMF, confirmed that the IMF, initially, 
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was reluctant to „touch upon‟ the „politically sensitive‟ issues like the flexibility 
of labour (Choi G-P and Lee S-J 2002: 64-66). This illustrates again that the 
structural reform programs were not solely an imposition of the IMF or the U.S., 
but were a mixture of domestic and external demands. With regard to the 
legitimization of labour policy, a tripartite council meeting between the leaders 
of the trade unions, the business circles and the government was organized in 
January 1998.  
 
The introduction of the flexibility of labour brought about obvious effects in the 
status of employees. It meant that the established practice of lifetime 
employment in Korean firms would no longer exist. The percentage of casual 
employees, including temporarily and daily hired employees, rose to 51.5% of 
the total employees in 1999 from 46.9% a year before (Kostat)
9
. It had 
gradually increased to 56% (8.8 million) in March 2007. The average annual 
salary of these casual workers was less than 50% of that of permanent 
employees (Hankyoreh, 15 Jun. 2010). 
 
 
2.5. The Shift of Power Relations 
 
Korea took the road of democratization from 1987 thanks to the tenacious 
resistance of the people against an authoritarian government. It was, the 
political scientists argue, a „transformation through the compromise‟ in which 
the ruling militarists and the dissidents agreed on competitive coexistence, i.e. 
the „second best solution‟. The compromise, including direct election for the 
Presidency and freedom of the press, was thus an outcome of a „balance of 
power‟ (Im H-B 1994: 249; see Choi J-J 1996 also). 
 
It is important to note that democratization in Korea was also a watershed for 
the liberalization of the Korean economy away from state intrusion. In this 
                                           
9
 Statistics Korea (http://kostat.go.kr/portal/korea/index.action, retrieved 12 Jan. 2010). 
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sense, the democratization should be understood as a „dual-liberalization‟ of 
both the political and the economic system (Cho H-Y, Kim D-C and Oh Y-S 
2009: 35). 
 
Contest and symbiosis between power brokers  
 
The ten years between democratization in 1987 and the economic crisis in 1997 
in Korea were characterized by contests and alliances between civil groups 
(including the labour), the corporate world, and the state. But, with the rise of 
the discourse of neo-liberal globalization, especially after the economic crisis, 
the power balance gradually tilted toward business. 
 
After democratization, the force of civil society groups had advanced; 
particularly notable was with the growth of the labour movement. Koreans 
experienced an unprecedented surge of labour disputes in 1987 and 1988, 
immediately after democratization. The disputes led to the organization of the 
labour movement, enhanced political awareness and active engagement in 
social and political issues by labour (Shin J-W 2004).  
 
The government and the business circles took a lenient position toward the 
labour movement for about two years after democratization. Through 
concessions from businesses circle, workers saw their wages increased 
considerably and welfare benefits enhanced during this period. These 
appeasement policies were possible because the state was forced to garner 
„democratic legitimacy‟ in the face of the people‟s aspiration for democracy. 
But, this would have been short-lived without the massive profit that Korean 
industries enjoyed thanks to the prolonged economic boom
10
 from 1987 to 
1989 (ibid: 232).  
 
                                           
10
 This economic boom was dubbed “Sam-Jer (three-low) prosperity” because the Korean 
economy enjoyed an especially favourable global business climate thanks to low oil prices, low 
global interest rates, and the low exchange rate (appreciation) of the Japanese yen. In particular, 
the drastic appreciation of the value of the yen after the Plaza Agreement in 1985 boosted the 
price competitiveness of Korean goods against Japanese goods in the global market, and this 
resulted in a surprising increase of Korean exports. 
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When the economic boom faded in the early 1990s, however, the government 
and business circle reverted to a reactionary position. For example, the 
government resuscitated the “wage guideline” to curb wage increases with the 
excuse that there was intensifying overseas competitive pressure. This hawkish 
posture was supported by the conservative turn of the political landscape, i.e. 
the political merger of the right-wing and liberal parties in early 1990 that gave 
the ruling party a comfortable majority in the parliament (ibid: 238-239). 
 
On the other hand, both business and the civil society shared the view that the 
state should refrain from arbitrary intervention in the economy and civil society. 
It was epitomized by the media jargon of “elimination of Kwanchi” 11 .  
Although both groups jointly challenged the state, their objectives were very 
different. Civil society group sought the democratic reform of the state 
apparatus lest it should be mobilized by the capitalists. But the business circles 
sought deregulation that would guarantee unbridled market freedom (Kim J-J 
2004). Ironically enough, business at the same time asked for decisive state 
intervention when it seemed to be to their advantage. For example, they kept 
asking for drastic measures to crack down on labour disputes. In the face of the 
combined pressure from both civil society and business, the state gradually 
withdrew from direct intervention in the economy. However, in line with the 
rise of business power, the bureaucrats increasingly sided with business, taking 
hawkish stances toward the labour movement. 
 
On the other hand, as democracy and economic liberalization advanced, 
inconsistencies between the economic system, led by chaebols, and the 
principles of the free market have become apparent. The government and civil 
society groups shared the idea that it was necessary to reform the pre-modern 
chaebols system. Each government, at the beginning of the President‟s term, 
made an effort to do so. The Kim Dae-joong
12
 and Roh Moo-hyun
13
 
                                           
11
 Kwanchi,meaning “rule by the bureaucrats” in Korean, refers to the general practices of 
directive intervention by state bureaucrats in the matters of, especially, the appointment of 
CEOs in financial institutions and quasi-public corporations. 
12
 the 15
th
 President, from February 1998 to February 2003. 
13
 the 16
th
 President , from February 2003 to February 2008. 
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governments, especially, tried to make use of „rival forces‟ -- the financial 
capitalists of Anglo-American shareholder capitalism -- in order to reform the 
chaebols system (Kim K and Park S-S 1998: 383). 
 
But the attempts of the „reformist liberals‟ faced tenacious resistance from the 
chaebols. As a result, most of the policies failed (Kim S-J 1998). When the 
proposed reform policies seemed to be unfavorable to them, the corporate world 
mounted massive opposition. They mobilized pro-business organizations and 
lobbies in order to dissuade the lawmakers from passing the reformist bills. The 
media outlets that were under the influence of business generated massive 
ideological assaults on the reformists. The chaebols claimed the reform 
measures to be unreasonable regulation. They even criticized the minimal 
industrial policy and fair trade regulation as market interference (Lee B-S 2006). 
 
Business hegemony after the economic crisis 
 
The structural reform guided by the “Washington Consensus” has considerably 
changed the balance between civil society group and business. The neo-liberal 
transformation has further empowered capital, while weakening labour. The 
globalized market has provided business with an enhanced sense of mobility. 
Their discretion in investment and employment were the origin of power. The 
emblematic sign of the power shift was the submissive remark of President Roh 
Moo-hyun in 2005 that „power already seems to have shifted to the market‟ 
(Pressian, 17 May 2005). 
 
The foreign financial capitalists and global transnational corporations (TNCs) 
have made full use of the favourable treatment from the government. For 4-5 
years after the crisis, the foreign financial institutions had overpowered the 
Korean financial market, mobilizing so-called “advanced financial crafts”. With 
the rise of the global-national expert networks, including legal advisors, fund 
managers and policy-makers, Koreans witnessed that astronomical amounts of 
national wealth were swiftly drained into the hands of the foreign alternative 
investment funds like private equity funds (PEFs) or hedge funds. 
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As the influence of the financial market on the management of firms increased 
after the crisis, the corporations became cautious about their investment 
decisions. The priority of the management of firms has changed from the 
maximization of market share (growth) to the maximization of shareholder 
value (short term profit). As a consequence, restructuring and reduction of 
employees became a daily routine of the management, in order to curtail 
expenses. This change has resulted in chronic under-investment and a high rate 
of unemployment. 
 
When the economic crisis broke out, the chaebols were named by the IMF and 
the economists as major culprits. Out of the thirty largest chaebols, almost one 
half were dismantled after the crisis due to financial problems. But the chaebols 
that survived the crisis were able to increase their size and consolidate their 
influence. The total assets of the eight largest chaebols accounted for 45.9% of 
GDP in 1996, just before the crisis. This ratio rose to 60.0% in 2000 and then 
reduced slightly, to 53.2% in 2005 (Solidarity for Economic Reform 2006). 
Notably, Samsung, the biggest of the chaebols, grew to be a matchless „super 
chaebol‟ thanks to the brilliant performance of its flagship affiliate, Samsung 
Electronics (Choi J-J 2005: 271). Samsung‟s total sales have increased from 
12.6% of GDP in 1996 to 17.5% in 2000, and then accounted for 15.8% in 2002. 
Its added-value production has also hiked from 1.8% of GDP in 1996 to 3.3% in 
2000 (Cho H-Y 2009:128). 
 
The structural reform of the economy has decisively empowered the chaebols‟ 
discretion over investment and employment, which were the „two main props of 
the capitalists‟ power‟ (Yoo C-K 2009: 59). The rise of unemployment and of 
casual labour after the adoption of labour market flexibility has weakened the 
bargaining power of labour in both the labour market and the production line. 
This was evident from the considerable decrease in organized labour, especially 
in small and medium sized companies, in which union representation was the 
weakest. The influence of business, based on their investment discretion, was 
fully augmented by the recurrent economic slump and ever-increasing 
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unemployment, especially among the younger generation. 
 
Also, the enlarged chaebols have increased their influence by mobilizing 
resources, such as their official-unofficial participation in the policy making 
bodies; their extensive elite network which was elaborately cultivated for 
lobbying; and their ideological leverage through the think-tanks and their 
affiliated media. In the policy-making tug-of-war, increasingly many decisions 
of the government and parliament were imprinted with the chaebols‟ interests. 
The government went so far as to depend on the chaebols to draft its major 
policy agendas and programmes. 
 
The state has gladly accommodated the requests of the business circles because 
it believed that was the “royal road” for robust economic growth and 
employment. The politicians and bureaucrats looked upon themselves as 
“promoters” of business activities, at the expense of such collective values as 
social welfare and solidarity. As a logical consequence, the “business friendly” 
government has relied heavily on the chaebols to deliver its supreme objective 
of economic growth, while discarding its duty to reform the economic 
backwardness rooted in the chaebol system. It became clearer, around the mid-
2000s, that the chaebols were „no longer a sub-partner‟ of the state. They had 
emerged as a dominant influence in the Korean economy and society (Choi J-J 
2005: 273). 
 
 
2.6 The Korean Media and Social Power Relations 
 
Since the late 17
th
 century, the idea of a free press has often been grafted on to 
the idea of a market-based media. Decentralized market competition was 
perceived as a vital antidote to political despotism. This line of thought is still 
prevalent within the argument for deregulation of the industry influenced by the 
neo-liberal policy paradigm (Freedman 2008). But the British political scientist 
John Keane (1991: 46) indicates that the idea of the free market has failed to 
guarantee the freedom of the press, let alone equality of communication. There 
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are „inevitable tensions within markets between the free choices of investors 
and property owners and the freedom of choice of citizens‟. He continues that 
market liberalism of the press is usually „spoiled by its fetish of market 
competition, which always produces market censorship‟ (ibid: xi). 
 
Along with the democratization of the Korean political system, the key word 
that defines the Korean media has rapidly changed from “the state” to “the 
market”. Before democratization, Korean media was strongly controlled by 
authoritarian governments. The Park Jung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan 
governments, which placed supreme importance on economic development, 
made use of the press and broadcasting as „a mouthpiece of government policy‟ 
through the use of „carrots and sticks‟ along with „co-option of journalists‟ (Lee 
W-R 2004: 19). Market competition, such as new entry and enlargement of 
capacity, was so strictly regulated by the government that the media industry 
could enjoy the “peace of oligopoly.” This system was categorized as a „state 
guardianship‟ which was characterized by a symbiotic relationship of 
„preference-loyalty‟, and „suppression-obedience‟, between the sate and the 
media (Park S-K and Chang K-S 2001: 60). 
 
In this sense, the freedom of the press was raised by the leaders of the people‟s 
demonstration as an indispensable milestone for the democratization of Korean 
society. From 1987, governments abandoned direct intervention in the media, 
and have liberalized the industry by lifting regulations. This change was guided 
by the ideal of a free press by which „error is exposed and the truth arrived at‟ 
(Watson 2003: 101) and marked by the „active introduction of the market 
principle into the media industry‟ (Yang S-M 1995: 113). With the lowering of 
entry barriers, several media companies, including the progressive daily 
Hankyoreh and commercial T.V. station SBS, had been established by the early 
1990s.  
 
However, it has again been observed that the freedom of the press is one thing; 
the equality of communication is another. The intensifying market competition 
has led to the partitioning of media space, suffocating the plurality of opinion, 
27 
 
by small numbers of conservative media outlets with huge capital power. The 
personal influence and the commercial censorship of the media barons and the 
advertisers quickly filled the void of intervention by the government (You H-H 
1993; Cho S-H 2002). What is heard increasingly loudly is the claim that there 
is a „crisis of journalism‟, with the phenomenon that the powerful media have 
colonized society and politics; capital becomes insulated from this media 
coverage; the professionalism of journalists has become degraded (Sohn S-C 
2006: 53). 
 
The crisis of journalism can be explained in terms of various phenomena, 
including the crisis of trust in media outputs. More and more audiences in 
Korea think media outputs are no longer truthful and fair. In an audience survey 
in 2004, 32.2% of the respondents answered that they did not trust media 
outputs. And 46.7% of the respondents replied that they did not think the media 
were impartial (Korea Press Foundation 2004). Also, in a survey of journalists 
in 2006, 45% of the respondents did not think that any of the media were 
trustworthy (Korea Association of Journalist 2006).  
 
The economy: a forbidden ground 
 
Along the way, capital has become increasingly insulated from the politically 
powerful media‟s scrutiny. As the media rely more on the chaebols for their 
advertisement revenues, journalists cannot help mobilizing a self-censoring 
mechanism for the benefit of the big advertisers. The Korean media, especially 
newspapers, are under constant pressure to find potential advertisers. Because 
of their extravagant marketing system
14
, Korean newspapers are highly reliant 
on advertising revenues. As of 2005, advertising revenue accounted for 63.4 % 
of the total revenue while subscription revenue was 15.9% (Newspaper and 
Broadcasting, Oct. 2005). In this regard, „it is of the utmost importance to make 
their news content appealing to those who have high purchasing power‟ (Lee B-
                                           
14 More than 85% of the newspaper circulation in Korea is home delivery. The sales from 
newsstands are negligible. It costs newspaper companies a huge amount of money to maintain 
their own nationwide delivery system. 
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S 2006: 75). Particularly, after the Korean economic crisis in 1997, when most 
of the media had to strive to survive, „the critical edge of the newspapers in 
relation to the misdeeds of the Chaebols became considerably blunted‟ (Lee J-R 
2008: 10).  
 
The political factionalism, together with their subordination to capital, is 
driving the Korean media towards the role of aggravator, rather than healer, of 
social conflict. For example, the Korean media have not maintained a balance 
or minimum impartiality in their coverage of labour-capital relationships, which 
is a critical element for the progress of democracy in a country with a capitalist 
economic system (Son S-C 2006). 
 
The professionalism of journalists can be an antidote to the degradation of 
journalism. Indeed, the struggles for independent editorials by the labour union 
of broadcasting journalists since the early 1990s considerably helped to enhance 
the truthfulness and impartiality of the two public service channels –KBS and 
MBC. But the idea of public service has increasingly been abandoned due to the 
pressure of market competition (Newspaper and Broadcasting, Jun. 2007: 60). 
The situation of the press journalists is even worse. Many of the press 
journalists have become merely „wage earners‟ who „put the interest of their 
companies ahead of the responsibility and ethics of the journalist‟ (ibid). 
 
Still, the thriving audience activism and the advance of the new media in Korea 
have created greater potential for a more plural and accountable media. In 
particular, the rapid development of new types of journalism based on the 
internet have helped the mushrooming of the „critical discursive public‟ who 
enjoy expressing themselves on the web and who put pressure on the 
mainstream media to become more accountable (Lee J-W 2005: 31). There have 
been several cases in Korea where so-called “netizen” (i.e. net citizens) have 
readily overturned the conservative framing of the mainstream media, for 
example during the row over the import of American beef in 2008 as explained 
below. 
 
29 
 
When the newly elected president Lee Myung-bak accepted America‟s demands 
and lifted the ban on importing American beef, small numbers of Korean people 
started to rally a demonstration against this decision. But, the dissidents actively 
utilized the highly connected infrastructure in Korea not only by sharing the 
information and opinions about the danger of “mad cow diseases”, but also by 
organizing rallies. The people‟s struggle continued for more than 2 months and 
the participants swelled, eventually, to almost 1 million. President Lee could not 
help but apologize for his hasty decision and he promised to negotiate again 
with America. Throughout the people‟s struggle, the three mainstream 
newspapers which sided with President Lee, Chosun, ChoongAng and DongA, 
were severely criticized by the “netizens” and had to witness a lot of their 
advertisers cancelling their advertisement for fear of reproaches from the 
“netizens” (Kyunghyang, 19 Jun. 2008).  
 
However, it is too early to say that the internet might become a forum for a 
participatory “e-democracy” because the new media are still an emerging field 
and the internet, especially the portal site as a medium, is also „considerably 
immersed in the logic of commercialism‟ (Newspaper and Broadcasting, Jun. 
2007: 60). 
 
 
2.7 The Social Consequence of the Neo-liberal Turn 
 
Many Koreans understand that the ten years between 1987 and 1997 was the 
“golden age” during which the living conditions of common people improved 
considerably thanks to the increases in wage, the reduction of working hours 
and promotion of welfare. Although there were many clashes between civil 
groups, business circles and bureaucrats, people‟s power overwhelmed the 
forces that tried to restrict democracy in its egalitarian sense (Cho H-Y 2009).  
 
Workers‟ wage as part of the national income at factor cost gradually increased 
to 58.7% in 1991 from 52.3% in 1986. And this ratio reached its peak in 1996 
with 63.4%, signifying that the labour movement, after democratization, helped 
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to increase the worker‟s share of the country‟s economic resources (Kim J-W 
2005: 65). The equity of the distribution of income also improved during this 
period. In 1988, the income of the lower 40% bracket accounted for 19.68% of 
the total income of Korea. That ratio had increased to 21.68% in 1996, while 
that of the upper 20% was reduced from 42.2% to 38.01% during the period. 
The Gini coefficient, a common measure of equity in a society, was 0.295 in 
1990, but, it decreased to 0.283 in 1997. All in all, by the mid 1990s, Korea had 
a relatively equitable income distribution (Yoon S-W 2009: 218). 
 
However, the diffusion of neo-liberal policy ideas and the consolidation of the 
economic power after the economic crisis led to the degradation of the standard 
of living. Table 2-1 shows the income disparity measured by the Gini 
coefficient and the 5th quintile over the 1st quintile (among household incomes 
of salaried employees living in the urban areas, except for agricultural and 
fishery employees). As shown in the table, income disparities had gradually 
reduced after the democratization but they sharply worsened after the economic 
crisis in 1997. The Gini coefficient has also jumped from 0.283 in 1997 to 
0.316 in 1998 and has stayed at a similar level since. The disparity between the 
5
th
 quintile and 1
st
 quintile also widened from 4.49 in 1997 to 5.41 in 1998 and 
to 5.43 in 2005.  
 
Reflecting the widening income disparity, one out of five Koreans thought that 
he/she was relatively poor. In effect, the relative poverty rate
15
 decreased from 
15.01% in 1999 to 13.63% in 2002. But it has rapidly risen again to 15.71% in 
2004, 15.97% in 2005, and 16.42% in 2006 (KiHASA-KLI
16
, Yeonhap 1 Nov. 
2007). One notable aspect of the poverty rate was that increasingly many 
employees were classified as poor. The classification of „working poor‟ (Yoon 
S-W 2009: 220) -- who had a job but could not escape poverty -- accounted for 
57.4% of the total classification of „poor‟ in 2005 (Yeonhap 1 Nov. 2007). A 
survey shows that 70% of employees regard themselves as “working poor” 
because they could hardly make ends with their salaries, never mind saving 
                                           
15
 The percentage of the population who earn less than 50% of the average income. 
16
 KiHASA-KLI homepage (http://www.kihasa.re.kr/html/jsp/, retrieved 3 Dec. 2009). 
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money (Maeil Business Newspaper, 5 Aug. 2009). The increase of this poor 
people can be attributed to the rapid increase in the number of casual employees 
after the introduction of the flexibility of labour (Yoon S-W 2009). 
 
Table 2-1: The Income Distribution Index from 1990 to 2006  
 
Year Gini coefficient The 5
th
 quintile over the 1
st
 quintile 
1990 0.295 4.64 
1991 0.287 4.46 
1992 0.284 4.42 
1993 0.281 4.35 
1994 0.284 4.42 
1995 0.284 4.42 
1996 0.291 4.63 
1997 0.283 4.49 
1998 0.316 5.41 
1999 0.320 5.49 
2000 0.317 5.32 
2001 0.319 5.36 
2002 0.312 5.18 
2003 0.306 5.22 
2004 0.310 5.41 
2005 0.310 5.43 
2006 0.310 5.38 
                                         (Kosis; Yoon S-W 2009: 218) 
 
Along with rising income inequality, the rapid hike of property prices as a result 
of the inflation of global currency has reinforced the accepted notion that “the 
rich get richer and the poor get poorer” in Korea. The real estate speculation 
and equity investment boom during the period have widened the gap between 
property owners and non-property owners. The government survey in 2005 
showed that the upper 1% of Koreans possessed 51.5% of all private land. And 
the ownership of land of the upper 5% has sharply increased to 82.7% of all 
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private land, from 65.2% in 1986 (Munhwa, 15 Jul. 2005). Also, the upper 5% 
of Koreans had 50.1% of all financial properties and the upper 10% possessed 
66.5% of them in 2008 (Kyunghyang, 22 Oct. 2009). 
 
This widening disparity in income and property, combined, has considerably 
dampened the dynamics of upward class mobility. The abolition of lifetime 
employment and reduction in seniority system have undermined the 
foundations of the middle class and led many of them become part of the lower 
class. According to Kim Jun-kyong and Choi Paul (2008), the middle class
17
 
has shrunk from 68.5% in 1996 to 58.5% in 2006. This is not because the 
middle class became rich, but because many of them became poor. This social 
change has raised concerns about the arrival of the “20:80 society” (Martin and 
Schumann 1997). 
 
There have been various signs that this disparity, combined with social and 
cultural factors like education, marriage and residential districts, have led to the 
„structuring‟ of a „closed class‟ with high entry barriers (Kim D-C 2009: 114). 
As the competition among students in order to enter prestige Universities 
intensified, the unbridgeable lifetime income gap is developing between the 
higher classes and lower classes. The affluence of parents increasingly 
determined their children‟s result in the university entrance examination, 
because expensive private tutoring relates directly to successful school 
performance. According to the Bank of Korea, in 2008, the households with 
high incomes (those earning 150% or more of the average income) spent 12 
times more money on private tutoring than the low income households (those 
earning 50% or less of the average income) (Hankyoreh, 14 Apr. 2009).  
 
Indeed, each government has tried to narrow the disparity by introducing or 
developing social policies. For example, the Kim Dae-jung government aimed 
to raise the standard of Korean social welfare a notch higher by carrying out 
                                           
17
The households that earn 50%-150% of average household income in terms of their disposable 
incomes. And the upper class means the households that earn more than 150% of average 
household income while the lower class comprises households that earn less than 50% of the 
average household income. 
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sweeping reform measures. However, these efforts were not successful in 
easing inequity, not only because most of the welfare policies were based on the 
„residual‟ approach, but also because governments were, in effect, reluctant to 
increase welfare expenditure sufficiently (Yoon S-W 2009: 231). The welfare 
budget of Korea was 8.3% of GDP in 2008, as shown in Table 2-2. This was 
less than half of the average welfare expenditures of the OECD countries. This 
was the reason why some researchers classified Korea as a „non-welfare state‟ 
(Ibid: 228). 
 
Table2-2: Public Expenditure for Welfare among GDP        
                                                  (Year 2008), (%) 
                                   (Ko K-W 2009, Hankyoreh 12 Feb. 2010) 
 
While the per capita GDP of Koreans reached $20,000 in 2007 (Seoul, 31 Mar. 
2011), it is an irony that more and more people are worried about the ever-
worsening living conditions. The alarming evidences of these hardships are that 
the working hours of Koreans are the longest, the rate of suicide is the highest 
and the birth rate is the lowest among the OECD countries (Herald Economy, 
27 May 2010). 
 
 
2.8 Neo-liberal Democracy 
 
The growing demands for both political democratization and economic 
liberalization generated mutually supportive effects in 1980s and 1990s (Ha Y-S 
2003). The aspiration for democracy stemming from the aversion to state 
despotism yielded the public sentiment that the market would be friendly to 
democracy by nature. The market mechanism, it was thought, would be the 
perfect when the transactions were free from the arbitrary intervention of the 
state. In effect, people identified „economic liberalization with democratization‟ 
Korea U.S Japan Norway Germany France Sweden 
Average of 
OECD 
8.3 15.9 18.6 21.6 26.7 29.2 29.4 20.6 
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(Lee Y-H and Kim H-R 2000: 121).  
 
However, the “paradox” of Korean politics after democratization was the 
widening gap between institutional democracy and substantial democracy, in 
other words, political democracy and economic democracy (Choi J-J 2005; 
Choi J-J, Park C-P and Park S-H 2007; Cho H-Y, Park E-H and Lee H-K 2009). 
The achievement of institutional democracy did not automatically guarantee the 
improvement of the living conditions of the people. The widening income 
inequity, crumbling job security and the diminishing hopes for upward class 
mobility have made people ask what democratization was for. 
 
This discrepancy should be attributed to the neo-liberalization of the Korean 
economy and society that the fledgling democracy had to face from the early 
1990s. The impact of the globalizing market, especially after the economic 
crisis in 1997, consolidated the socio-economic monopolies, including those of 
the chaebols, global financial capital and Korean bureaucratic. The economic 
power eventually combined the political and social influences with it and 
prevented the development of democracy from including social rights.  
 
Korean politics after democratization was distinguished by its detachment from 
the public. While formal democracy advanced, political debate was not 
responsive to the needs of the public (Choi J-J 2005). Organized labour, which 
was the stronghold of the democratic forces, was systematically excluded from 
the political process. The parties, which were the political arbitrators of social 
conflicts, fell into malfunction because of their narrow and callous ideological 
stances resulting from the division of the Korean peninsula (ibid). The media, 
which played its part in the struggle for democratization, gave up its role as a 
watch dog in the face of the emerging economic power. 
 
In particular, it was puzzling that the neo-liberal transformation and 
concomitant degradation of people‟s living conditions was notable during the 
Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun governments, as these came to power thanks 
to the aspirations of people for substantial democracy as well as formal 
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democracy. When President Kim Dae-jung, the Nobel peace prize winner in 
2000, proclaimed that his government would pursue the “democratic market 
economy” in which democracy and a market economy develop together in 
harmony (Kim D-J 1998), many people paid tribute to his insight into the 
principal contradictions in Korean society. But his ideal has been shattered in 
the face of the exigency of overcoming the economic crisis. Far from leading a 
harmonious development of both democracy and market economy, throughout 
his term and that of his successor Roh Moo-hyun, the substances of democracy 
has retreated. Meanwhile, the power of the market and the corporate world 
advanced in leaps and bounds (Choi J-J 2005; Cho H-Y 2009). 
 
The imbalance between formal democracy and substantial democracy is a 
widely noticed phenomenon among countries in Asia and Eastern Europe (Cho 
H-Y, Park E-H and Lee H-K 2009) which established themselves during 
„democratization‟s third wave‟ in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Huntington 
1991). This was in line with Robert Dahl‟s observation that „Democracy and 
market-capitalism are locked in a persistent conflict in which each modifies and 
limits the other‟ (2000: 173). Korean democracy -- that was not competent to 
improve the living conditions of the people -- was termed „a democracy 
remained in ruin‟ or „neo-liberal democracy‟ by political scientists (Choi J-J 
2005: 267). 
 
 
2.9 Conclusion 
 
Over the last three decades, Koreans have undergone a socio-economic 
transformation, which has been driven by both democratization and neo-liberal 
economic globalization. Both of these have proceeded in tandem with each 
other, while the ascendance of market liberalism increasingly calls into question 
the egalitarian expansion of democracy, which is basically bound to the nation 
state. In the meantime, the state silently let go of the levers which had been 
used to correct the monopolies and inequalities, which the market system 
generates. As a consequence, equality between the “haves” and the “have-nots” 
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deteriorated, undermining the social foundations of democracy. 
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„Polanyi‟s thesis on this point, however, has never been refuted: left to 
themselves, market forces will destroy society. It has always been the 
function of states to prevent this; but economic globalization has made 
states market-driven, rather than market-controllers, and left societies more 
fully exposed to market forces than ever before‟ (Colin Leys 2001:217). 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter locates the research agenda, i.e. the exploration of the “power 
value” of media, communication and culture in the downsized politics of 
hyperglobalization, in the theoretical terrain and draws out specific research 
questions to be explored. 
 
In order to understand the Korean “paradox of democracy” that has been 
discussed previously, this chapter examines the heightened tension between 
hyperglobalization and democratic politics that lies deep in the intrinsic rivalry 
between liberalism and democracy. Then the examination turns to the role of 
media, communication and culture in the market-driven politics that restricted 
the egalitarian expansion of democratic politics. The existing explanations were 
examined and evaluated in other to find loopholes that demand alternative or 
complementary explanations. Based on this theoretical consideration, the 
researcher could single out a few research areas and research questions. 
 
 
3.2 The Rivalry between Freedom and Equality 
 
3.2.1 Liberalism and Democracy  
 
Liberalism and democracy look like identical twins of modern progress, since 
we are familiar with the “liberal-democratic” or “democratic-liberal” polity as a 
regime of the present time. In reality, the reciprocal interdependency of the two 
is much more vague and complicated. Historical accounts show that liberalism 
and democracy have sometimes been friends, sometimes rivals, and at other 
39 
 
times awkward cohabitants. 
 
Liberalism envisages the expansion and emancipation of the private sphere in 
which the individual or civil society is free from interference from the public 
power, and particularly from the state.
18
 The two main spheres of emancipation 
have been „religion and spiritual matters generally‟ and „economic or material 
concerns‟. This reflects the establishment of liberal doctrine, which coincided 
with both the rise of the religiously neutral state and the burgeoning of 
bourgeois mercantile society that sought the free disposal of wealth and liberty 
of exchange (Bobbio 1990: 16-17). Understanding the state as a „necessary evil‟, 
liberals are interested in the demarcation of the “power” and the “function” of 
the state by means of the „rights-based state‟ (the limit of her power) and the 
„minimal state‟ (the limit of her function) (ibid: 11, 16).  
 
Democracy, on the other hand, stands for a „mode of government‟ in which 
power lies with everybody or with the majority rather than with a strong one or 
a few (ibid: 1). The ideal of democracy presupposes „politically equal‟ 
individuals who take part in the process of collective decision-making on the 
basis of democratic criteria such as „effective participation‟, „equality in voting‟, 
„gaining enlightened understanding‟, „exercising final control of agenda‟ and 
„inclusion of (all) adults‟ (Dahl 2000: 37-40). Despite its many flaws, Dahl, the 
American political scientist, argued that democracy can produce more desirable 
consequences for the people than any feasible alternatives, in terms of „avoiding 
tyranny‟, and promoting „essential rights‟, „general freedom‟, „self-
determination‟, „human development‟, „peace-seeking‟, „prosperity‟ and so on 
(ibid: 44-61). 
 
The principle of democracy was eloquently presented in the famous address of 
Abraham Lincoln when he claimed that: „government of the people, by the 
                                           
18
 The state denotes, in this thesis, „a very special type of association that is distinguishable by 
the extent to which it can secure compliance with its rules, among all those over whom it claims 
jurisdiction, by its superior means of coercion‟(Dahl 2000: 41). 
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people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth‟.19 Yet, historically, 
democracy has been interpreted in either one of two main senses, depending on 
the stress laid on it: the first is democracy as a „rule of the game‟ (by the people); 
the other is democracy as a harbinger of „the ideal of equality‟ (for the people). 
This distinction has been commonly transposed into a difference between 
„formal democracy‟ and „substantial democracy‟ (Bobbio 1990: 31-32).  
 
Democracy “for the people” embodies the „egalitarian ideals‟ (ibid: 54) that the 
government of the people should be of use in the achievement of political and 
socio-economic equality beyond the juridical-institutional formalization of 
democratic procedures. Accordingly, the pursuit of democracy turns into an 
„open-ended‟ project in which what denotes the substance of democracy varies 
throughout the „deepening of the democratic qualities of key arenas of life‟. In 
this latter sense, thus, „one of the goals of democracy always has to be more 
democracy‟ (Dryzek 1996: 3-5). 
 
The encounter of liberalism with democracy was by no means amicable from 
the outset. The liberal constitutional movement, from the era of Magna Carta, 
was not linked with democracy or polyarchy (Lindblom 1977). Liberal thinkers 
in modern times often considered that liberalism was antithetical to ancient 
democracy, a republic of demagogues. Since liberal egalitarian ideals are 
mutually incompatible („liberalism aut democracy‟), they believed, „democracy 
as progressive realization of the egalitarian ideal is attended by the danger of 
levelling‟, which results at length in despotism or the tyranny of the majority 
(Bobbio 1990: 49, 53). It was not strange that a lot of modern liberals, including 
Alexis de Tocqueville, were highly skeptical of all types of popular government 
(Held 1996). 
 
But politics over the previous three centuries showed that the threat has never 
been unilateral. Liberty was often usurped by unlimited, not necessarily 
                                           
19
 Gettysburg Address 
(http://myloc.gov/Exhibitions/lincoln/presidency/ComtmanderInChief/GettysburgAddress/Ex
hibitObjects/GettysburgAddress.aspx , retrieved 1 September 2010). 
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democratic, power, while democracy was again and again taken over by a 
power without public accountability. Having alternated between these 
predicaments, the „hostile twins, liberalism and democracy, of necessity became 
allies‟ (Bobbio 1990: 90). No longer does liberalism look incompatible with 
democracy („liberalism vel democracy‟), while modern democracy can be seen 
as „the natural extension of liberalism‟ („liberalism et democracy‟) (ibid: 37, 49). 
Today, only those liberal-democratic states in which liberal ideals and 
democratic procedures are intertwined enjoy political endurance. 
 
This is not, however, to say that the cohabitation is harmonious all the time. 
Since the late eighteenth century, liberalism has been supportive of democracy 
inasmuch as it has been „instrumental‟ to the enhancement of the right to liberty 
(Lindblom 1977: 163). Historically, the formation of the liberal state was 
associated more with democracy in its procedural (judicial-institutional) than its 
substantial (egalitarian) sense. When democracy is conceived in its egalitarian 
sense, the relation between liberalism and democracy becomes antithetical, as it 
resolves itself into a much acuter problem, i.e. liberty or equality. 
 
In the economic sphere, especially, liberalism and egalitarianism plainly reveal 
their deep-rooted incompatibility, arising partly from very dissimilar 
conceptions of man and society. It is a truism that „neither can be fully realized 
except at the expense of the other: a liberal laissez-faire society is inevitably 
inegalitarian, and an egalitarian society is inevitably illiberal‟ (Bobbio 1990: 32-
33). Contrasting judgments are made upon the two different understandings of 
liberty, which are usually termed „negative liberty‟ and „positive liberty‟, 
depending on historical situations, but „depending above all on the social 
position of the judge; those who are well-placed usually favour the former, 
those lower in the social scale usually opt for the latter‟ (Ibid: 2, 89). In this 
regard, democracy and laissez-faire liberalism are „locked in a persistent 
conflict in which each modifies and limits the other‟ (Dahl 2000: 173). 
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3.2.2 Market, state and democratic politics 
 
The market and the state are the two main institutions through which resources 
and income are allocated and distributed (Przeworski 2003). The market exists 
in the capitalist economy because private property is located outside political 
authority. And the principles of operation of the two are quite different. The 
market works on the principle of “one pound, one vote”, while the democratic 
state stands on the principle of “one person, one vote” (Polanyi 2001[1944]). In 
these decentralized and centralized distribution mechanisms, individuals are at 
the same time market agents and citizens (Austen-Smith et al. 2008). In a 
variety of ways, both markets and states can be organized and combined, and 
they jointly determine what the economy produces as well as who gets what 
(Przeworski 2003). 
 
Liberals usually interpret the market as a „self-regulating‟ mechanism. But the 
market economy is by no means autonomous; it is „embedded‟ in politics, 
religion and social relations. At the very least, market transactions cannot exist 
without trust, mutual understanding and the legal enforcement of contracts 
(Polanyi 2001[1944]: xxiv, 35). From this comes the justification that the 
essential role of the modern capitalist state is to remedy the inequality that the 
market system inevitably generates. The consequence of and reaction to the 
expansion of the market was epitomized by Karl Polanyi (ibid: xxvii) as a term 
of „double-movement‟. In brief, all market systems generate inequalities, but 
the harshness of the market is eased by „redistributions of money and resources 
authorized by the democratic state‟. And it is politics that determines the scale 
and nature of these „social transfers‟ (Curran 2006:143; see also Chang H-J 
2010: 261-262).  
 
Market-capitalism has existed in both democratic and authoritarian states. There 
seems to be no correlation between the economic growth of a country and its 
types of government or regime (Przeworski and Limongi 1993). And the 
authoritarian state may also effectively cure the harmful effects of the market. 
But the democratic state is generally believed to be more egalitarian because it 
43 
 
is more sensitive to the political demands of the general public. After having 
experienced Fascism and Nazism, the postwar peace enhanced optimism about 
the harmonious cohabitation between market capitalism and democratic politics. 
The „polyarchy‟, for pluralists, is an acceptable regime where there exists 
„multiple power centers, diverse and fragmented interests, the marked 
propensity of one group to offset the power of another, a “transcendent” 
consensus which binds state and society, the state as judge and arbitrator 
between frictions‟ (Held 1996: 208). Though the polyarchy may be an 
„extremely rough approximation‟ to a fully democratized system (Lindblom 
1977: 233), it is the „real world system that is closest to‟ it (Dahl 1971: 8). 
 
The market as a prison  
 
The escalation of tension and conflict throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, 
however, has dismantled the premises of classic pluralism. Robert Dahl and 
Charles Lindblom, now neo-pluralists, admitted that, „against the background of 
capitalist market system, the pluralist game is always biased in favor of 
business interests‟ (Dryzek 1996: 65). Lindblom (1977: 172-173) pointed out 
that the imperative, that the state should maintain economic growth and stability, 
provides businessmen who have discretion in investment with a structurally 
privileged position. The businessmen „are taken off the agenda of government‟ 
and exercise a „public function‟, while „a major function of government, 
therefore, is to see to it that businessmen perform their tasks‟. In a similar vein, 
Claus Offe, a neo-Marxist thinker, argues that the state tends to have an 
„institutional self-interest to safeguard the vitality of the capitalist economy‟ 
(Offe 1984, in Held 1996: 223). 
 
Due to these structural constraints, Dahl (1985: 60) suggests that the modern 
system of „corporate capitalism‟ is liable to generate „inequalities in social and 
economic resources so great as to bring about severe violation of political 
equality and hence of democratic process‟. He admits that „market-capitalism 
greatly favours the development of democracy up to the level of polyarchal 
democracy‟ (Dahl 2000: 178). In other words, capitalism‟s blessings for 
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democracy beyond the level of polyarchy are „at best mixed and at worst 
negative‟ because of its adverse consequences for political equality (Dryzek 
1996: 25). This is why Lindblom likens the market to a „prison‟ which punishes 
nonconformists. 
 
„For a broad category of political/economic affairs, it imprisons policy 
making, and imprisons our attempts to improve our institutions. It greatly 
cripples our attempts to improve the social world because it afflicts us with 
sluggish economic performance and unemployment simply because we begin 
to debate or undertake reform‟ (Lindblom 1982: 329). 
 
Although theory on democracy is in a state of continuous change, there seems 
to be a consensus between various thinkers, including neo-pluralists and neo-
Marxists, that „democratic life is unacceptably impaired by private economic 
power‟. When the market is “disembedded” from social relations and it 
subordinates society to its logic, then the „satanic mill‟ grinds all social relations 
into „demolition‟ and ever growing inequality (Polanyi 2001[1944]: xxiv, 35). 
In this sense, if liberty was menaced in any countries, the threat comes from too 
little equality, not from too much. According to Robert Dahl (1985: 44, 46), 
democracy requires a „widespread sense of relative economic well-being, 
fairness, and opportunity‟. A diminution of this sense in a society has „often 
helped to fragment or polarized the citizenry into hostile camps, to weaken 
confidence in democratic institutions, and to generate support for dictatorship‟. 
 
 
3.3 Hyperglobalization and the Shrinking of Democratic Politics 
 
3.3.1 Is globalization inevitable? 
 
Many people nowadays perceive globalization as the „in here phenomenon‟ 
where the world is fast becoming a shared economic and social space (Giddens 
1990: 12). But globalization is still a notoriously contentious research area. 
Researchers have variously defined globalization by emphasizing respectively 
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its material, spatiotemporal and cognitive aspects. Nonetheless, what they have 
in common is the idea that globalization is „a process promoted by, and 
resulting in, increasing cross border flows of goods, services, people, money, 
information and culture‟ (Held et al. 1999: 16). One crucial feature of 
globalization is the accelerating interdependence where „states and societies 
become increasingly enmeshed in worldwide systems and networks of 
interaction‟ (Held and McGrew 2003: 3). 
 
Although there are significant differences between scholars on the extent and 
nature of this change, most now agree that changes of an unprecedented scale 
and extent are indeed happening and that this „deep globalization‟, or 
„hyperglobalization‟ (Rodrik 2011: 188-189), has the potential to transform the 
nature of the world (Guillen 2001). Yet, despite the insistence of some hyper-
globalists or determinists that the spread of technology and markets is driving 
the change, this does not mean that contemporary globalization is inevitable or 
irresistible. Nor is the process harmonious or inscribed with a certain 
„preordained logic which presumes a singular historical trajectory‟ (Held and 
McGrew 2003: 7). Instead, globalization can be defined as a fragmented, 
incomplete, discontinuous, contingent and in many ways contradictory and 
puzzling process (Gilpin 2000: 294; Held et al. 1999: 431).  
 
Globalization is a multidimensional process, but its economic dimension is the 
most conspicuous one. Thus, some argue that it may be better understood as an 
aspect of capitalist development, especially in its „imperialist phase‟ (Sparks 
2007: 152). Economic globalization can be defined as „the emergence and 
operation of a single, worldwide economy‟ (Grieco and Ikenberry 2002, in 
McGrew 2005: 209). This transformation may be clear in the formation of 
global markets, production networks, a global division of labour, intensifying 
business competition and a global system of economic regulation and 
management. Finance may be the most notable area of economic globalization. 
So deeply does finance „pervade the operation and management of all modern 
economies‟ that it ushers in „a new epoch of financial capitalism‟ (McGrew 
2005: 213). 
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Over the past generation, „the opening and integration of the market 
undoubtedly has been made possible by the political intervention of networks of 
actors known as the Wall Street-Treasury-IMF complex or Washington 
consensus‟ (Callinicos 2005: 64). For some researchers, the neo-liberal market 
regime is part of a hegemonic project designed to shift power and wealth to  
elite groups around the world and to benefit, especially, U.S. capital. To 
elaborate, „cotemporary economic globalization has an underlying political 
logic insofar as it is the product of political ideology, national or international 
public policy, the interests and interactions between states, global institutions, 
and global social forces‟ (McGrew 2005: 224). Here, the ideas and strategic 
actions of agents emerge as a critical parameter for the configuration of 
economic globalization. 
 
3.3.2 Neo-liberalism: a leading spirit of hyperglobalization 
 
Neo-liberalism has been the central guiding principle of economic globalization. 
Born in the second half of the 1970s, with the crisis of the Bretton Woods 
system and the Keynesian compromise, the neo-liberal idea gained substantial 
ground with the election of Margaret Thatcher in 1979 and Ronald Reagan in 
1980. For almost 30 years, the application of neo-liberal policy ideas has 
expended within the economies of industrialised and developing countries 
(Palley 2005). 
 
Neo-liberalism proposes, in the first instance, that „human well-being can be 
best advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedom and skills within 
an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free 
markets, and free trade‟ (Harvey 2005: 2). In this theory, market is supposed to 
be a self-regulating and optimal social institution. Thus, if markets are allowed 
to function without restraint, this will efficiently utilise all economic resources 
and automatically serve all economic needs, especially full employment. In a 
similar vein, globalization is presented as the best way to extend these benefits 
to the whole world through the upholding of free trade among states (Shaikh 
47 
 
2005). 
 
From this point of view, most modern socio-economic problems, such as 
unemployment, poverty and periodic economic crises, are ascribed to the 
imperfect functioning of the market. Logically, any social institutions and 
practices which are thought to constrain markets are doomed to undergo 
structural adjustments. The general policy outcomes comprise the weakening of 
labour, reducing the state‟s role in relation to social welfare, and the 
liberalization of economic activity by means of privatization and deregulation 
(Saad-Philho and Johnson 2005).  
 
Neo-liberalism is based on the quite „asocial social vision‟ of modern neo-
classical economics „with its imagined world of atomized, isolated, satisfaction-
seeking, strategizing individuals‟ (Othman and Kessler 2001: 130-131). Even 
though this moral model of neo-liberalism is abstract and impersonal in 
appearance, this does not mean that its effect is also impartial or neutral. On the 
contrary, when applied to unequal situations, formally impartial value systems 
generate unequal impacts and consequences. This moral code „systematically 
favours individuals who are already advantageously placed, while its formal 
impartiality disguises the way it operates and its inequality-intensifying nature‟ 
(ibid: 135).  
 
What makes matters more complex is that sometimes neo-liberalism looks like 
a promoter of democracy. For example, when the political process is dictatorial, 
highly corrupt or when the elites in the society make use of regulation to protect 
their wealth and privileges, the deregulation of the market may be welcomed as 
a vanguard of democracy. Although political and financial powers are the main 
driving forces, the implementation of neo-liberal programmes has also been 
achieved because of the relative appeal of neo-liberalism, when society has 
been presented with the choice „between traditional (i.e. undemocratic, often 
corrupt) state control of economic activity and the market‟ (ibid: 175). 
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3.3.3 The “trilemma” in the age of hyperglobalization 
 
Arguably, the most significant impact of hyperglobalization is that it generates a 
shift in power relations among social actors. Globalisation reshapes the 
configuration of social forces within a nation state and across them such that the 
„key sites of power and those who are subject to them are literally oceans apart‟ 
(Held et al. 1999; Held and McGrew 2003). Susan Strange (1996: 189) 
indicates that there are three types of power shifts in the globalizing world: 
„from weak to strong state, from state to markets, and from labour market to 
financial markets‟.  
 
This changing landscape of power raises an issue of popular sovereignty, since 
transnational forces undermine the autonomy, capacity, and sovereignty of the 
nation state which is the traditional domain of democracy (Leys 2001; Hay 
2005). In order to manage these tensions between national democracy and the 
global market, according to Dani Rodrik (2011: 200, emphasis in original), 
there are three options: „restrict democracy in the interest of minimizing 
international transaction cost‟; „limit globalization, in the hope of building 
democratic legitimacy at home‟; or „globalize democracy, at the cost of national 
sovereignty‟. The „trilemma‟ is that we can only have two out of three: „we 
cannot have hyperglobalization, democracy and national self-determination all 
at once‟.  
 
There have been a lot of debates on the restriction of democracy with the proxy 
of the “demise of the state” in the age of globalization (Ohmae 1990; Strange 
1996). In particular, the retreat of the state has mostly been discussed in relation 
to the heightened mobility of capital. The gist is that „markets are becoming 
dislodged from social and political control‟ so that „no sovereign power can 
claim legitimate authority over the world market‟ (Mittelman 2001: 4). The 
enhanced discretion of financial (portfolio) or industrial investors (TNCs) to 
change their investment sites across borders „generates powerful pressures on 
states to develop market friendly policies‟ (Held and McGrew 2003: 13). The 
constraint of “footloose” capital is tightly structured in financial markets with 
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various norms, practices and institutions. Credit rating agencies, having an 
influence on interest rates, routinely review all areas of public policy for almost 
every country. Market analysts estimate a “political risk factor” in a country, 
„expressed as a premium on the current interest rate on government bonds, 
which discount the possibility of future political changes unfavorable to capital‟. 
The surveillance of the financial markets is so comprehensive that nothing can 
escape from their consideration (Leys 2001: 22).  
 
The pressure of “footloose” capital „pits national economy against national 
economy in an increasingly intense competitive struggle‟. Any countries that 
neglect to do so experience „a hemorrhaging of invested funds, labour shedding, 
and, in turn, economic crisis‟ (Hay 2005:240). Governments, therefore, have no 
real option other than to accommodate the forces of economic globalization by 
reducing welfare budgets, lowering taxation levels, and lightening regulation 
regimes -- namely, „social dumping‟, „competitive deregulation‟ (ibid: 240) or 
„a race to the bottom‟ (Gilpin 2001: 368). 
 
But critics claim that the argument of “state retrenchment” has gone too far 
(Hay 2005). At the extreme, the powerlessness of the state may be a „sedulously 
cultivated myth‟ (Othman and Kessler 2001: 126). On the contrary, critics argue, 
„governments, or states, have been central to the process of economic 
globalization‟. Each state in the OECD has been „instrumental in establishing 
both the necessary national political conditions and politics‟ (McGrew 2005: 
223). Although state authority and capacity may not be seriously undermined, 
its role has been reconfigured. Those functions were strengthened that could 
„ensure the primacy of private property, preserve the dominance of market over 
social control‟, while the state retreated from such functions as social protection 
(MacEwan 2005: 172). 
 
Downsized democracy with elite domination 
 
This situation illustrates an obvious conflict between the logic of the market and 
the „logic of legitimation, which drives politics in all states with free elections‟. 
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States increasingly have difficulty in catering for market forces and practicing 
democracy at the same time (Leys 2001: 26, 34). The mobility of capital, in the 
first instance, restricts the “Keynesian capacity” of national governments, which 
is a policy option for a more equitable society. As the budget deficit of a 
government is believed to be detrimental to the price of financial instruments, 
with its negative effect on inflation, interest rates and exchange rates, financial 
capital is generally averse to expansion of welfare budgets.  
 
Privatization, commoditization and deregulation, the typical policy agenda of 
market liberalism, can lead to the „rapid erosion of democratically-determined 
collective values and institutions‟ (ibid: 4). Privatization and commoditization 
often imperil such public goods as universal health care, general education and 
widely-accessible media, which are primary requirements of a genuine 
democracy, as well as basic needs of people. These are goods the distribution of 
which is determined by need, rather than the price mechanism alone. 
Deregulation also undermines the political process, which balances the different 
goals of economic activity. The efficiency rationale for deregulation does not 
fully take into account the interests of society or efficiency in the long run; for 
instance, environmental considerations or the „infant industry‟ argument 
(MacEwan 2005: 171). 
 
The erosion of democratic capacity is accelerated further by the decline of the 
negotiation power of labour: this is an important lever for mass participation in 
the political process. The pressure of market forces has pushed downwards the 
levelling of labour through the casualization of labour, sub-contracting and high 
levels of unemployment. Such developments have generated ever-increasing 
inequality in most of the countries, denoted by new terms, such as „the 
excluded‟, „winners and losers‟, and the 20: 80 society (Leys 2001: 36). This is 
highly destructive not only to community but also to democracy as democratic 
participation „cannot easily flourish under conditions of ever-increasing 
material inequality‟ (Dryzek 1996: 82). 
 
The state finds itself in a difficult position between growing discontent over the 
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global market regime (Stiglitz 2002) and the imperative of external forces. With 
few policy options remaining to harmonize both internal and external 
compulsion, states choose to reduce their „exposure to political pressure from 
the electorate‟ (Leys 2001: 3). And many important decisions that have 
significant impact on the people are appropriated by technocrats or experts, who 
are „insulating‟ themselves from the demands of popular groups (Rodrik 2011: 
189). In this situation, democratic politics cannot help being “downsized” 
(Crenson & Ginsberg 2002) and losing its egalitarian ideals. Sometimes, in 
order to be best to adjust to global market forces, „mass political opposition 
must be crushed‟. This suggests that market-driven politics in the age of 
globalization is prone to be more authoritarian (Dryzek 1996: 80-81). 
 
 
3.4 The Media, Communications and Power 
 
This section examines the role of the media, culture and communications in the 
politics of neo-liberalism that sanctioned the sharp increase of inequality. By 
way of context, this section examined the „power value‟ of the media, culture 
and communication as well as the discourses of power. It is vital to understand 
how symbolic images are associated with social power relations, by defining 
and signifying our reality (Watson 2003: 13). Next, this section moves on to the 
existing explanations that link market-driven politics, in Korea and abroad, to 
the media, culture and communication. 
 
3.4.1 Power and its process  
 
Debates on power, in the tradition of Western political philosophy, have long 
been concerned about sovereign power (political power) and the contexts of its 
exercise. A more common view has highlighted its conflictual character, 
equating power with the means of domination, in other word “power over”. 
Here, power entails the quantitative and cumulative capacity of agents or 
groups „to realise their own will even against the resistance of others‟ (Weber 
1978: 926). 
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Power as domination evokes concern about the chronically unequal power 
relations that exist among social actors. C. Wright Mills, an American political 
scientist, pointing out private elite domination, warned that American politics 
deviated from its founding principles, i.e. rule of, for and by the people. 
According to him (1956: 361), not only is power concentrated in the hands of 
political, economic and military elites who share life experiences and a 
common perception of the world, but also its exercise is unreliable because the 
unequal power is exercised „within the American system of organized 
irresponsibility‟. 
 
American pluralists, including Robert Dahl, on the contrary, have countered this 
“dominant (power) elite” argument by developing an individualistic and 
mechanical concept of power. According to them, power should not be confused 
with power resources, which are only a potential power (Haugaard 2002). 
Pluralists‟ observation of American society was that power was dispersed 
among many individuals and, drawing on Schumpeter‟s model of democracy, 
that democratic ideals were pursued by way of „competition between elites‟ 
(ibid: 7).  
 
But the pluralists‟ concept of power was criticized for being unduly narrow, 
only focusing on the visible and event-oriented performance of power. Instead, 
Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz (1962: 1) took note of the informal, 
private face of power. This entails the exercise of power, not just by decision 
making, but also by „non-decision making‟, covertly excluding the interests of 
particular individuals or groups from consideration. This hidden face of power 
„creates or reinforces barriers to the public airing of public conflicts‟ (Lukes 
2005[1974]: 6-7). 
  
Distancing himself from the behavioural leaning of the previous explanation, i.e. 
decision making or non-decision making, Steven Lukes (ibid: 1, 29) argued that 
„power is at its most effective when least observable‟ and when it deals with 
„latent conflict‟. So, we need to attend to the “third dimensional power” that can 
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„influence the thoughts and desires of its victims without their being aware of 
its effects‟ (Hindess 1996: 5). What hinders the governed from recognizing their 
„real interests‟ is „false consciousness‟ (Pine 1993: 43) or ideology. Moreover, 
those biases are „inherited from the past in the form of structured and culturally 
patterned behaviour of groups‟ (Hauggard 2002: 38). Lukes‟ theory of power 
has contributed to broadening the scope of the concept of power. But his terms 
of real interests and alleged „moral relativism‟ have invited critiques from some 
researchers (Clegg 1989: 86). 
 
On the other hand, Michel Foucault and post-structuralism have contributed to 
the broadening of the concept of power to the sphere of everyday life. Foucault 
suggested that „We need to cut off the King‟s head‟. This is an accusation that 
political theory has been too much obsessed with the „mechanical and sovereign 
conception of power‟ (Clegg 1989: 158). What emerged in the place of the 
beheaded King was a „micro-physics‟ of power. According to Foucault (1980: 
39), this new paradigm is concerned with a „capillary form‟ of power which 
„reaches into the very grain of individuals, touching their bodies‟. 
 
3.4.2 The “power value” of the media, communication and culture 
 
Power as a form of domination inevitably raises the issues of consent and 
legitimacy. This is linked to the questions why unequal power relations are 
maintained and „how do the powerful secure the compliance of those they 
dominate‟, as Lukes (2005:12) puts it. The “power value” of the media, 
communication and culture is explored within this conceptual framework. 
 
Nonetheless, not every perspective in this scholarly field automatically assumes 
power to be domination. The liberal pluralists‟ or functionalists‟ perspective on 
the media and communication shows little interest in the structure of power in 
society or in the role of media in sustaining existing power relations. The 
researchers in this mainstream research tradition tend to take the institutional 
order of society for granted, although admitting that there are some 
dysfunctional features at certain points. In this line of thinking, the media are 
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basically „seen (as) independent and socially neutral agencies which work for 
the benefit for all‟ (Ampuja 2004: 61). 
 
Another consensual angle is to presume a normative situation in which the 
exercise of power can be legitimated. This approach acknowledges power as a 
„right to act‟ or „power to’ rather than as domination or „power over‟ (Hindess 
1996: 1; Haugaard 2002: 4). Jurgen Habermas‟s concepts of the “public sphere” 
and the “ideal speech situation” depict instances where autonomous actors in 
the rationalized life world can find their “real interests” through the exercise of 
communicative competence (Habermas 1972). In the ideal speech situation, free 
and equal individuals communicate with each other and „attempt to reach 
rationally motivated agreement‟ (Hindess 1996: 92). The consensus can be 
reached by a speech-community built only on trust, not power. The legitimacy 
of political and economic power can be assessed against these normative 
criteria, because a rational consensus can be created only when the conditions 
of the discussion remain undistorted by the effects of power. 
 
The normative media model, drawing on the Habermasian concept of the public 
sphere, takes note of the process in which citizens‟ deliberation shapes public 
opinion by means of a collective determination. In this ideal speech situation, 
the news media is expected to play the “fourth estate” role by providing 
objective information, unbiased analysis, publicity on power groups (the 
watchdog role) and a forum for rational debate (Goldsmiths Media Group 2000; 
Curran 2002). 
 
The critical perspective: political economy 
 
In the critical
20
 tradition of media sociology and cultural studies, on the other 
                                           
20 The term “critical” generally refer to this statement : „At a very general level, critical 
approach to media, or society …, call into question the way things are and expresses explicit 
scepticism towards dominant institutions, ideologies and social relations‟ (Ampuja 2004: 60). 
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hand, the central concern about power has been its tendency to dominate. Hence, 
it usually asks „how mass consent was maintained in patently unequal society‟ 
(Davis 2007: 4). Most researchers in this school argue that media and culture 
function as a „powerful ideological agency‟ in society, but they are generally 
subject to „established power‟ (Curran 2002: 148, 165).  
 
The media political economy tradition, from its inception, was interested in „the 
structural development of the media under capitalism‟ (Ampuja 2004: 61). It 
explores the ways in which communicative activities, i.e. the making and taking 
of meaning, are structured by the unequal distribution of material and symbolic 
resources in capitalist society (Murdock and Golding 2005). A lot of researches 
documented the top-down influence of the government and the market in 
shaping media texts and entertainments which are „powerfully distorted‟ in 
favour of governments and corporations (Goldsmiths Media Group 2000: 23). 
 
Traditional pressure from the state is still resilient, as elites keep a tight hold of 
their weapons of licensing, regulation, censorship and libel law. Additionally, 
the media as a private corporation has become increasingly vulnerable to 
financial and business influence through ownership, overlapping personnel 
networks and directorships as well as advertising that „operate as a latter-day 
licensing authority‟ (Murdock and Golding 2005: 63 ; Davis 2007: 5). The 
salient trend of the concentration and conglomeration of media corporations has 
rendered the „town square of the public sphere‟ that is „inaccessible‟ to the 
general public (Curran 2002: 225). 
 
The specialized communication management has helped make this overt 
influence all the more effective. The techniques of “media play” comprise 
spinning; blocking; threatening journalists; as well as subsidizing; guiding; and 
offering incentives (Davis 2007; Parson 1989: 213-214; Norris et al. 1999: 2). 
In times of crisis, these techniques are mobilized as a means of „manufacturing 
consent‟ (Herman and Chomsky 2002: lxv). The daily routine of journalists and 
news organizations, encouraging journalists to seek stereotypical news 
production and source approach, further empowers the „primary definers‟ of the 
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„problematic event‟ who are already advantaged (Hall et al. 1978: 58-59; see 
Schlesinger 1990; Gans 1979 also). 
 
Critical perspective: Cultural Studies 
 
Cultural studies, from its inception, claimed to be centred on issues of power, 
politics and the need for social change, on the conceptual ground that culture is 
a zone of contested meaning. Cultural politics hinges around such powers as: to 
name; to represent common sense; to create the „official version‟; to represent 
the legitimate social world (Jordan and Weedon 1995: 13). As people organize 
their lives and experience through the „common sense‟ of popular culture, the 
terrain of the „taken-for-granted‟ becomes „the most significant site of 
ideological struggle‟ (Barker 2008: 67). 
 
Ideology has been one of the central research domains in this perspective, as 
consent and legitimacy seem to be closely related to ideology. According to 
Althusser (1969: 64), ideology is double-edged. One side of it is the lived 
experience that has a „general function of constituting subjects‟. The other is a 
more „elaborate set of meanings‟ that „misrecognize and misrepresent power 
and class relations‟. Ideology is embodied in a form of apparatus and its 
associated practices. The education system, the church and the mass media 
function as “ideological state apparatuses” (Althusser 1971). Althusser‟s 
understanding of ideology, however, has the limitation of structural 
determinism, whereby the subject is regarded as an „effect of structure‟ rather 
than a „self-constituting agent‟ (Barker 2008: 63). 
 
When we turn to Antonio Gramsci‟s concept of “hegemony”, we find a more 
flexible, sophisticated and practical account of ideology. Hegemony denotes a 
situation where the „historic bloc‟ of a ruling class faction has gained social 
authority and leadership over the subordinate class. Hegemony is achieved not 
just through force but also, more importantly, through the „consent of majority 
expressed by the so-called organs of public opinion‟ (Gramsci 1971: 80). But a 
hegemonic bloc never consists of a single socio-economic category. Rather, it is 
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formed through a series of alliances in which one group takes on a position of 
leadership. Hence, hegemony is inherently unstable and needs to be constantly 
re-won and re-negotiated. 
 
For Foucault, on the other hand, power is closely related to the production of 
the subject, hence „rendering the governed governable‟ (Lukes 2005: 98). This 
social construction of the subject is a process whereby „norms mould the soul 
and are inscribed upon the body‟. What is pivotal in the social constitution of 
the subject is knowledge. In their perspective, language defines, and at the same 
time limits, „regime of truth‟ (ibid: 91). Discourse, concerning both language 
and practice, „entails regulated production of knowledge through language 
which gives meaning to both material objects and social practice‟ (Barker 2008: 
20). Discourse constructs, defines and produces the object of knowledge in an 
intelligible way, while at the same time excluding other ways of reasoning as 
unintelligible.  
 
3.4.3 Media and communication study on the politics of economic power 
 
This section reviews the existing studies on the utility of the media, 
communication and culture in sustaining unequal power relations with regards 
to the “downsized” politics of neo-liberal market forces. It may seem odd that 
there has been a relative lack of research on the topic on the part of media and 
communication studies 
 
Any serious examination of the advance of liberal market forces and its political 
implications must begin with Stuart Hall. In his book, The Hard Road to 
Renewal (1988), Hall expanded his Gramscian exploration to analyze the 
ideological ascendancy of Thatcherism in Britain. He ascribed the success of 
„the great moving right show‟ (1979) to an ideological struggle that transformed 
common sense so that it embraced the virtue of possessive individualism. 
 
But, partly because of the turns of intellectual fashion, subsequent researchers 
were gradually detached from the research tradition that attempted to associate 
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popular culture and the mass media with the power dynamics of society 
(Ampuja 2004). In this regard, James Curran (2006: 143) points out that critical 
media studies in Britain and Europe has been „seduced by the discourse of 
market liberalism into bracketing out class‟. Rather than „scrutinizing growing 
income inequity on a global scale‟ and the weakening of democracy, he pointed 
out, „researchers from postmodernism, cultural populism and hyper-globalism 
have tended to laud the liberating and egalitarian force of the free market‟. 
 
When it comes to this research area, the intellectual tendency within Korean 
media and communication studies is not very different. One persuasive 
explanation would be that Korean academic circles have been influenced 
predominantly by an American pluralist or positivist research tradition that 
tends to take the institutional order of society for granted (Lee B-S 2006). One 
critic found that there is not a single article, as of early 2008, which explores 
journalism‟s share in producing growing inequality during the ascendancy of 
neo-liberalism in Korea, in the Korea Journal of Communication and 
Information, a leading critical media research journal (Sohn S-C 2009: 49-51). 
Whereas the media may be the main culprits of the kind of indoctrination that 
has made people believe that neo-liberal transformation is inevitable, Sohn Suk-
choon argues, „critical media studies in Korea has neglected to check or 
criticize the media‟. 
 
The constructivist and political economic approach 
 
Despite the paucity of the literature, the existing researches can be grouped into 
two categories in terms of its theoretical orientations and approaches. These are 
(1) the „constructivist approach‟ (McGrew 2005: 229) that focuses on the role 
of ideas and discourse in the establishment of the local and global hegemony of 
market liberalism; and, (2) The political-economic approach, that focuses on the 
media institutions and the influences of empowered economic forces on the 
media production. 
 
Firstly, the main body of the literature on this theme employs the angle of a 
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“politics of discourse” to explore the establishment of neo-liberal hegemony. 
Within the contours of domestic political economy, inquiry focuses on the 
contest of sense-making, framing, and discourse in such typical agendas of 
market liberalism as national competitiveness, privatization, deregulation, 
possessive individualism and casualization of labour. Typically, it asks such 
questions as: what kind of discourses emerged, who actively partook in these 
discourses, for what purpose, in what context, and how did those discourses 
contribute to constituting reality? 
 
Kang Myung-koo (1994; see Kang M-K and Park S-H 1997 also) pioneered 
research in which he explored the rise of market liberalism as a ruling discourse 
in the early 1990s. He analysed it within a historical context, in which the ruling 
bloc should have renewed its hegemony after the collapse of the authoritarian 
regime in 1987. Kang argues that a series of campaigns promoted by 
governments and the mainstream media, including the discourse of “economic 
crisis” (1987-92), “New Korea” (1993), “Internationalization” (1994) and 
“Globalization” (1995), can be understood as a „politics of discourse‟ or as a 
„discursive project‟ (1997: 123) which was tailored to replace the decades-long 
model of the “development state”, which had run out of steam. Similarly, Park 
U-sun (2006) investigated how the discourse of globalization evolved alongside 
the political and economic changes from the early 1990s to the mid-2000s. 
 
Kim Jin-young (2002: 63) observed how the idea of “national competitiveness” 
was discursively constituted and how it reshaped the main objectives, roles and 
capacities of the nation-state in the early 1990s. The state was claimed to be a 
„corporation state‟, which placed supreme values on economic growth and 
promoted competitiveness by adopting business-friendly policies. You Young-
min and Kim Sung-hae (2007) have investigated how media discourse about the 
labour movement in Korea, in the late 1980s and early 1990s in Korea, has 
gradually degraded the legitimacy of the labour unions. Hong Seong-ku (2004) 
paid attention to the impact of media discourse on the corporatist class politics 
among the state, capitalists and labour, which was established in the middle of 
the Korean economic crisis in 1997 and which devised a compromise on labour 
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market flexibility. 
 
The Asian economic crisis in 1997 provided a crucial momentum for market 
liberalism to spread into every corner of life in Korea. In this respect, Kim 
Sung-hae and his colleagues (2007) explored how media discourse after the 
crisis mediated the transformation of Korean society into adopting an Anglo-
Saxon style economic model, i.e. a shareholder model. As the “business-
friendly” candidate Lee Myung-bak won the presidential election in 2007, Shin 
Jin-wook and Kim Young-min (2009) analysed the logical structures and 
discursive techniques of the market populist discourse of his government. 
 
It is true that without the guardianship of America, as well as the viceregal role 
of the global media and transnational institutions like the IMF, neo-liberal 
transformation of a local country might have been fairly difficult. After the 
collapse of the Soviet bloc, the „promotion of democracy and human rights and 
a free flow of capital worldwide are the proclaimed aims of US public 
diplomacy‟ (Thussu 2000: 5). In this sense, several researchers paid attention to 
the interaction between “global and national” in the context of the 
internalization of the neo-liberal paradigm within specific countries. Rodney 
Hall (2003) attributed the rapid diffusion of the Anglo-Saxon economic model 
into Asian countries amid their economic crisis to the politics of discourse of 
America. Concerning the discursive demolition of the Asian development 
model which was once hailed as “alliance capitalism”, Hall points out that the 
U.S. Treasury, the IMF and the Korean government portrayed key practices 
associated with the Asian model to be “cronyism” and “corruption”. Through 
this, the Asian model was normatively delegitimized. Kim Sung-hae (2005) 
argued, employing the intellectual leadership model, that the discourses of the 
economic superpowers have reconstituted the preferences of Koreans so that the 
socio-economic policy package of the “Washington Consensus” was adopted by 
the crisis-ridden country with relatively weak resistance. In another piece of 
research, Kim Sung-hae (2007: 77) indicated that the „Americanization‟ of 
Korean society after its financial crisis was led by proactive discursive practices 
by journalists, visiting columnists, professors and foreign experts. Comparably, 
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Frank D. Durham (2007) investigated how The Financial Times, a leading 
global financial press, framed the role of the Thai government in coping with its 
financial crisis in 1997 and how it advocated the dominant fiscal policy based 
on free market liberalization. 
 
Secondly, several researchers who employed a political economic approach 
focused on the structural constraints in the media production, which lead to 
overtly pro-market and pro-capital media texts. Kang Myung-koo (1997: 134-
135) identified that the Korean conglomerates (the chaebols) became 
increasingly active from the early 1990s in producing and distributing specific 
discourses „not only through their own media and think tanks, but also by 
organizing intellectuals, journalists, policy elites and political elites‟. Lee Bong-
soo (2006) explored how the rapid diffusion of neo-liberal ideas led to the 
economic crisis in 1997, focusing on the deterioration of the public sphere of 
economic decision-making. This study paid more attention to distortions of the 
media production process by the ruling alliance between chaebols, mainstream 
media and bureaucrats. 
 
 
3.5 Omissions from the Existing Research  
 
Indeed, the existing studies offer meaningful answers to the question of how 
media, communication and culture are engaged in social power relationships in 
the era of neo-liberal hyperglobalization. But, at the same time, the approaches 
adopted in the literature reveal a lot of loopholes in their explanations of the 
features and communicative process of neo-liberal economic power, because of 
their narrow assumptions about the relationship between media and power.  
 
At the risk of oversimplifying, the existing research shares a seemingly 
undisputable supposition that the “power value” of media and communications 
is located in their influence on mass audiences. This assumption was termed an 
„elite-mass media-audience‟ paradigm, in which the elite in a society 
communicates with the public (or mass) through the media (Davis 2007: 6). 
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Although the purpose of the communication may vary between deliberation on 
issues in the public sphere, indoctrination, or generating consent and hegemony, 
the paradigm helped to keep documenting how the elite secured domination (or 
how civil group resisted it) by the will-formation of the public through the mass 
media. 
 
But an approach that rests on the institutionalized, visible and mass forms of 
communication does not capture the important features of the “power value” of 
media, communication and culture in the downsized politics of market 
liberalism. Because the notable characteristic of the “shrinking of democracy” 
in the hyperglobalization era is the “shrinking of public domain”, research that 
comfortably relies on the norm of state-centered politics only explains so much. 
At least three blind spots should be raised concerning this issue.  
 
The change of locus of power 
 
Firstly, over the last three decades, in line with neo-liberal economic 
globalization, the locus of power has changed considerably. Political and 
economic resources and power have seeped away from national governments 
and shifted toward liberal market forces, including transnational corporations, 
global financial markets and transnational institutions.  
 
One notable feature of these new sources of power is that they operate with a 
quite different logic and process from that of state-centered political power. 
More than anything else, power is increasingly detached from legitimacy and 
accountability. This is in line with the decline of party membership, 
conventional party ideology, electoral support and faith in politicians in many 
post-industrial countries. This mismatch is regarded as a typical attribute of 
globalization. But it has also been deliberately promoted by various discourses 
of „de-politicization‟ and by the „market-driven politics‟ of each government 
(Leys 2001). To take the example of the socio-economic transformation of 
Finland in 1990s, according to Anu Kantola (2001), an anti-political and anti-
public discourse that favoured economic expertise and bureaucracy negated or 
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narrowed the scope of the public sphere and public discussion. 
 
Another particularity of these neo-liberal market forces is their “invisibility”. 
The agents of this force often operate in a way that is undetectable by the media 
as well as the public. This may be because they are insulated in lofty expertise, 
exclusive networks, and other discrete culture and practices. Norberto Bobbio 
(1987: 18, 92-93) pointed out that the survival of „invisible power‟ is a 
distinctive symptom of the „broken promise‟ of democracy. The paradox is that 
the „arcana imperii (secret power)‟ reappears „in the guise of technical experts 
and technocracy‟. He believed this tendency has been reinforced recently (i.e. 
during the1980s) in the area of the management, but it also continued thereafter 
in line with the diffusion of neo-liberalism. 
 
When liberal market forces operate with minimal transparency, legitimacy and 
public accountability, the attempt to apply the elite -media -public paradigm to 
research becomes problematic. In effect, in many cases, the public are excluded 
from the consideration of these market forces. 
 
The significance of private forms of communication  
 
Secondly, most of the existing research on this topic often disregards the 
importance of private forms of communications in the social power relations. 
Locating the mass media at the centre of the investigation, the strategy of 
inquiry was usually to explore how the liberal market forces utilized the 
political, economic and cultural means to shape the media text to further their 
advantages. This seems to be a logical consequence of the basic supposition that 
power emanates from influencing the mass through the media. 
 
However, the unaccountable and exclusive attributes of the neo-liberal market 
forces suggest that the private actions of the powerful, and the private 
communicative activities that mediate these actions, are no less important in 
shifting and maintaining power relations. Taking lobbying, think tank and 
policy planning organizations as examples of the private communicative 
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activities or organs, Dinan and Miller (2009: 260) insisted that „these 
communication networks and fora are among the least visible, most exclusive 
and most politically significant spaces of the contemporary public sphere‟. 
 
The full picture of the process of power is more complex 
 
Thirdly, by focusing on the institutionalized media and visible forms of 
communication, existing research tends to overstate the “top-down” influence 
of the media on the masses as well as on the media by the powerful. The 
inclination is to regard power as a given, rather than exploring the actual 
process of exercising power. In the real world, however, various modes of 
power are in action at the same time in which the media, communication and 
culture are engaged to a different extent.  
 
Once we explore the national diffusion of the neo-liberal credos at the time of 
economic crisis, for example, the indoctrination through the global financial 
media can explain only a part of the whole story. The diffusion might have been 
smooth because the pre-existing epistemic community among economic experts 
has actively colluded through private correspondence, the limited circulation 
trade gazette, or intellectual apprenticeship based on the same educational 
background between elites (Kim S-H 2005; Kyunghyang Shinmun 2008).  
 
The reason we should be cautious about these variant processes of power is to 
avoid sliding into “media-centrism”, one of the problematic ideas which 
„automatically assume[s] that the media are central to explaining the dynamics 
of contemporary societies‟ (Couldry 2006: 182). This media-centrism often 
results in giving undue prominence to the media, especially to the mass media, 
rather than to other causal factors. In fact, as David Deacon puts it (2003: 215), 
there has been widespread failure to „appreciate how powerful institution and 
individuals seek to exert influence and construct political discourse in arena 
other than the media‟. 
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3.6 The Emerging Research Area 
 
Thus far, this chapter reviewed the structural imperative of market liberalism 
that restricted egalitarian expansion of democratic politics in the age of 
hyperglobalization. Then the study reviewed the existing explanations for the 
process and mechanism through which the media, communication and culture 
are engaged in market-driven politics. 
 
From these reviews, the researcher can single out research areas that demand an 
alternative or complementary exploration, to achieve a better understanding of 
the “power value” of the media and communication in the contemporary 
politico-economic system. That is, that the research should engage with the 
organized interests of economic elites and their communicative strategies, 
which increasingly replace the democratic process of consensus formation 
through the mass media. In addition, the variant modes and processes of power 
that these market liberals exercise also point toward a communication -oriented 
study on the actual site or network which the powerful inhabit. 
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Chapter 4. 
 
Approaches and Methods 
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4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter charts the theories and related approaches that are employed to 
explore the research questions presented above, along with a few key research 
parameters. It then outline the methods. Indeed, one theoretical approach may 
not provide exhaustive tools of analysis for a multi-faceted social phenomenon. 
Yet it is also true that a well-selected approach can help opening up a new 
landscape of understanding. Considering the research interest and problems that 
demand non-traditional explanations about hyperglobalization and the 
shrinkage of democratic politics, this thesis employs approaches that could help 
to grasp the detailed process of Korean economic power. 
  
To some extent, this strategy conforms to the concern that „while the impact of 
globalization on the nation-state has been the central theme of contemporary 
political economy, even the strongest variants of the thesis (e.g. the argument of 
“state retrenchment”) tend to be presented without pointing directly or 
explicitly to the mechanism‟ (Hay 2005: 239). 
 
 
4.2 Theoretical Frameworks 
 
This thesis seeks to investigate the organized interests of economic elites and 
their communicative strategies, in order to present an alternative or 
complementary explanation about the “power value” of the media and 
communication in the era of neo-liberal hyperglobalization. This overall aim 
requires the researcher to attend to two theoretical considerations. One is to set 
out the global-national exchange of influences in the age of globalization. The 
other is to look into the micro-process of power that actually operates between 
economic elites. 
 
With regard to the former consideration, the research examined the dynamics of 
the global-national penetration of neo-liberal policy, as well as discourse, expert 
groups and cognitive processes that are closely related to the global diffusion of 
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hegemonic ideas. It was understood that the influence of the global centre on 
the national state is not solely a product of external imposition, nor the outcome 
of independent choices by the local. 
 
For the latter consideration, this thesis turned to the “inverted political economy 
approach” (IPE) that evolved recently in the research field of political 
communications and media sociology (Davis 2003; 2007). This approach 
locates sites (networks or fields), participants and processes of power at the 
centre of investigation and explores the social, cultural, ideological and 
discursive elements of the elite-centred sites of power. This assumes that the 
private, ordinary, less visible types of practices of „powerful individuals‟ are 
also significant in the reproduction of unequal power relations in society (Davis 
2007: 10).  
 
The utility of the media and communication here is linked to the questions of 
how the communicative activities are used by, as well as influencing, those 
actors, processes and sites themselves. By so doing, the research engage with 
the multiple forms of power, such as conscious agency, disciplinary power, 
dominant ideology, discourse, habitus, performativity, power over and power to, 
that operate at the sites of economic power. The following are the key research 
parameters that are derived from these two research approaches. 
 
4.2.1 Research Parameters 
 
Policy diffusion 
 
Since the neo-liberal turn in the U.K. and the U.S.A in the early 1980s, the pro-
market economic reform has spread over many parts of the world. The question 
then arises whether the diffusion
21
 of the policy paradigm is an outcome of 
                                           
21 Diffusion has received attention from various fields of research. Anthropologists have 
delineated it as „the process of adopting or borrowing by one culture from another various 
devices, implements, institutions, and beliefs‟ (Malinowski 1944, in Simmons, Dobbin and 
Garrett 2008: 9). Sociologists have argued that nations mimic their successful peers almost 
69 
 
independent choices made by national government or whether it is the product 
of external imposition?  
 
Over the last three decades, it has been widely observed that the national elites 
have spontaneously embraced neo-liberal norms, values and policy programs. 
This means that the catalyst has come not only “from outside” but also “from 
inside”. The internal dynamics that reflected external constraints reshaped the 
neo-liberal paradigm according to the national contexts and political ends. Thus 
the „internalization‟ (Cerny, Menz and Soderberg. 2005: 1) of neo-liberal tenets 
is inevitably a political construction which is „promoted by political 
entrepreneurs who have to design projects, convince others, build coalitions and 
ultimately win some sort of political legitimacy‟ (ibid: 19). 
 
In order to arrive at a more detailed explanation, it may be useful to turn to Beth 
A. Simmons and her colleagues‟ four causal mechanisms of the international 
diffusion of policy (2008: 10). These are models of „competition‟, „coercion‟, 
„learning‟ and „emulation‟. Competition among countries has been broadly 
acknowledged as a causal mechanism for the global diffusion of neo-liberal 
economic policies. In the globalized world, according to this perspective, 
countries have to compete with each other for international market and capital 
investment. To this end, governments have a strong incentive to choose pro-
business policies, for example, deregulation, curtailing corporation tax, and 
simplifying investment procedures.  
 
The coercion model pays attention to the uneven nature of power in 
international relations. Theorists of this school suggest that policy is diffused 
from the center to the periphery by more powerful actors who can impose their 
preferences on the weak. This coercion can be exercised by multiple actors: 
powerful governments, international organizations and even private actors like 
multinational banks. Nonetheless, coercion does not exclusively mean the overt 
                                                                                                                           
ritualistically (Thomson et al. 1987). Political scientists have incorporated the diffusion of ideas 
into their accounts of the choice of economic policies (Keller 2002). 
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use of threats or physical power. Rather, it is applied in a more subtle way, 
involving the „conscious manipulation of incentives by powerful actors to 
encourage others to implement policy change‟ (Simmons, Dobbin and Garret 
2008: 11).  
 
In contrast with the coercion approach, the model of emulation and learning 
focuses more on the voluntary adoption of new policies. But the emulation 
model differs from the learning model in that, for the most part, it does not 
presuppose the information is rational, dispassionate and complete. Instead, it 
seeks constructivist explanations that highlight the importance of shared norms 
and the inter-subjectivity of meaning. Here, „theory and rhetoric often serve as 
the base of decision making, and theory and rhetoric change over time‟ (ibid: 
32). And both legitimate ends and appropriate means are shared social 
constructs (Meyer et al. 1997).  
 
Notwithstanding this staking out of causal mechanisms, a closer look at the 
process of diffusion reveals a black box-like complexity. Below, we will discuss 
further the importance of ideas and diffusers in the process of policy diffusion. 
 
Ideas, epistemic communities and cognitive processes 
 
The internal dynamics of the diffusion of neo-liberal policy are closely related 
to ideas (or discourse), expert groups and cognitive processes. As policy-makers 
have to determine their policies within a „bounded rationality‟, discourses, 
including economic theory and narratives, often serve as mental maps or 
guidepost for them (Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett 2008: 34). Among 
discourses, the „idea as a paradigm‟ plays a critical role in the process of 
diffusion, especially by emulation, learning and even competition. The „idea as 
a paradigm‟ refers to a „taken-for-granted word view‟ or theoretical hypothesis 
that can inform the general course of policy. Neo-liberalism, in this sense, can 
be said to be an „idea as a paradigm‟ (Ha Y-S 2003: 3). 
 
These discourses are normally constructed within social networks of experts, 
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and diffused within given social and national structures (Strange 1991). 
Accordingly, if a specific policy paradigm is to be adopted across countries, it is 
essential that there is a pre-existing expert group or „epistemic community‟ 
(Haas 1992) „for the articulation of policy as well as for command of the 
practical knowledge of how to do it‟ (Kogut and Macpherson 2008: 105). This 
social network of experts is „a micro-foundation by which ideas are 
communicated and legitimated as economic policies‟ (ibid: 106).  
 
Economists and experts in academia, think-tanks, the media and international 
institutions are often viewed as missionaries for the diffusion of neo-liberal 
economic policies around the world. Kogut and McPherson (2008) find that 
there is strong correlation between the number of economists and the diffusion 
of neo-liberal economic policies. They argue that the global diffusion of 
American-trained economists -- especially ones sharing the perspective of the 
“Chicago school” -- have resulted in the spread of privatization to all corners of 
the globe. De Vries (1997) stresses the importance of economists working in the 
IMF and the World Bank for the spread of economic ideas internationally. 
 
As far as the “diffusion of diffusers” is concerned, the flow of influence is not 
even. Powerful countries have an advantage in the framing of policy 
discussions because they have plenty of research infrastructures, critical 
intellectual mass and well-developed networks between the policy world and 
various research nodes (Hira 1998; Krugman 1995). 
 
However, the dominant ideas mediated by networks of experts or epistemic 
communities do not generate homogenous policy outcomes around the world. 
The political, economic and social circumstances of the individual countries 
determine which aspects of the dominant idea are highlighted, and which other 
aspects are neglected. In other word, the diffusion of policy inevitably include 
the process of “translation and negotiation” (Kjaer and Pedersen 2001) in which 
policymakers „selectively apply‟ the dominant idea to their indigenous situation 
(Ha Y-S 2003: 8).  
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Sites or networks of elite power 
 
The starting point of a detailed investigation of the process of liberal market 
power is to locate particular sites of economic, political and legal power „where 
localized and networked action and decision-making have wider social impacts‟ 
(Davis 2007: 170). The site, field or network here denotes „a world within a 
world‟ (Gordon 1997 [1947], in Davis 2007: 12) in which the members share a 
discrete and localized culture, values and practices.  
 
Then, attention turns towards those “elites” or “classes” who inhabit these sites 
of power. In general, the elite are a set of „identifiable human actors who 
exercise power and influence‟ or „leadership, within a given setting‟ (Holton 
2008: 183). The traditional analysis of elites, which rests on the conceptions 
either of an establishment or of a control elite (Mills 1956), has become 
outdated as a result of researches which emphasizes the relative autonomy of 
the elite group or the „depersonalization of power relations in an age of 
capillary power‟ (Froud et al. 2006: 2). Nonetheless, it is hard to deny that 
„powerful individuals and groups‟ have been „central agents‟ of neo-liberal 
change over the past three decades (ibid: 3). 
 
This is not to say that the elites are cohesive enough to exercise power to 
maintain their position and material benefits. Rather, their power emanates from 
their inhabiting of the site of power, in other words, their decision-making and 
their relations with each other both within and among these sites.  
 
Processes of power: culture and mediated practices 
 
Since localised and networked actions, as well as decision-making in this site of 
power, bring about wider social and economic influences, it is vital to look into 
the social, cultural, ideological and communicative elements that inform the 
decisions and actions within those sites (Davis 2003; 2007).  
 
The assumption is that a discrete and localized „elite micro-culture‟ may evolve 
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at these sites with some autonomy from the outside world (Davis 2007: 77). As 
has been exemplified by Mitchel Abolafia (1998) in the case of financial trading 
rooms, the cultures, beliefs and practices within this exclusive site or network 
are prone to become “deviant”, or “disembedded” from those of the wider 
public. In this regard, the linkage between culture and power here is not set in 
terms of the utility of culture in the construction (or negotiation) of ideological 
mass consent. On the contrary, in the sites, many issues are negotiated and 
implemented in „private‟ without either being raised in the public domain or 
being discussed with the public in mind (Davis 2007: 77-78).  
 
The practices of communication, either in private or mediated forms, are also 
critical elements in the process that determines the shape of power. Again, what 
is notable with these processes and communication forms is, like the cultural 
elements in the site, their exclusiveness, in that the process „takes place outside 
the public sphere‟, „without reference to the majority of consumer-citizens‟ 
(Ibid: 11). All in all, the localised forms of communication lead to the long-term 
“mobilization of bias” (Schattschneider 1960) that guides decision-making and 
practices in certain directions.  
 
Materialization of the power  
 
The observation of the micro-level of cultures and practices may lose part of its 
significance unless it is linked to wider socio-economic and political 
consequences, and extended frameworks of power. The proposition is that 
particular beliefs, practices and ideologies/discourses that „evolve from a 
mixture of lived social relations‟ influence the „behaviour of elites, their day-to-
day practices, decision making and shaping of institutions‟ (Davis 2007: 12). 
 
What generates the specific material impact is the „position of the individuals‟ 
within those sites of power, rather than their conscious wielding of power (ibid: 
171). But the outcome of this material impact is neither neutral nor innocuous. 
Instead, in many instances, it has a lop-sided influence on power relations in 
society and leaves a strong imprint of inequality, since the elites in the site act 
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according to a narrowly defined individual rationality, rather than taking 
account of public accountability or democratic legitimacy (Davis 2003, 2007). 
 
 
4.3 The Selection of the Empirical Field 
 
The first step of empirical research is to select the discrete sites of elites which 
can best illustrate the process of economic power in the era of neo-liberal 
globalization. Depending on the purpose of the research, there are many 
possible options, including headquarters of multinational corporations; 
institutional bodies of global economic governance like the IMF, the OECD and 
credit rating agencies; globally integrated financial markets; alternative 
investment networks centered on private equity funds; the epistemic community 
of economists and management; global financial media, and economic 
bureaucrats.  
 
Julie Froud and her colleagues (2006: 16) emphasize the need of a new 
approach to elite study that focuses on the „privileged beneficiaries and agents 
of our form of neo-liberal capitalism‟. This research approach conceives of 
„elites as existing in the context of neo-liberal socio-economic reform and 
permanent restructuring of the public and private sectors‟, rather than seeing 
them as cohesive control elites at the apex of major bureaucracies. Also, this 
approach directs attention toward the rise of “intermediary groups” which seem 
to „partly disconnect power from its classical locus within the organization‟ and 
redefine it „as the ability to manipulate cultural representations and switch 
funding flows in the economy of restructuring‟. In this sense, apart from 
traditional CEOs and their boardroom networks, now new economic elites may 
include, 
 
„many new high reward positions around finance for investment bankers, hedge fund 
managers, private equity specialists; plus new implementation and policy elites 
including consultants, think-tank wonks and policy advisers; and a much increased 
demand for professional advisers like accounting partners and law partners‟(Froud et al. 
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2006:16). 
 
Taking this suggestion into consideration, the researcher selected three sites of 
economic elites which are the headquarters of chaebols; globally integrated 
Korean financial markets; and global-national networks of alternative 
investments, including private equity specialists, intermediary experts and 
economic bureaucrats. In the context of Korean society, these three sites or 
network have emerged as a locus not only of economic power but also of social 
and political power, particularly after the financial crisis in 1997 and subsequent 
neo-liberal transformation.  
 
The chaebols, which are fully fledged globalized business entities in terms of 
their investments and operations, arrived at the apex of power in Korea in 
around the mid-2000s, as the buzzword of the „republic of Samsung‟22 well 
illustrates (Choi J-J 2005: 273). Their headquarters play central part in the 
organization of the resources in Korea.  
 
The Koran financial market has also emerged as a conduit of global financial 
forces because market agents increasingly share „the spirit of the times of neo-
liberalism‟, „the investment logic of neo-classical economics‟, and practices. It 
thus disciplines the corporations as well as policy makers with their latent but 
occasionally visible „exit power‟ (Cho Y-C 2007:10).  
 
The global/national network of alternative investment has emerged after the 
Korean financial crisis in the form of a business connection between global 
private equity (or hedge) funds (PEFs), “glocal” advisory specialists, and 
policymakers in the government. When the network had inflated its power until 
it was commending the decision-making of the government, by way of a 
symbiotic relationship with policymakers, it resembled what is called the „iron 
triangle‟ in America: the connection between Wall Street, the White House and 
the arms industry (Briody 2003). The major restructuring and recapitalization of 
the crisis-ridden banks and the big corporations could be done mainly through 
                                           
22
 Samsung is the largest chaebols in Korea. 
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the transformative role of these networks. Their investment decisions usually 
had a formidable impact on the companies, employees, subcontractors and local 
communities. 
 
 
4.4 Methodological Considerations 
 
The research problem of this thesis is an open-ended inquiry and it can be better 
answered by employing a qualitative (or, to a lesser extent, a mixed) approach. 
Considering the inductive nature of qualitative study, there could be a critique 
that the suggested theoretical paradigm excessively invokes „assumptions about 
what the research findings might be like before the data are collected and 
analyzed‟ (Kelly 2004: 131). To avoid this fallacy, the role of the theory here is 
limited to a „guide for interpretation‟ (Griffin 2006: 14) or a „lens‟ that can 
inform „the researchers as to what issues are important to examine‟ and „the 
people that need to be studied‟ (Creswell 2003: 131). 
 
The qualitative exploration envisaged by this thesis requires the researcher to 
conduct a reflexive conversation with what is thought to be reality. Not only 
should the research seek an exact description of sequences of events and 
phenomena in their natural setting, but it should also look into the meaning of 
reality within its historical, social, and political contexts. Among the several 
strategies of inquiry, it appears that “small scale” ethnography based on 
interview and participant observation, as well as use of qualitative case studies, 
is appropriate to this thesis. A full scale ethnography may be more thorough and 
intense than a number of interviews, case studies and limited participant 
observation that this research conducts. Nonetheless, once these are carefully 
employed, small scale ethnography can provide robust research tools that 
explore highly complex and politically and contextually „sensitive‟ causal 
relations (Silverman 2004: 62), in that they place “contextual interpretation” at 
the centre of the inquiry.  
 
Case study works best when the researcher tries to look into an issue in depth. It 
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„provide(s) an explanation that can cope with the complexity and subtlety of 
real life situation‟ (ibid: 38). The case can be an event, a process, an activity, a 
program, or one or more individuals, but it should be chosen on the basis of the 
relevance to the problem and the issue being studied. In this thesis, the cases 
were selected only when they were believed to be „typical instances‟, allowing 
the researcher to generalise from the findings. This point is particularly 
important, in that case study as a research strategy is most vulnerable to 
criticism of the „credibility of generalizations made from its finds‟ (ibid: 40, 45). 
In qualitative case studies, similarly to ethnography, the researcher „adopts an 
interpretive approach to data, studies “thing” within their context and considers 
the subjective meanings that people bring to their situation‟ (de Vaus 2001:10).  
 
Both strategies of inquiry basically share the same philosophical stance of 
social constructivism (often combined with interpretivism). According to 
Michael Crotty (1998, in Cresswell 2003: 9), constructivism is an idea that 
assumes that:  
 
„meanings are constructed by human beings as they engage with the world 
they are interpreting; humans engage with their world and make sense of it 
based on their historical and social perspective; the basic generation of 
meaning is always social, arising in and out of interaction with a human 
community‟. 
 
In short, society is constructed, rather than being an object-like reality. 
Although this study shares such epistemological position, this does not mean it 
wholly accepts the kind of post-modern discourses that abandon all forms of 
realism. 
  
In qualitative studies, the researcher is the basic instrument of research. This 
requires the researcher to be sensitive to the issue of his/her own position. The 
researcher of this thesis has been a journalist for 17 years, covering mainly the 
fields that this research investigates. In this sense, the position of the researcher 
is similar to that of the „complete participant‟. This position has the attraction of 
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generating more complete knowledge, but at the same time it runs the risk of 
„going native‟, where the researcher abandons the position of an analyst for one 
of identification with the people under study. To avoid this mistake, the 
researcher needs to make a strenuous effort to maintain the position of a 
„marginal native‟ living in two worlds simultaneously, that of participation and 
that of research (Walsh 2006: 229, 233). 
 
 
4.5 Methods  
 
4.5.1 Data collection 
 
Ethnography and qualitative case studies employ quite extensive techniques of 
inquiry, including observing things that happen, listening to what people say 
and questioning people in the setting under investigation (Walsh 2004: 226-
228). Three main data collection techniques are applied in this research. These 
are 1) interviews, 2) analysis of media text and other contents, and 3) 
participant observation. By combining these methods, this research tried to 
curtail the biases that are inherent in a qualitative approach.  
 
Interviews 
 
Interviews are a central significance to this thesis. Interviews with economists, 
journalists, members of corporate elites and policy-makers provided critical 
information and contexts with regard to the actual working of the sites of 
economic elites. These interviews were guided by the understanding that 
internal communications and subcultures in a discrete, local group and 
community are important because the rationality of decision-making is, to a 
large extent, the outcome of such internal communications. Indeed, the in-depth 
interviews with key actors helped the researcher to grasp the mechanism by 
which internal communications and culture are related to broad material impact, 
such as changes of policy, in the sites of power. 
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A total of 58 interviews were conducted for this research. Forty nine interviews 
among them were done during the researcher‟s field work in Korea between 
early December 2008 and late February 2009. On average, one interview was 
organized per day except over weekends. Most of the interviews during the first 
month were set up before the researcher‟s departure for the field, while the 
interviews of the second and third months were organized during the 
researcher‟s stay in Korea. Most of the interview requests were successful, but 
three of them were declined. Seven additional interviews were also conducted 
during a later visit to Seoul Korea, mainly about the link that the researcher 
found between the interviews or the archival texts. And two interviews were 
conducted in 2007. 
 
All of the interviews were conducted on a one-on-one basis at the working 
place of the interviewee or in a calm restaurant near the interviewee‟s office. 
The interviews lasted on average for 40-45 minutes. However, a few were as 
short as 20 minutes, while a few lasted over an hour. All of the interviews, 
except for two, were recorded and notes were taken in case they were necessary. 
Each interview generated on average 2,000 words (in Korean) of transcript 
material. 
 
The interviewees were selected by means of „theoretical sampling‟ in which the 
process of data collection is controlled by a „theoretical purpose‟ and emerging 
perspectives (Glaser and Strauss 1964, in Seale 2004: 242). To select a „relevant 
range‟ of interviewees (Byrne 2004: 187), the representative professional 
sectors which compose the field of research were drawn up in each area of 
research. Then typical positions or occupations were sought, to obtain direct 
accounts of the culture, discourses and communication practices within the site. 
As is common with qualitative or field research (Deacon et al. 1999), the 
selection of interviewees was also conducted using non-probability sampling. 
This method gives the researcher convenience and availability, but it is also 
acknowledged that this kind of sampling has risks of „unrepresentativeness‟ or 
speculative „generalising‟ (Pole and Lampard 2002: 35).  
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The interviewees were business executives and public relation personnel (9), 
analysts, fund managers and bankers (12), financial intermediaries such as 
consultants, accountants and lawyers (5), researchers in business(financial) 
think-tanks or academia (7), business or financial journalists (18), members of 
parliament and high-ranking public officials (7). 
 
Table 4-1: Categories of Interviewees 
 
Business Financial 
market 
Intermediaries Researchers Journalists Politicians 
and 
Government 
Total 
9 12 5 7 18 7 58 
 
The number of interviewees in each of the professional sectors and areas (e.g. 
the stock market, bond market or foreign exchange market) was set to reflect 
the central concerns of the research. Interviewees were sought who had been in 
the profession for at least 10 years; largely this guide line was met. Some of the 
interviewees were selected from the address book of the researcher, who 
worked in those fields as a journalist. The snowballing process was also used to 
obtain several further interviews. The sampling, based on the researcher‟s 
acquaintances, helped the researcher in contacting directly appropriate 
interviewees with few errors. But this may lead to certain biases; for instance, it 
raises the question of how those limited examples relate to a wider population. 
Journalists who covered each site or field were especially helpful because they 
generally knew well who were the key persons in the site and they were 
cooperative in introducing the researcher to the interviewees. 
 
The interviews were conducted on the basis of semi-structured questions and 
open questions, thus they could be referred to as „conversations with purpose‟ 
(Mason 1996: 38). In the first place, three different types of questions were 
prepared in line with the characteristics of each site. The questions contained 
basic inquiries about the field and the elites within the field, focusing on the 
following interests: which actors constitute the site of power and how those 
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actors are networked; what are the discrete culture, discourses and practices in 
the site; what specific norms and values in relation to market liberalism are 
prevalent and shared among actors in the site; to what extent are information 
(knowledge), media and communications important for the actors in 
comprehending the outside world and making private or public decisions; what 
specific style of communication and consumption of the mass or private media 
has developed in the site; what role do the mass media play in the site and how 
do the actors utilize the media to produce the intended consequences. 
  
But a larger numbers of open or in-depth questions were added to the basic list 
of questions depending on specific cases, issues and interviewees. Moreover, 
the actual questions varied and certainly had to be reshaped within the 
interviews, according to the interviewee‟s responses. In this sense, the 
interviews had aspects both of data collection and of data generation in which 
the interviewer, sometimes, co-produced the data through an interaction with 
the interviewee (Mason 1996: 36). 
 
Archival records 
 
Documents and media texts were a valuable resource for the qualitative 
research. Throughout the study, the researcher collected archival records from 
as many sources as possible, including media texts, web pages, books and 
internal documents. This data is helpful to comprehend the social context of the 
specific issues dealt with in case studies, as well as to map out the overall shape 
of the sites of economic power. The collection was initially guided by the 
research questions, but the reading of the texts helped to reshape or sharpen the 
angle of the questions. This led to another search for the archival data. The 
same “dialectical process” was also applied in conducting interviews for this 
thesis. Textual records were collected in order to comprehend the fields of the 
agents whom the researcher intended to interview, but one interview would 
often generate a further search for archival records, as it raised several issues to 
check for the next interviews. 
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Most of the archival records collected and analyzed were media reports, in 
particular press reports, though broadcasting scripts and internet news were also 
broadly selected case by case. This is not just because press reports are well 
archived, and hence convenient for the researcher, but also because it is widely 
received that the elite are influenced more by the newspapers than by any other 
kinds of media. This situation is not very different for the Korean economic 
elites. Indeed, broadcasts have far larger audiences than press in Korea, but the 
elite portion of the audiences often do not have time to watch prime-time 
broadcast news. As far as agenda-setting in relation to economic issues is 
concerned, the newspapers are superior to broadcast news in terms of „depth, 
detail, and numbers‟ of articles (Tunstall 1996: 354). As Michael Schudson 
(2003: 7) has put it, most of the TV news „begins with what TV journalists read 
in the morning newspapers‟. Recently, more audiences, including members of 
the elites, have been reading news from on-line media. But it turns out that most 
of the news contents of good quality on the web are also created by the 
newspapers or broadcast journalists (Hankyoreh 21, 21 Dec. 2006). 
 
The archival data studied has been restricted to the period between the financial 
crisis in 1997 and the end of the presidency of Roh, Moo-hyun in early 2008. 
This period is particularly relevant for this study in that, during the ten years 
since the financial crisis, Korean economy and society have been considerably 
transformed under the influence of the neo-liberal perspective and policy 
paradigm. But, if necessary, texts that date back to the early 1990s or after 2008 
are also included. The media texts are mainly collected through the database of 
the Korea Press Foundation, e.g. the Korea Integrated News Database System 
(KINDS, http://www.mediagaon.or.kr/ jsp/search/SearchKindsMain.jsp), which 
provides archival news taken from 10 national and 8 economic dailies. Its 
keyword search method provides reliable accessibility. The newspaper texts 
comprise news reportage, editorials and columns. The news items of Chosun 
and JoongAng, the two major national newspapers, were collected from its web-
page as they are not included in the database of KINDS. 
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Participant observation 
 
Participant observation and field experience has helped to fill the gaps that 
could not easily be bridged by interviews and archival texts. The researcher has 
worked as a journalist for 17 years, together with 13 years as a business writer, 
in a national newspaper (The Hankyoreh) and an international news agency 
(Thomson Reuters) in Korea. During his career, the researcher covered various 
fields of the economy, inclusive of such areas as industry and the headquarters 
of chaebols, banks and financial markets, and economic departments. In 
particular, the researcher witnessed and reported the whole process of the Asian 
economic crisis in the late 1990s, from the collapse of the Thai baht, its impact 
on the Korean financial market, to the neo-liberal transformation of the Korean 
economy and society. In all the stages of the research, this thesis was guided by 
this experience of the field and by an understanding of the global economy. In 
particular, the researcher was indebted to the direct access to the key agents of 
the economy as well as the remaining notes and articles. 
 
4.5.2 Data Analysis 
 
Most of the texts collected, including the interview transcripts and archival data, 
were analysed qualitatively in order to „grasp their significance‟ (May 
1993:146). The researcher read the text carefully over and over again. This was 
followed by the categorization of the information according to the particular 
concerns of the thesis, for example, the mechanisms of the capillary exercise of 
power or its material impacts. Ideas arising from reading the texts were also 
noted. But, using analytical software such as Nvivo was not practical because 
most of the interview scripts were extracted from the specific open questions 
rather than structured questionnaires. Instead, the texts are understood in terms 
of their social production rather than their truth (Walsh 2004). In other words, 
attention is given to the question of why they are written (spoken), who writes 
them, who reads them, how they are read, for what purposes, with what 
outcomes and so on.  
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Alongside this, a quantitative method was also employed to compare the 
frequency of the specific words used in the news articles. This analysis was 
useful in determining the media‟s orientation towards specific discourses or 
agendas. This quantitative analysis also helped further to consolidate the 
knowledge which had been obtained with qualitative methods. Another 
technique of “triangulation” will be elaborated more fully below.  
  
4.5.3 Enhancing the quality of the research 
 
Qualitative research often generates concerns of „reliability and validity‟ 
resulting from incomplete data collection, selective perception and reactivity 
(Wimmer and Dominick 2006: 119). Triangulation may be a popular way of 
enhancing the trustworthiness of the knowledge obtained by a qualitative 
approach. Norman K. Denzin (1978, in Seale 2004: 77) suggested four types of 
triangulation: triangulation of data, investigator, theory and method. In a similar 
vein, Maykurt and Morehouse (1994, in Wimmer and Dominick 2006: 120) 
addressed four factors that help build credibility: multiple methods of data 
collection, audit trials, member checks and a research team. Among these 
techniques, three were employed in this research. 
 
Firstly, in order to build up confidence of the data collected, as suggested in the 
data collection section, different data sources are used. The information and 
knowledge from interviews, archival texts and participant observation were 
compared and cross-checked. When any incompatibility was found, another 
interview or archival search was made in order to figure out the reason for this.  
 
Secondly, to avoid bias resulting from a single investigator with a specific 
hypothesis, the guideline was kept in mind that researchers should seek 
„evidence that provides a compelling test of the theory‟, rather than „seeking 
evidence that is consistent with our theory‟. Even if the evidence looked self-
evident, another trial was made deliberately to seek for aspects that could 
„disprove the theory‟ (de Vaus 2001: 11). 
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Mixing qualitative and quantitative methods is the most widely applied 
triangulation. While this thesis was originally based on qualitative analysis, 
thirdly, quantitative techniques such as statistical analysis of media text were 
also used as a supplement. 
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Chapter 5 
 
The Discursive Construction: 
 The Downsizing of Politics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
87 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter explores the discursive construction of the „downsizing‟ of 
democracy (Crenson & Ginsberg 2002) in the Korean context. The research 
inquires what specific discourses on globalization and the market economy 
accompanied neo-liberal transformation. And it asks how these discourses 
influenced the political space by reformulating and redefining the public sphere, 
the usefulness of politics, the range of political engagement, and the nature of 
democracy. In particular, this chapter takes note of the role of the community of 
Korean economic experts, including economists, ministry officials and the 
leading journalists, in the construction of the neo-liberal economic and political 
reality. The experts are examined from the point of shared intellectual 
background among them and their private networks with the hegemonic 
countries, notably with the U.S. 
 
Experiencing the Asian economic crisis in the late 1990s, the dominant 
paradigm of Korean society and economy changed considerably. It was a 
transformation similar to that outlined by Karl Polanyi (2001[1944]), from a 
market that is embedded in the society to the society that is embedded in the 
market. This change should be understood not only as a structural 
transformation but also as a discursive construction 
 
According to researchers in economics and politics, neo-liberalism generally 
promotes de-politicization of economy by which it restrains democracy from 
increasing people‟s influence through state politics (Chang H-J 2003; Choi J-J, 
Park C-P and Park S-H 2007; Cho Y-C 2007; Yoo C-K 2003). It should be 
emphasized that such a de-politicization of economy „reflects a distrust of 
democracy‟ and that it „ultimately tries to narrow the democratic control‟ over 
the economies (Chang H-J 2007: 138). Neo-liberals mobilize a general 
antipathy towards politics and politicians to undermine the legitimacy of 
politics. As such, the anti-democratic discourse of neo-liberals makes common 
cause with the elitism whereby economists, entrepreneurs and technocratic 
bureaucrats enjoy the autonomy of decision-making. It goes without saying that 
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a state and a form of politics that are „relatively insulated from popular 
pressures are best able to make the ongoing adjustments to global market forces‟ 
(Leys 2001: 33).  
 
In order to explain the discursive process of the neo-liberal transformation of 
Korea, a broad range of newspaper articles were collected from the news 
database of KINDS or from the website of each newspaper. Various key words, 
such as “economic crisis”, “state and market”, “neo-liberalism”, “globalization” 
and “populism”, were used in order to obtain pieces relevant to the research 
theme of this chapter. Most of the articles were in written in the period from 
1997 to 2004, the zenith of neo-liberalization of Korea. From the articles, 
around 400 pieces were selected and carefully read in order to grasp the order 
of discourses and their social significances. Parts of the articles are cited 
directly in this chapter. Alongside this, such books as the memorandum of the 
key government officers who handled economic policies at the time of the 
Korean economic crisis were also consulted. 
 
 
5.2 The Korean Epistemic Community of Economics 
 
In chapter 4, this thesis examined the dynamics of the global-national 
penetration of hegemonic ideas. It presented Beth A. Simmons and her 
colleagues‟ four causal mechanisms of the international diffusion of policy 
ideas (2008: 10), i.e. models of “competition”, “coercion”, “learning”, and 
“emulation”. It also stated that discourse, expert groups and cognitive processes 
are closely related to the dynamics of diffusion. It was stressed that a pre-
existing expert group or „epistemic community‟ (Haas 1992) is critical. 
 
When it comes to the neo-liberal transformation of Korea, the structural 
imperative of post-Breton Woods capitalism and coercion from the „new 
international financial architecture‟ (NIFA) (Soederberg 2004: 1) can only 
explain half of the dynamics. Both the limitation of the state-driven 
developmental strategy and the unprecedented economic meltdown in 1997 
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surely explain a large part of the momentum for Korea‟s neo-liberal turn and its 
deepening. However, the comprehensive neo-liberal transformation that took 
place over a relatively short period requires a supplementary explanation. This 
can be sought in the voluntary adoption of the neo-liberal policy paradigm by 
the Korean experts, including economists, policy-makers and journalists. 
  
The Korean economic crisis in 1997 was followed by a battle of interpretation 
about the causes of the crisis. As a result of this battle, the previously successful 
paradigm, the state-driven developmental model, was officially discarded while 
neo-liberalism has consolidated its position as an „idea as a paradigm‟ (Ha Y-S 
2003: 3). It was the like-minded Korean economic experts that led the 
transformation of the paradigms when the crisis required a change of 
interpretative frameworks. These Korean experts played the role of an epistemic 
community which was linked to the global experts who produce authoritative 
socio-economic theories and discourses (Lee B-C 1998). 
 
This expert group, however, did not appear from a void. The economists who 
had strong belief in the free market made their appearance from the early 1980s. 
Following the neo-liberal turn of the U.S. and the U.K., these experts actively 
introduced the neo-liberal policy paradigm into Korea as an alternative to the 
developmental state model. These experts have gradually accumulated 
intellectual leadership as their numbers have increased in the universities, the 
economic ministries and the media. They looked upon themselves as advocates 
of an innovative paradigm against the resilient institutional legacy of the old 
model, i.e. the intrusive state bureaucrats and the “mercantile” chaebols system. 
When the Korean economic crisis broke out, in this respect, these experts even 
thought that the crisis could be a „blessing in disguise‟ for pro-market reform 
(Kang K-S 1999: 357). Using the intellectual leadership that the crisis has 
endowed them with, they played the role of „missionaries‟ of neo-liberal 
transformation (Cho H-Y 2009: 38-42). 
 
One might then ask: what made them play the role of a pre-existing expert 
group for the internalization of the neo-liberal paradigm? One convincing 
90 
 
answer might be sought in their deep co-option by the „intellectual leadership‟ 
of the U.S. (Jung S-I 2004: 352). And this co-option arouse mainly through the 
similarity in their academic carriers. Most of these influential Korean 
intellectuals had studied in the U.S. Among 365 professors in politics, 
economics, and sociology in the 9 best universities in South Korea, 306 (83.8%) 
received their Ph.D.s from the U.S., while only 24 (6.6%) obtained them from 
the universities in Korea (Kyunghyang-shinmun 2008: 189). This intellectual 
connection with the U.S. became more conspicuous around the turn of the 
1990s as the American-trained experts took up a leading position within their 
field.  
 
Table 5-1: Korean Ph.D.s from the U.S.A.          
                                                      (1948~2010) 
Major Overseas Ph.D. Ph.D. from the U.S. (%) 
Economics 1,289 882 (68.4%) 
Business Administration 1,062 771 (72.6%) 
Politics 882 440 (49.9%) 
Sociology 396 223 (56.3%) 
Media & 
Communications 
393 295 (75.0%) 
                                                               (NRF) 
 
In terms of economic ideas and discourses, the influence of these American-
trained experts was even more powerful. From the global network perspective 
(Holton 2006), these experts played the hub role that linked the domestic and 
global spheres of economic discourse. Out of 1,289 Ph.D.s in economics 
obtained from overseas universities, 882 (68.4%) graduated from a university in 
the U.S. When it comes to business administration, 771 (72.6%) out of 1,062  
overseas Ph.D.s obtained their degrees in the U.S. (NRF
23
).  In Seoul National 
University, one of the most prominent universities in Korea, 30 out of 34 
professors in the economics department took their Ph.D.s in the U.S. Moreover, 
                                           
23
 Registered in the National Research Foundation of Korea between 1948 and 2010 (Webpage 
http://www.doctorinformation.or.kr/FDTSapp/index.jsp , retrieved on 4 June 2010). 
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a majority of them studied at the top 10 private universities such as Chicago, 
Harvard and Yale.
24
 
 
It was difficult, among the influential economic professors, to find anyone who 
had majored in any subject other than mainstream (neo-classical) economics. 
Overall, they were undivided in that they had an affinity with the „Chicago 
School‟ of neo-liberal economics (Kyunghyang-shinmun 2008: 190). Chang 
Ha-joon, an economist at Cambridge University, said in an interview with the 
researcher: 
 
 „Until the early 1990s, there were some mixtures of economic perspectives 
among economists who just graduated from the university in the U.S. Some 
of them had the Keynesian leaning of the East Coast universities while others 
had the Friedmanite leaning of the inland universities, especially, Chicago 
University. But, after the mid-1990s, the majority of the Ph.D.s in economics 
became monotonous in their perspectives. They were all “Chicago-boys” 
who shared the belief in the supremacy of free market economics. And these 
economists gradually occupied the post of teachers in the major universities 
in Korea‟ (Interview, 16 Dec. 2010). 
 
Still, it may be true that this academic background and personal connections do 
not automatically lead to an uncritical co-option to the specific perspectives. 
But, as Stephen Walt (2005) has pointed out, they unwittingly absorb 
mainstream American views and are prone to be uncritical about hegemonic 
political and economic perspectives. Thus it was little wonder that they acted as 
missionaries of the neo-liberal paradigm when they took up influential positions 
in academia and in official circles, working in close communication with the 
American experts in academia and in supranational institutions such as the IMF, 
the OECD and the World Bank (Lee B-C 1998: 19; Ha Y-S 2003: 11). 
 
The policy-makers in government departments and economic journalists who 
                                           
24
 Webpage (http://econ.snu.ac.kr/m5/m5_1.htm , retrieved on 4 June 2010).  
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had already imbibed the intellectual influence of neo-classical economics at the 
university also created an intellectual connection with the U.S. through their 
overseas on-the-job training. Most Korean journalists go to university in the 
U.S. when they get a chance to study overseas during their careers. Out of 84 
journalists who received a grant for one-year-overseas-study from LG Sangnam 
Press Foundation
25
 during the period 2001~2009, for example, 71 (84.5%) flew 
to the U.S.A.
26
 And, out of 901 government officials who studied overseas for 
1~3 years during the period 2003~2005, 521 (57.8%) chose to go to the U.S.A 
(Kyunghyang, 2 May 2007). 
 
Due to this intellectual affinity, perhaps, the interpretative frameworks 
concerning the causes and remedy of the economic crisis, authored by the IMF, 
the American intellectuals and the American media, have penetrated deeply into 
the minds of the Korean economic experts. Kim Sung-hae (2005: iii) observed 
that the Korean intellectuals actively played the role of a pre-existing expert 
group or epistemic community by developing „an intellectual apprenticeship 
with the hegemon‟s intellectuals‟ and by prioritizing, in the case of media 
coverage, the „hegemonic affiliations over the Korean power elite‟. 
 
 
5.3 The Interpretation of the Crisis 
 
When a country is faced with an economic crisis, it is very important what the 
experts „interpret‟ the forthcoming crisis to be. Once a specific explanation 
becomes dominant, then the account gains substantial power. In effect, it 
delineates people‟s perceptions of the situation and constrains the policy 
measures that the government can take (Ha Y-S 2003: 12).  
 
When the crisis broke out in Korea, a variety of explanations about the cause of 
the crisis mushroomed. Thus it might be safe to say, as the World Bank (1998) 
noted, that multiple factors interacted along the road to the crisis. Those factors 
                                           
25
 A press foundation set up by a donation from the LG, the third largest chaebols in Korea. 
26
 Homepage( http://www.lgpress.org/main.dev, retrieved 11 Oct 2009) 
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included the exacerbating macroeconomic fundamentals; the rapid inflow and 
outflow of short-term foreign financial capital; the huge build-ups of corporate 
debt; and the incompetent financial regulations. 
 
Overall, we can group the vicissitudes of the debates, largely, into four 
contending perspectives, each of which stressed one possible critical cause, 
such as unfriendly international circumstances, exogenous shocks, policy 
mistakes and fundamental weaknesses. Once again, these perspectives can be 
grouped into two polarized debates between an “exogenous” and an 
“endogenous” thesis according to their emphasis (see Table 5-2). The 
exogenous thesis basically regarded the crisis as a market panic. It thus ascribed 
the cause mainly to the volatility of the global financial market and the failure 
of governments to develop a system that could curb the backlash of financial 
liberalization. The endogenous thesis emphasized the structural weakness of the 
state-driven development model. The economists in this perspective have 
emphasized the unavoidable demise of Asian “crony capitalism” because of its 
internal failures, such as the collusion between business and politics, careless 
government intervention into the market mechanism, and imprudent lenders and 
the “moral hazard” of firms.  
 
In Korea, however, the exogenous crisis thesis had few echoes. Instead, the 
endogenous crisis perspectives authored by a number of American economists 
in the university, Treasury and Wall Street prevailed. Among 50 economic 
experts who were cited in the Korean media more than twice between 1997 and 
2005, 75% agreed with the “endogenous” crisis thesis. One notable aspect was 
that 80% of them obtained their Ph.D.s from the U.S. majoring in economics or 
finance (Kim S-H 2007: 151). 
 
In their diagnosis, debates were largely framed in a manner that dichotomized 
between the state and the market. Specifically, as the Korean crisis was the 
culmination of the crisis that swept the Asian countries in the late 1990s, the 
cause and remedy were discussed from the angle of the demise of the state-
driven Asian model. Considering that the pre-crisis debates on the 
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developmental state model have never sharply polarized between the state and 
the market, as we can see from the fact that the World Bank (1993) identified 
the model as a „market-based authoritarian regime‟, this dichotomization 
seemed to be „overdone‟ (Choi H-I 2009: 168-169; Park E-H 1999). 
Nonetheless, the transposed framework of the debate was rapidly shared 
between the economic experts in both Korea and the U.S. 
 
Table 5-2: The different explanations of the cause of the Korean crisis 
 
 Main causes Solutions 
Main 
advocates 
Exogenous 
crisis 
-The uncontrollable financial 
market 
- The failure to develop a regulatory 
system 
-The lack of international 
cooperation 
-The misjudgment of the 
government 
-Regulation of 
currency speculation 
-Slowdown of capital 
liberalization 
-Reform of the 
international 
financial architecture 
Joseph 
Stiglitz 
(U.S.) 
Linda Weiss 
(Australia) 
Jeffery Sachs 
(U.S.) 
Chang Ha-joon 
(U.K.) 
 
Endogenous 
crisis 
Government 
failure 
-The structural 
weakness of East 
Asian capitalism 
-Crony capitalism 
-Too much state 
intervention 
 
-Additional 
liberalization of 
capital movement 
-Transparency and 
accountability 
- Structural reform 
-Market-friendly 
policy (Deregulation) 
Chung Un-chan 
(Korea) 
Robert Rubin 
(U.S.) 
Fred Bergsten 
(U.S.) 
Charles Wolf, 
Jr. 
(U.S.) 
Market 
failure 
-Imprudent 
investment of the 
firms 
- Moral hazard of 
the banks 
- Incompetent 
regulatory system 
-Transparency and 
accountability 
-Market friendly 
policy 
- Proper regulation 
Laurence 
Summers 
(U.S.) 
Steve Marvin 
(Korea) 
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Accordingly, the policy paradigm that the IMF has imposed as „conditionality‟ 
was almost completely accepted (Kang K-S 1999: 373). As we can see from the 
journalistic praises of „a model student of the IMF program‟, Korea has gone 
further than the IMF and Wall Street had expected (Dong-A 25 Nov. 2002). In 
less than 2~3 years after the crisis, Korea has taken many steps towards 
becoming the society that the “Washington Consensus” conjures up. 
 
One explanation would be the structural constraints from the geopolitical 
particularities of Korea. A small open economy that relies for its trade and 
security heavily on the U.S. had only narrow political room for manoeuvre. In 
effect, according to autobiographies by Korean ministers, the U.S. Treasury 
mobilized an invisible hand with the clear objective that Korea should go to the 
IMF (Chung D-G 2008; Kang K-S 1999). Hence, the Mahathir-style “my way” 
approach may have been the least imaginable option to the Korean experts, who 
actually gave the cold shoulder to the Malaysian solution.  
 
The “mea culpa” mood 
 
But structural constraints may have been the only part of the reasons. The more 
convincing explanation would be that the Korean economic experts placed their 
hope in the market when the state and chaebols, the two pillars in Korean 
economic development over the last 30 years, were blamed for the crisis. When 
the crisis hit Korea, thus, the initial response of the economic experts was 
predominantly self-reflexive (Song H-K 1998; Sohn H-C 1999). A lot of 
lamenting columns in the press wound up with a „mea culpa‟, i.e. „I am to 
blame‟ (Kim S-H 2005: 193). Cho Yoon-jae, a professor in economics stated:  
 
„Even before the crisis, many people learned that the Korean economy had 
serious structural imbalances and that it might not be easy to avoid 
comprehensive corrections sooner or later … The culprits of the current 
economic hardship are, in a word, all of us who stood idly to one side‟ (Korea 
Economic Daily, 28 Apr. 1998). 
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This “mea culpa” argument has provided a mood of conformity towards the 
endogenous thesis, while dampening the rise of economic nationalism against 
foreign capital. In this perspective, it was the tardiness of structural reform in 
respond to the economic globalization over the last decade that should be 
blamed. The problem was the insufficient penetration of the market as the 
guiding principle of the whole society. The chronic deformation of the market 
by both the monopolistic chaebols and the intrusive government –kwanchi27-- 
was denounced as the main purveyor of this unprecedented national agony. Kim 
Joong-soo
28
 lamented: 
 
„Has the Korean miracle indeed come to an end? Does the Asian value have 
no global power of persuasion? … The roots of the crisis lie in the fact that 
we failed in the globalization of our economy. … We should admit that 
Korean originality is no longer effective in the global economy‟ (Korea 
Economic Daily, 18 Dec. 1997). 
 
With this self-reproach in mind, the economic experts endowed the neo-liberal 
reforms with historical legitimacy. They were believed to be an extended or 
stricter version of the reform program that Korea had already pursued (Chung 
D-G 2008). The economists as well as the media were very keen on comments 
or reports from American experts prioritizing them over others. When Booz 
Allen Hamilton, a global consulting firm, issued a report about the reform of 
the Korean economy in 1998, it became very popular among the Korean experts. 
Also its policy recommendations were seriously taken by the bureaucrats 
(Chung U-C 2007). 
 
What the experts hoped was that the crisis would supply a strong momentum 
for pro-market structural reform. In this respect, the crisis was interpreted in 
relation to the existing intellectual paradigm and the shared interest of the 
experts. One consolation was that the two most powerful groups of the “ancient 
                                           
27
 See page 22, footnote 11. 
28
 A prominent economist and the then president of KDI, a government-funded research 
institution. 
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regime”, the chaebols and the bureaucrats, were in a tight corner at that time in 
the face of the people‟s fury. Kang Kyong-sik, the then deputy prime minister, 
stated in his memorandum: 
 
„When the crisis broke out, many Koreans said that it has finally come. But 
foreigners said that it is a blessing in disguise. It was the same story, in that 
we are able to carry out structural reform which has long been deferred. As a 
result, the Korean economy has a chance to be reborn‟ (1999: 357). 
 
Being chagrined at the lack of market reform, the Korean economic experts 
discursively drove a nail into the coffin of the East Asian developmental model 
and internalized the “modus operandi” of neo-liberalism with close reference to 
the experts of the U.S.  
 
 
5.4 The Discourse of the “Economy First” Society 
 
5.4.1 The market: a purveyor of economic democracy 
 
Why then did the Korean economic experts turn to market liberalism in earnest? 
One reason was that the market looked as if it was a liberal reformer. In a 
country like Korea, where the liberal reform of the „mercantile economy‟ was 
still an important task, market liberalism was often identified with democracy 
(Choi J-J, Park C-P and Park S-H 2007: 121; Kim S-J et al. 2007: 39). This was 
in line with the remark of the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher   
(2002: 421) that the market can be a „more powerful and more reliable 
liberating force than government can ever be‟. In this sense, the reform of the 
chaebols system and of the intrusive bureaucrats was venerated as an „economic 
democratization‟ (Ha Y-S 2003: 14). Ha Yong-chul, a political scientist, pointed 
out: 
 
„It was certainly the market or marketization that captivated the mind of 
Koreans after the crisis. The market was an emblem of reform, a signal for the 
clean-up of the past, and a key to future hope. Anything that had the traits of 
tradition was devaluated as being anti-market. At the same time, an anti-
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market attitude was regarded as being anti-reform and behind the times‟ 
(Munhwa, 28 Apr. 2001). 
 
The market was highlighted again, with the remarkable success of shareholder 
activism, as the liberal reformer of the old-fashioned chaebols system. This 
activism was led by the PSPD,
29
 a liberal citizens‟ campaign organization, with 
the support of the World Bank and the OECD. This activism mobilized minority 
shareholders‟ rights in order to reform the corporate governance system of the 
banks and the chaebols. This strategy was in harmony with the policy aim of the 
Kim Dae-joong and Roh Moo-hyun governments that intended to curb the 
chaebols by means of the financial markets. They sought a way to reform the 
chaebols system by inviting in „rival horses‟ – the financial capitalists who were 
dedicated to Anglo-American shareholder capitalism (Kim K and Park S-S 
1998: 383). 
 
The leading activists, many of whom were American-trained economists or 
management scholars, shared the belief that firms should be disciplined by the 
surveillance of the equity market. Chang Ha-sung,
30
 a representative advocate, 
stated the purpose of the activism as follows: 
 
„The formidable threat to the democratic market economy would be a 
concentration of both political and economic power in the hands of small 
numbers of people as we see in the Korean chaebols. …We can avert this risk 
by enhancing the transparency of the chaebols through the minority 
shareholders‟ monitoring and checking‟ (Kookmin, 15 Mar. 1999). 
 
Ever since its first proxy fight against the Korea First Bank in 1997, this kind of 
activism has adopted the strategy of maximizing „politically framed influences‟ 
by deliberately targeting symbolic firms, such as Samsung Electronics and SK 
Telecom, the leading affiliates of the Samsung and SK chaebols (Roh H-K 2002: 
                                           
29
 People‟s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy. It was dedicated to promoting participatory 
democracy and human rights. 
30
 A professor of Business Management at Korea University. He obtained his Ph.D. from the 
University of Pennsylvania, and he was chosen as one of 50 Asian Stars by Business Week in 
1998 and 1999, along with Asia‟s Best Advocates of Shareholders‟ Rights by Asia Week in 2000. 
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7). Accordingly, this activism has succeeded in gaining support from the public 
and in attracting favorable media attention. This activism, it was said, has 
instilled the “one dollar, one vote” principle of the market into Korean 
industries, where the firms, no matter whether they were listed or not, had been 
appropriated by the chairman‟s family.  
 
5.4.2 Market Fundamentalism  
 
A prominent Korean economist Chung Un-chan
31
 (2007) has expressed his 
frustration that almost every Korean economist, after the crisis, seemed to 
become an ardent believer in the supremacy of the market. Indeed, trust in the 
market had ascended to the verge of „market fundamentalism‟ that argued that 
the „market principle should be applied to every corner of social life‟ 
(Hankyoreh, 20 Jun. 2007). The market was deemed to be a „self-generating‟ 
and „spontaneous‟ order that negates the need for a director (Hayek 1973: 38). 
Similarly, the market was taken to be a “cosmos” that is rooted in the real 
nature of human beings and of society. Intellectual endeavours were undertaken, 
as Karl Polanyi (2001[1944]) pointed out, to reorganize all human and social 
relationships in terms of the principle of the market. 
 
In this escalation of “market-fundamentalism”, special attention should be paid 
to a group of militant economists in CFE,
32
 a think-tank established in 1999 by 
donations from the business world. Those economists actively developed and 
disseminated agendas and discourses on the organizing principle of the market 
society. Many of them took part in the Korean Hayek Society which was 
established to promote the ideas of neoconservative thinkers, such as Friedrich 
Hayek, Milton Friedman and Ludwig von Mises. Kim Young-yong, the 
president of the Korean Hayek Society, insisted in a media interview: „The 
market is virtue and the government is vice. There is no such thing as the third 
way‟ (Dong-A, 2 Nov. 2003). 
 
                                           
31
 He held the post of Prime Minister in 2009.  
32
 The Korean Centre for Free Enterprise 
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In their discourse, the market was a „cosmos‟ where „possessive individuals‟ 
calculate and pursue the maximization of their interests with reference to the 
price (Hong K-B 2006: 405). The most efficient and desirable outcome for 
society will appear once the market is sufficiently competitive using all the 
information available. In this sense, it was argued that if there were de-
commoditized elements in society, for example labour and public goods, they 
should be returned to the market system.  
 
Likewise, the common good was not something that politicians or powerful 
interest groups could dictate. Rather, it should be understood as the outcome of 
the unregulated egoism of agents through which the “invisible hand” of the 
market manifests itself. Having discarded a prior general will, the best policy of 
the state and society would be to consolidate property rights and respect the 
pursuit of wealth or private interest in itself. According to this vein of ideas, the 
ultimate objective of a business was stated by Kong Byung-ho, a militant liberal, 
as follows:  
 
„Today, we should clearly understand that the purpose of the enterprise, from 
A to Z, is to maximize interest. The tendency that begs them for mercy will 
result in inefficiency in the long run‟ (Kookjae, 7 Aug. 1998). 
 
In the market society, the militant economists argued, the freedom of economic 
choice was the foundation of the freedom of human beings. The man of 
economic freedom has his flip side of self-reliance and independence. But the 
weak-minded have the vicious habit of relying on the state and of criticizing the 
rich, especially the chaebols (Kim S-J 1998). This misguided egalitarianism, 
they argued, merely revealed their jealousy of the rich and their fear of 
competition, which would eventually lead to the „road to serfdom‟ (Hayek 
2001[1944]).  
 
5.4.3 Globalization: There is no alternative 
 
For Koreans, after the crisis, the term “globalization” could no longer be merely 
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a political slogan of the previous Kim Young-sam government. It was endowed 
with a much stronger sense of an exigency that, as an American journalist 
Thomas Friedman admonished Malaysia‟s Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad 
in his column, „globalization isn‟t a choice. It is a reality‟ (New York Times, 29 
Sep. 1997). Combined with the people‟s painful memory of the bail-out of the 
economy, the discourse of globalization continuously reminded Koreans of the 
urgency of a radical change in the way of living and thinking. At last, 
globalization has risen to the spirit of the times, i.e. “globalism”, on which the 
state should be rebuilt. On the 50
th
 anniversary of the Republic of Korea, 
President Kim Dae-jung, insisted: 
 
„It is globalism which embraces and proceeds to embrace the world. And it is 
the road we should take because it will guide us toward a second nation-
building. … We must establish a new value system based on universalism 
and globalism‟ (The Korea Herald, 15 Aug. 1998). 
 
The “global village” was described as a borderless market place where the 
scope and extent of economic competition has become increasingly broader and 
stronger. The endless competition in the global market place clearly 
distinguishes between the winners and the losers, where the winner takes all. 
Self-help was thus the norm of the globalizing world because any form of 
safeguard was no longer viable in the face of the pressure from competition. No 
government or benevolent entrepreneur, for instance, could guarantee the 
security of the employee. 
 
To survive in the globalizing world, it was argued that each individual and firm 
should enhance its productivity and competitiveness. And the general 
competence of a country in the global economic battlefield was termed its 
“national competitiveness”. And the cardinal point of competitiveness was to 
strategically conform to „the rule of game of the global economy‟ (Ahn B-Y 
1999: 111) because, in the age of cross-border flows of goods and capital, 
national competitiveness inevitably depended on the confidence of foreigners. 
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Kim Ki-whan,
33
 an influential senior economic policy-maker, pointed out: 
 
„It is the age when the border cannot deter the movement of production 
factors. Information as well as capital flits across the border without any 
restriction. Once the economic policy is behind the global trend, then capital 
may flee to other countries at any time. This is true not only of foreign capital 
but also domestic capital‟ (Dong-A, 10 Nov. 2000). 
 
The so-called “global standard” became the references of the structural reform 
policies after the crisis. What was significant about the idea of the global 
standard was that it was „just another name‟ for the dominant market-
fundamentalism of the „Washington consensus‟ (Chosun, 22 May 1999). 
 
The last but not the least important aspect of the globalization discourse was 
that it became a “coupling device” between market fundamentalism and the 
credos of the developmental state. The globalization discourse often presented 
its imperative by mobilizing both the fear and the economic nationalism of the 
general public. It was inculcated that if Korea failed to live up to these global 
trends, then it would fall again into the bottomless pit of economic destitution. 
But if Korea successfully transformed itself into a global citizen, then it would 
soon be a member of the advanced countries and would become one of the 
leading economies in Asia. Here, the deep-rooted „developmental-state mindset‟ 
among Koreans was „intertwined‟ with the market-centered globalization 
discourse (Cho H-Y 2003: 85). 
 
5.4.4 The “economy first” society 
 
Market fundamentalism and globalism, combined, have consolidated the belief 
in the “economy first” in which the various different dimensions of society 
were to be subordinate to economic growth. The economy, both in name and in 
                                           
33 He obtained a Ph.D. in Economics at the University of Berkeley. He successively filled 
various posts such as the deputy Minister of Commerce and Industry, the President of KDI, and 
the special envoy of foreign economic cooperation. 
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reality, became the emblem of prime value in the post-crisis Korea. That is why 
successive presidents, including Kim Dae-jung, Roh Moo-hyun and Lee 
Myung-bak, have all pledged that they will become an “economy president” or 
“CEO President”. On the first day of President Kim Dae-jung‟s term of office, a 
national paper strongly argued that: 
 
„The new president should be the “economy president”. He should tackle this 
task with all his might. The main policy agenda of the new government, 
therefore, should be the “economy first” in which the economy is the first, 
the second and the last priority as well‟ (Seoul, 25 Feb. 1998).  
 
In this society, the enterprise and the businessman were revered as the main 
players that eventually „earn our bread‟ in the „global economic battlefield‟ 
(Munhwa, 1 Nov. 2004). This line of thought gave birth to the discourse of a 
“business-friendly country” in which the whole country should work together to 
support enterprises and businessmen. 
  
Overall, money became the increasingly dominant yardstick for measuring 
success in both the public and the private arena. The state was reformulated as 
the service bureau for footloose global capital, taking care of the task of 
supplying as lenient a business environment as possible. Labour was asked to 
shun any militant labour movement lest capital should flee abroad. If it did not 
do so, it was argued, it deserved the tough enforcement of law and order by the 
government. The universities, for instance, should reform their curriculum in 
order to supply “human resources” tailor-made for the purpose of business. In 
the same context, the economics textbooks of secondary schools were revised 
for the purpose of eliminating anti-business phrases as well as encouraging 
students to have a positive mindset toward the market economy and business 
(Maeil Business Newspaper, 15 Nov. 2005). 
 
The necessity of being a “business friendly country” was emphasized at 
intervals by mobilizing the fear of economic meltdown. The recurrent 
discourses of the danger of an economic slump, the threat of unemployment of 
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the young generation, and the weary life of casual workers have empowered 
business circles which have ultimate discretion over capital investment in the 
country. Accusing the lack of economic leadership of the so-called “equalitarian” 
President, in early 2004, four hundred professors in economics and business 
management issued a statement entitled „Now it is the economy‟: 
 
„The Korean economy now stands at the crossroads of either a rise or a fall. 
… If we hesitate any longer, our economy will slowly collapse and slide 
down into a “failing student” of the global economy. … In order to avert the 
impending crisis, it is essential to encourage the investment and job creation 
of the business circle‟ (Dong-A, 20 Jan. 2004). 
 
It was not a sheer coincidence that, on the same day, President Roh Moo-hyun 
asked the chairpersons of the 30 largest Korean chaebols for an increase of 
investment and recruitment at his lunch meeting with them, promising a 50% 
reduction of labour disputes and the determined reduction of regulations (Dong-
A, 20 Jan. 2004). There has been an implicit understanding that, as a media 
researcher Chung Yeon-ku has remarked expressing his puzzlement, 
„everything other than the economy seemed to be set aside‟ (Hankyoreh, 27 Jan. 
2004). 
 
 
5.5 The Anti-political, Anti-public Discourse 
 
The flip side of the “economy first thinking” was the negation of the 
significance of public affairs and the legitimacy of the political process. As the 
market principle emerged as a cardinal “modus operandi” of Korean society, a 
moral order has emerged that prefers the market to politics, private to public, 
experts to politicians, efficiency to political deliberation. The economy was 
depoliticized by the discourses that tried to dichotomize political affairs and 
economic affairs. In the discourses, politics was, at best, a “necessary evil” that 
wastes the resources of a country and exerts a baneful influence on the economy. 
This was embodied in a cliché that “politics is blocking the economy”. 
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5.5.1 Dichotomy: economic logic vs. political logic 
 
As market liberalism became dominant, a discourse was repeatedly presented 
that politics and the economy should be detached as far as possible. This 
argument emphasized the binary dichotomization between “political logic” and 
“economic logic”. This presupposed that politics and the market had little to do 
with each other; political logic and market logic could be clearly separated. 
 
The dichotomization was based on the different moral preferences between 
politics and economy. In effect, politics was stigmatized to be old-fashioned, 
inefficient and unprofessional. This notion was partly originated from neo-
liberalism‟s affinity with “public choice theory”, which presupposed that public 
policy is motivated more by the private interests of the politicians and 
bureaucrats rather than the public good (Hay 2007). 
 
On the other hand, the economy was seen as autonomous, scientific and 
professional. An article put, for example, „when we say economic logic in 
relation to political logic, it implies rationality, fairness and efficiency‟ (Dong-A, 
27 Dec. 2007). The economy was perceived to be an arena where the economic 
principle of „one dollar, one vote‟ predominated over the democratic principle 
of „one person, one vote‟ (Cho Y-C 1998: 144-145). Accordingly, it was natural 
that the Korean economic experts were very skeptical about the relevance of the 
“democratic market economy” when President Kim Dae-jung proposed it as a 
“third way” perspective in 1998. For example, Kang Kyung-sik, a former 
deputy-prime minister for economic policy, shunned it as an “oxymoron”: 
 
„The confusion originates in the term “democratic market economy” (DJ-
nomics). The democratic market economy is understood as a political market 
economy. Democracy pursues equality, while the market economy pursues 
efficiency. They are not compatible with each other. Accordingly, democracy 
should be limited to the distribution of public goods‟ (1999: 361-362). 
 
It was argued that the market, as a natural and rational system, could function 
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efficiently as long it was detached from political logic. After the crisis, the 
aphorism of „leave the economy entirely to economic logic‟ has been reiterated 
like a „cure-all medicine or a mantra‟ in the columns of the newspapers 
(Hankyoreh, 19 Jul. 1999). A famous columnist Song Bok
34
 stated: 
 
„Now, the market should be returned to the market logic. No matter how 
much the market is insecure, imperfect, and full of unlawfulness and 
absurdity, it is still more effective than government intervention‟ (Munhwa, 
15 Jul. 1998). 
 
There were several counterarguments against the discursive pattern that 
separated politics and the economy. Theoretically, it was argued that a clear 
detachment between political logic and economic logic was almost impossible 
because the market, the foundation of economic logic, was in itself the result of 
politics. As a matter of fact, economic coordination was always possible 
through the existing institutional measures. And it is politics that designs and 
alters the institutions (Chang H-J 2007; 2010). Chung Tae-in, a nonconformist 
economist, argued that „in reality, there is neither a pure economic logic nor a 
political logic‟ (Hankyoreh, 19 Jul. 1999). Nonetheless, this alternative 
explanation was barely heard due to the skewed discursive balance. 
 
5.5.2 The strategy of “de-politicization” of the economy 
 
As was stated in the previous section, the de-politicization of the economy 
started with the polarization between politics and the economy. Then politics 
was repeatedly stigmatized as being parasitic, unproductive and unreliable. 
Here, the discourse of “high cost but low efficiency” and “collective selfishness” 
were typical narrative devices that were mobilized to stigmatize politics and 
politicians. On top of that, the discourse of “populism” has played the critical 
role in narrowing the scope of politics, by urging the politicians and public 
officials to distance themselves from the egalitarian demands of the general 
public. 
                                           
34
 Professor of Sociology in Yonsei University 
107 
 
 
The anti-public discourses undermined the viability of politics by applying the 
standard of business, i.e. efficiency. In the discursive framework of “high cost 
but low efficiency”, politics was usually depicted as a game of the leisured. In 
media and academic discourse, politics was often modified by the adjective 
“unproductive”, implying that it normally yields fewer outputs than inputs. This 
line of argument took the assumption that politics was similar to business, 
where legitimacy was measured by the gauge of efficiency. Party politics, the 
labour movement and citizen campaigns were given an unfavorable impression 
as being little concerned with the difficulties of the life world. Im Hyuk-baek, a 
political scientist stated: 
 
„the distrust of politics was taken to its extreme. … that is because of the 
“high cost but low efficiency” character of politics. It is the typical frail 
industry in our society which has less output than input‟ (Chosun, 29 Apr. 
2002). 
 
In a similar vein, politics was often described as being behind the times, and as 
not having a good understanding of the historical significance of contemporary 
global circumstances. It has been reiterated over and over again that it is 
enterprises that have advanced to the top level, producing world-bestselling 
goods, while government and politics were still staggering behind.  
 
„Among the three groups of the Korean elite, it is only the businessmen of the 
big corporations that hold global competitive power. This may have come 
from the fact that the businessmen, striving to survive, have long been 
exposed to global competition‟ (Chosun, 7 Jan. 2003). 
 
Another common way of stigmatizing politics was to blame political processes 
for being motivated by a collective egoism. Many political activities such as a 
labour disputes, peasants‟ uprisings and regional conflicts were simply 
demonized. These activities were deemed to be a manifestation of the selfish 
interests of strong interest groups. By their habitual breach of law and order, it 
was argued, the interests of the silent masses or consumers were captured. Kim 
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Kwang-du, a leading economist, stated: 
 
„We have witnessed how the consistency of the economic policy was 
jeopardized by the collective egoism of the labour unions, the teachers, the 
medical doctors, the pharmacists, the farmers and the fishermen. ... We 
should admit that the stability of the economic policy is at stake‟ (Dong-A, 5 
Feb. 2002). 
 
Last but not least, an even more powerful discursive device of the de-
politicization of the economy was the discourse of populism. According to 
Webster‟s online dictionary,35 populism refers to „the political doctrine that 
supports the rights and powers of the common people in their struggle with the 
privileged elite.‟ But, in Korea, the word has solely a bad connotation that 
suggests the irresponsible opportunism of politicians to the shortsighted 
demands of the general public. Thus, if a politician was named a „populist‟, that 
was synonymous with saying that he/she was „irresponsible‟ (Kyunghyang 24 
Sep. 2002). Seo Byung-hoon, a political scientist, noted: 
 
„Populism soaked through Korean society like the Apocalypse of Death. 
From politicians, to entrepreneurs, to labourers, everybody behaves as if they 
do not care about the national economy. …We should acknowledge that the 
ghost of populism has already come closer to us‟ (Dong-A, 13 Dec. 2000). 
 
Frequently, the sluggish economy was ascribed to the imprudent politicians who 
tried to control the economy in favor of winning votes in the election.  
 
„the criticism that political logic has suffocated the Korean economy came 
from the experiences that a lot of important policy decisions have been made 
unpredictably at the time of an election. Once politics becomes a matter of 
the number of votes, then any principle will easily become a piece of nothing‟ 
(Kyunghyang, 21 Mar. 2001). 
 
In particular, the narrative of the downfall of Argentina due to Peronism gave a 
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decisive aura of truth to the discourse of the de-politicization of the economy. 
The fall of the Argentinean economy, the fifth largest economy in the world in 
1930, was cited so often that it came to be received as common sense that 
showed the mischief of populism.  
 
„The method was simple. It was taking out of the coffers of the State. Evita 
gave alms to anyone who asked for help. … But, is there any future without 
pain? What happened to the national economy when everybody acted like 
onlookers?‟(Dong-A, 13 Dec. 2000).  
 
There was also a counter argument about populism. Theoretically, it was very 
difficult to distinguish between populism and democratic politics, as Margaret 
Canovan (1990) put it; „populism is the shadow of democracy‟. Hong Yun-ki, a 
political scientist, noted that „the discourse of populism has successfully 
excluded the people from the political consciousness by branding democracy as 
mobocracy‟ (Hankyoreh, 5 Dec. 2005). But this counter-argument was heard 
only very faintly in the media. 
 
 
5.6 The Downsizing of Democracy 
 
The discursive separation between politics and the economy and stigmatization 
of the political process had undermined the socially viable scope of politics. It 
was assumed that most of economic life would be better insofar as it was 
insulated from political deliberation. This was a similar situation to that 
illustrated by Anu Kantol (2001: 69) from the experiences of Finland after the 
economic crisis in the early 1990s. She noted that, as „market liberalism creates 
a political regime that does not favor political life‟, the economy „invade(s) the 
realms of politics and the public‟ as well as politics retreating „from public life 
to professional shelter‟. 
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5.6.1 Closing politics 
 
It was argued that politicians and public officials should refrain from the 
temptation to oversee business and the market, which is an effective and 
autonomous institution in itself. This argument was based on the assumption 
that politics inevitably „corrupts the rationality of the market‟ because it is the 
„bartering process between pecuniary benefit and political assistance‟ (Chang 
H-J 2003:142). Hence, it was argued, society tended to pay an exorbitant price 
when political logic trespassed on market rationality. 
 
„This is because, when the government intervenes, all the economic activities 
of the private sector slide into opportunism. The firms will do their best to 
make full use of the government and politicians for their interests. … In this 
respect, it inevitably leads to collusion between politician and business 
circles‟ (Munhwa, 15 Jun. 1998). 
 
In particular, the discourse of populism had a strong practical influence that 
hindered the politicians from engaging actively in the egalitarian demands of 
the people. This was embodied by the de-politicized neo-liberal policy package, 
including deregulation, privatization and non-discretionary monetary policy.  
 
The redistribution of resources for the sake of equality, a well-received role of 
politics, has suffered from these anti-political discourses. The pro-market 
experts looked down on welfare policy as a form of short-sighted populism that 
would impoverish the poor in the long run. Gong Byung-ho, a militant market 
liberal, put it like this: 
 
„There is no such things as magic in the economy … The poor might get 
some benefits from these poor-oriented policies in the short term. … But this 
will eventually lead to the shrinking of the economic pie by discouraging 
those who are the most eager to produce economic value. … As Karl Popper 
noted, the road to ruin is decorated with good deeds‟ (Ilyoseoul, 31 May 
1998). 
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Once political parties or politicians tried to broaden their political engagements 
with the general public, they run the risk of being stigmatized as “populist” or 
as “amateurish” by the economists and the mainstream media. The discourse of 
populism has become an „ideological device that interprets and blocks every 
small effort of the progressive coalition of civil society‟ (Hankyoreh, 5 Dec. 
2003). 
 
Surprisingly enough, the politicians were openly encouraged, in the name of 
reliable leadership, to violate their election promises once they had won the 
election. The obstinacy of the cool-headed experts was usually a good excuse 
for the breaking of promises. An economist advised the incumbent president to 
give up his popularity in order to restructure the economy, which was expected 
to lead to mass unemployment. Lee Young-ho, a senior economist at the 
POSRI
36
, asserted that: 
 
„the President should keep in mind a golden saying that he must forget 
campaign pledges once he has won the election. Where economic logic is 
mixed with political logic, the restructuring of the economy will go astray‟ 
(Dong-A, 21 Dec. 2000). 
  
Several experts have presented the alternative view that politics should play the 
role of rectifying market failure, including reforming the chaebols system (Sohn 
H-C 1999). But, the pro-market argument stretched to the verge of saying that 
even market failure could be remedied more effectively by sticking to the 
market principle, instead of allowing any political engagement. If there 
remained any task for politics, it would be just „serving the business-friendly 
environments‟ (Choi J-J, Park C-P and Park S-H 2007: 121). In this situation, 
politics and democracy cannot help being „downsized‟ (Crenson & Ginsberg 
2002). 
 
 
 
                                           
36
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5.6.2 Elite decisions: colonizing politics 
 
The economy, detached from politics, was left as the arena where the “technical 
reason” of the experts reigned. In order to fully revitalize the market, it was 
argued, the economy should be managed by „cool-headed guardians‟ (Cho Y-C 
2007: 11) or dispassionate experts. The economy and the market were supposed 
to be an area the complexity of which the „emotional, irrational‟ and „insensible‟ 
public, politicians and even the media were „unable to understand‟ (Kantola 
2001: 65). 
 
Regarding the definition of “experts”, however, some were given their say 
while others were silenced. It was the entrepreneurs, the pro-business interest 
groups and the economists that were able to make their voice heard. Yet, the so-
called non-experts, such as the workers, the citizen groups and the politicians 
found their voices increasingly diminishing. The officials in the economic 
ministries were also given a voice on condition that they would stand aloof 
from political pressure. So often, mainly in relation to the economic issue, the 
political vision encountered the criticism of an “excess of ideology”, while 
public deliberation faced the snub of a “lack of expertness”. A leading national 
daily put this as follows: 
 
„(The Roh government) should not obscure this self-evident (market) 
principle with honeyed words such as equity or solidarity. The Korean 
economy will be revitalized only if they return economic policy to the 
experts, business to the firm, and sound consumption to the people‟ (Chosun, 
25 May 2005). 
 
The enterprise and the entrepreneur have considerably increased their autonomy 
and their voice. In the age of borderless global competition, it was argued, it 
was a mistake to discourage our “warriors” in the economic battle by 
cumbersome political or public considerations. Choi Seung-rho, a militant 
liberal a CEF, put it like this: 
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„The leader of global competition is an enterprise. The reason why we do our 
best to provide a business-friendly environment lies in the realistic desire to 
be affluent. The politics that disregards this exigency is a second-class one 
with low productivity‟ (Kiupsarang, 1 Jan. 2003) 
 
As far as the economy was concerned, one fundamental principle of democracy, 
i.e. rule by the people, gave way to the “sage of the market”. As a result of the 
closing and the colonizing of the public sphere, the political agora was 
narrowed to become a “manor” where a group of elites or experts appropriated 
decision-making with minimal political conflict and public deliberation. In this 
manor, the ideal type of the good politician was configured to be „wise but lazy‟ 
enough to leave economic issues to the experts (Chosun, 27 Dec. 2005). By 
doing so, it was argued, he could protect economic logic against the gusts of 
populist pressure from the workers, farmers or the general public. 
 
In summary, as the public and politicians were distracted from decision-making, 
the discretion of a group of economic elites or experts increased. But this was 
never a value-neutral process immune from the interests of specific social 
classes or divisions. It can be said that the size of the political arena is closely 
linked to the democracy of decision-making (Schattschneider 1960). 
Accordingly, „the smaller the sphere of conflict and deliberation‟, as both 
scholars agreed, „the more likely it was that the democracy would succumb to 
elite private interests‟ (Crenson & Ginsberg 2002: xviii). 
 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
 
The rise of the market and the economy in Korea after its economic crisis in the 
late 1990s led to the “downsizing of democracy” by the closing and colonizing 
of the political and public sphere. In the adoption of the neo-liberal program, 
Korean economic experts, such as economists, economic officials and 
journalists, played an active role as a pre-existing expert group or epistemic 
community, a micro-foundation through which ideas are communicated and 
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legitimated as economic policies. By interpreting the cause of the economic 
crisis as being the “lack of the market and of globalization”, the Korean 
economic experts internalized the modus operandi of the forced paradigm with 
close reference to the experts of the hegemonic countries, i.e. the U.S.A. 
 
The discourse of market fundamentalism and globalism, combined, have 
consolidated the belief in the principle of the “economy first” in which the 
various dimensions of society were to be subordinate to the imperative of 
economic growth. The economy, both in name and in reality, became the locus 
of prime value in post-crisis Korea. The prevalence of “economy first thinking” 
led to the negation of the significance of public affairs and the legitimacy of the 
political process. The stigmatized sphere of politics has receded from the 
multitude of socio-economic issues. This surrender has been guided by the 
principle of the separation of political matters and economic matters.  
 
The economy, detached from politics, is regarded as the arena where the 
technical reason of the experts should rule. As the public and the politicians 
were distracted from the decision-making process, the discretion of a group of 
economic experts increased. But this change was a process in which politics is 
prone to succumb to elite private interests. 
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6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter documents the advance of Korean business elites, i.e. the chaebols, 
as a dominant social power after the crisis. The focus of investigation will be 
placed on the way in which the chaebols enhanced their influence on 
government policy, mobilizing their superior cultural and communicative 
resources. In particular, this chapter examined the unbalanced ecosystem of 
policy knowledge in Korea, which feeds the journalists and informs the policy 
makers. 
 
Traditional work on business elites‟ influence on the state focused on certain 
social and network factors, such as shared ownership, educational background, 
or overlapping personnel. All these are to be noted in Korea with the chaebol-
state relationship. But, the business elite‟s influence is also the result of 
contention over government policy between various social groups, such as 
labour unions, citizens‟ campaign groups and reformists in the government and 
the parliament. Indeed, government policy-making has increasingly become a 
battle ground between competing knowledge and rationality. In this sense, 
cultural, media and discourse factors, which dominate policy debate and 
knowledge about the economy, are of critical importance. In Korea, chaebols 
control these factors through various means and dominate policy decisions, in 
the face of the democratic process. 
 
This chapter investigates chaebols and their connection to the elite 
communication network on economic policy. The features, culture and ideology 
of the networks will be examined. Then the chapter explores the cultural and 
communicative aspects of their influences by examining the production, 
circulation and „imposition as truth‟ of particular knowledge and discourse 
(Haugaard 2002: 185) within the network. This is followed by a case study that 
illustrates the chaebols‟ success in establishing the national agenda of the Roh 
government. 
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6.2 The Business Elite and Policy 
 
The research tradition on elites has regarded the corporate elite as a main actor 
whose power pursues the broader interests of the capitalist and ruling class in 
coalition with other elite groups. The American sociologist C.W. Mills (1956) 
posited executives of giant firms as one pillar of coalescence of a single power 
complex -- „the power elites‟ -- along with military and political elites.  
 
Researchers who asked why corporate power has prevailed over government 
decision-making processes have addressed the role of social organizations and 
interpersonal ties. The observation was that the policymakers, although they 
sometimes respond to pressure from the public, are often linked with the 
corporate elites through diverse social networks such as policy-making groups, 
think-tanks and foundations (Domhoff 1990). The American management 
researcher Michael Useem (1984: 61) has also insisted that corporate elites‟ 
frequent membership of public and private decision-making bodies is „at the 
forefront of corporate outreach to government, political parties, non-profit 
institutions and the media‟. 
 
It is generally believed that the media system plays an integral role in the 
„struggle of ideas‟ (Sabatier 1991) within the political process of policymaking 
– by controlling the scope of political discourse and regulating the flow of 
information (Barker 2005: 1). But the influence of the media on government 
policy is a disputed area. Some researchers argued that the media have only a 
minimal effect on policy (Mortensen and Serritzew 2004, in Barker 2005), only 
with sensational or nonrecurring issues (Protess et al. 1987). Others believe that 
policymakers are susceptible to media reports and that the media have a strong 
influence on policy processes (Herbst 1998; Mayer 2002). A more likely 
scenario would be that the degree of influence changes considerably according 
to the issues (Barker 2005). 
 
The conventional explanation of the media-policy connection is that media 
exposure spurs widespread changes in public opinion, and then the government 
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capitulates to the collective pressures of organized citizens and carries out the 
appropriate policy reforms. This linear “mobilization model”, however, is 
disputed by a number of scholars who question the supposition that the public is 
a necessary link between the media and policy changes. David L. Protess (1991: 
19) showed that policy changes in America „often occur regardless of the 
public‟s reaction‟ to media exposes. The definite tendency was, these scholars 
suggest, that „special interest groups and other political elites dominate the 
policymaking process, not the public‟ (Barker 2005: 3). Moreover, the media 
themselves have emerged to be a powerful political actor, following the trend of 
deregulation of media systems and concentration of the media corporations 
(McChesney 1999). The policy makers also have great incentives to maximize 
positive publicity for their policies. These situations have brought about the 
symbiotic relationship between the media and policymakers to determine policy 
agendas. 
 
To understand the complex elite-media-policy nexus, therefore, it is necessary 
to investigate which social actors are actively working to influence the media 
agenda. One conspicuous recent change is that professional public relations (PR) 
is increasingly engaged in the policymaking process. Resource-rich groups 
equipped with strategic PR skills are now energetically making use of their 
superior source power to direct government policy for their own interests. Even 
alternative or non-institutional sources try to utilize public relations techniques 
in their own ways (Parson 1989; Davis 2002). The advance of PR has also 
resulted in the increase of source power and the erosion of media autonomy. 
The „information subsidies‟ (Gandy 1982) of PR specialists have gradually 
replaced more independent and investigative reporting. In the late 1980s, 
Parson (1989: 213-214) suggested that the financial press had became a mere 
„extension of PR companies‟. 
 
One notable feature of this situation is that the mass media have been gradually 
transformed into an „elite communication channel‟ in the policymaking process. 
With the help of the marketing technique of segmenting, targeting and 
positioning, strong sources focus on specific audiences such as policymakers 
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and opinion leaders. The result is that „politics is no longer a game for low 
budge amateurs‟ (Bennet and Entman 2001: 17). This observation confirms 
Hawthorne‟s finding (1993, in Barker 2005: 6) that the primary target was an 
elite audience, who could directly influence policy, and the secondary target 
was public opinion. 
 
Corporate elites, with their potential to mobilize affluent PR resources, are in an 
advantageous position to advance pro-business policy outcomes. This process is 
definitely beneficial to the corporate elites, but, at the cost of „excluding the 
media, the general public and rival elites from knowledge of elite policy-
making processes‟. Thus, „for much of the time outside electoral campaigns, the 
role of the media in policymaking is more connected to the manufacturing of 
the elite rather than mass form of consent‟ (Davis 2002: 179). 
 
 
6.3. The Chaebols: the Dominant Korean Business Elites 
 
6.3.1 The evolution of chaebols 
 
The chaebols are a specific form of Korean conglomerate. Though the form and 
the characteristics vary, chaebol-style conglomerates are normally found in the 
East and South Asian countries which have experience „condensed economic 
growth‟ (Kim K-W 2001: 4). Three distinctive characteristics distinguish 
Korean chaebols (Lee K-U 1994: 471): corporate governance (family 
ownership and control); market position (monopolistic or oligopolistic); and 
organizational structure (the business group with multi-ownership and 
managerial linkage). These features are very similar to those of the Japanese 
“zaibatsu”37 before the defeat of the Japanese empire in 1945 (Park H-J 1999: 
                                           
37 The large capitalist enterprises of Japan before World War II, similar to cartels or trusts but 
usually organized around a single family. One “zaibatsu” might operate companies in nearly all 
important areas of economic activities. All “zaibatsu” owned banks, which they used as a means 
for mobilizing capital. The four main “zaibatsu” were Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and 
Yasuda (Britannica 1992 Vol. 12: 887).  
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4). 
 
The Korean chaebols developed during the „catching-up process of the 
economy from the mid-1960s‟ (ibid: 5). The chaebols consolidated massive 
amount of capital in this period, as the government mobilized them as a sub-
partner of economic development. Amsden (1989) ascribed the tremendous 
achievement of the Korean economy to the state-chaebols partnership, in which 
the state alternated between special favour and discipline. Specifically, the state 
deliberately nurtured the chaebols by funneling exceptionally generous 
preferential finance. This was possible because the banking system was under 
close control by the government. Foreign loans were also distributed under the 
guidelines of government industrial policy. In some instances, the state sold 
monopolistic public corporations to chaebols. However, the state also checked 
the chaebols in return for the benefit (Cho Y-C 1998) 
 
The chaebols have pursued freedom from state control and expansion overseas 
in the course of the neo-liberal transformation of Korean society. They 
relentlessly pursued deregulation, weakening of organized labour, and the 
marketization of multiple areas of society. More than anything else, the 
chaebols asked the government to ease financial regulations in order to access 
cheaper global financial capital. Once they gained considerable financial 
autonomy, around the mid-1990s, the chaebols demanded, more boldly, that the 
state retreat from the economic sphere (Ha Y-S 2003).  
 
Along with the globalization momentum, the chaebols have evolved to be the 
most powerful entity in contemporary Korean society. In terms of economic 
resources, the 8 biggest Korean chaebols
38
 possess most of the national wealth. 
The amount of their assets account for 60.7% of GDP (the four biggest chaebols 
account for 49.0% of it), while their total revenues account for 59.1% of GDP 
                                           
38 To show the dominance of the chairman‟s families, their sister chaebols are integrated into 
the statistic. These are ultra Samsung (Samsung, Shinsegae, CJ, The ChungAng Ilbo), ultra 
Hyundai (Hyundai Motors, Hyundai Heavy Industries, Hyundai Co., Hyundai Oilbank, 
Hyundai Department Store, Hyundai Engineering), ultra LG (LG, GS, LS), SK, Lotte, ultra 
Hanjin (Hanjin, Hanjin Heavy Indutry & Construction Co.), Hanhwa, Doosan.  
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(50.7%) and their investments account for 37.54% of GDP (32.40%) in 2008 
(Solidarity for Economic Reform 2009). The chaebols also dominate the men of 
talent in Korean society. Among the 100 biggest corporations, 23% of new 
employees graduated from the top three prominent universities, i.e. Seoul, 
Yonsei and Korea, in 2008 (Dong-A, 13 Mar. 2009) 
 
6.3.2 Who controls chaebols? 
 
Chaebols are distinguished by their governance system in which the chairman‟s 
family effectively dominate the business group with strong controlling power 
like a king. Even though each of the corporations within the chaebols is 
managed by professional executives with a westernized management style, the 
important decisions are usually made by the chairman and his family. That is 
why the chaebols system has long been accused of a lack of transparency, of the 
illegal appropriation of business opportunities by the chairman‟s family, and of 
a patriarchal, authoritarian and paternalistic management style. Although the 
chairman is checked by the shareholders and labor unions, his power in the 
business group is still similar to that of a “king” (Lee B-S 2006). 
 
Nonetheless, the chairman‟s domination stands on shaky ground. As the 
chaebols grew into huge conglomerates, i.e. when the corporation goes to IPO, 
the stake of the chairman‟s family gradually dwindled to a minimal portion. 
Among the biggest 28 chaebols, which are controlled by the chairpersons‟ 
families, the stakes of the chairman and his/her family accounted for only 4.23% 
on average in 2008. For example, Samsung is controlled by Chairman Lee and 
his family, who have only a 3.57% stake. Notably, Chairman Lee has only a 0.3% 
stake in the business group (Korea Fair Trade Commission 2008). But, the 
chairman‟s family can maintain their controlling power by appropriating the 
stakes possessed mutually by the sister corporations in the group. With the help 
of this circular ownership scheme, the chairman‟s family can control on average 
50.95% of the voting rights. This appropriation is supported by two types of 
investment schemes. One is a circular investment among sister corporations (e.g. 
Company A B  C A). The other is an investment by affiliate financial 
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corporations, which is, strictly speaking, a portfolio investment by the 
customer‟s money. In this way, the voting rights of the chairperson‟s family can 
be multiplied to reach 7.87 times their real stake (ibid.).  
   
But the complex dominance structure becomes extremely problematic when the 
family tries to hand over the chairmanship to the eldest son or daughter. The 
inheritance tax rate in Korea is 50% if the amount of the inheritance is over 3 
billion won (about $2.5 million). When the successor pays inheritance tax, 
logically, the chairman‟s family may not be able to maintain their controlling 
power over the chaebols. Hence, the handing down of the chairmanship resorts 
to dazzling financial engineering tactics or to swindling the business 
opportunities of the affiliated corporations. In the 1990s and 2000s, a lot of top 
executives in Samsung and Hyundai Motors, including the chairman, were 
prosecuted for breach of duty in their help with the handing down of the 
chairmanship.  
 
The nepotistic management system of the chaebols had long suffered from the 
lack of legitimacy. When the Asian economic crisis hit, for example, the 
chaebol system was ridiculed as a symbol of “crony capitalism” by the Western 
media. Since the early 1990s, a lot of academic literature, media reports and 
government policies on the chaebols have focused on the reform of their 
corporate governance system (Song W-K 2008). Some critics argued, especially, 
that the hierarchical social order of rank in production and distribution, 
governed by the chaebols at the top, may have „hindered the development of 
pluralism‟ which is the precondition of democracy (Choi J-J 2005: 271-273). In 
order words, a chaebol system that has an affinity with an authoritarian mindset 
and modus operandi is hardly compatible with democracy.  
 
Headquarters, Umbrella association and think-tanks 
 
The chaebols system is constituted with the headquarters, business associations 
and in-house think-tank. Each of the headquarters of the chaebols consists of 
50-300 members of staff. It is a control tower that virtually manages the 
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business group and supports the dominance of the chairman. The headquarters 
supervises all of the important decision-making on financing, planning, 
personnel administration, PR and the legal affairs of the business group. The 
chairperson‟s power reaches its apex when he, annually or intermittently, 
announces the reshuffle of the top managements of affiliated corporations based 
on assessments by the headquarters. 
 
The Federation of Korean Industries (FKI) represents the chaebols and the 
bigger corporations in the country. Established in 1961, the FKI had 380 large 
Korean companies as members in 2008. Its president is elected from among the 
chairman of the chaebols. It works in close cooperation with the chaebols‟ 
headquarters and advocates the common interests of the chaebols. Most of the 
important decisions are made at the presidential council, which consists of 22 
members of the large chaebols‟ chairpersons. The presidential council holds 
regular sessions, at least one per month. In these meetings, various issues such 
as the macro-economic situation, trade conflicts, tax policy, government reform 
and education are discussed. Often the FKI organizes a special meeting with the 
President, the ministers of the economic departments or MPs to discuss 
macroeconomic issues, such as investment, trade, money supply, interest rates 
and taxes. 
 
The influence of the FKI is most obvious when it changes government policy 
and public discourse. The FKI frequently suggests its own policy ideas to the 
government. The recommendation can be highly effective when FKI hints at a 
“capital strike”. Hence, it became a routine event for the Presidents to invite the 
chairmen of the 30 largest chaebols to lunch meeting and ask them for active 
investments. At the meeting, the chairmen usually propose extensive de-
regulation in return for investment. Each government in turn accepted these 
proposals and established a co-chaired committee for abolishing regulations. 
 
The chaebol-funded think-tanks supply information and knowledge for the big 
business circle. The role of the chaebol-affiliated institutes in the management 
of social discourse will be discussed in more detail in the later sections.  
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6.3.3 Social connections of the chaebols 
 
Policy networks 
 
Although the partnership between the state and the chaebols has loosened with 
the liberalization of the economy, the corporatist tradition has survived with a 
different face. During the 1980s-1990s, Korea witnessed a mushrooming of 
widely connected and multi-layered policy networks between the state and 
business. These formal or informal policy networks have been the main conduit 
for business elites to engage in policy decision-making (Kim Y-R 1990). 
  
According to BAI, as of 2007, over 450 advisory, consultative and decision-
making committees attached to the government had been established (E-Daily, 
29 Apr. 2008). It was through these committees that the chaebols‟ requests, such 
as de-regulation and strict discipline of labour, have been embodied in return 
for their promise to increase investment and employment. President Lee 
Myung-bak, for example, established the “Committee for the Enhancement of 
National Competitiveness” immediately after his inauguration in 2008. This 
committee, which directly reports to the President, confirmed his main 
campaign pledge to revitalize the economy with business-friendly policies. 
Among the 27 members, 12 were businessmen (including 4 foreign 
businessmen), while there was only one representative of labour, from the 
Federation of Korean Trade Union (FKTU).  
 
Other than the official consultative bodies, the business community keeps 
talking to mid-level or senior policy makers on upcoming issues. Choi Jae-
hwang, an executive director of labour policy of the Korea Employers 
Federation (KEF), said:  
 
„…we frequently meet policymakers in government and the national 
assembly to lobby for our policy ideas … Who should go and whom he 
should meet depends on the significance of policy issues. When the issue is 
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critical and a decision should be made by the top-tier policy makers, then our 
chairman goes.‟ (Interview, 9 Dec. 2008). 
 
Thus, a lot of economic policies tend to be coordinated in advance through 
various levels of private meeting between policymakers and business elites. 
Often official consultative sessions are held after the main decision was made.  
 
Career mobility   
 
Career mobility between the state sector and the business community has been 
an important channel of influence through which big businesses can advance 
their interests (Useem 1979; Scott 1991). In Korea, the process was 
unidirectional before the mid 2000s; the posting of business elites to high-
ranking government positions was relatively limited, but a lot of government 
officials have been invited to the executive positions of big corporations. From 
1945 to 2002, only minimal numbers of businessmen were posted to ministerial 
positions in each government. They accounted for 1.6%, or 12 out of 768 
ministers (Lee S-W 2002: 536). The unfavourable public image of collusion 
between the state and the chaebols prevented governments from directly 
appointing members of the business elites to higher positions. 
 
But it has been quite normal for mid-level and high-ranking state bureaucrats, in 
the middle of their careers or after they retired, to enter the business community 
with which they had close working relations. As far as the economic 
departments are concerned, the officials of the Ministry of Strategy and Finance 
often go to the top managements of banks and financial institutions. 
Bureaucrats from the Economic Planning Board, the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry and the Ministry of Land, Transport and Marine Affairs are also often 
posted to big manufacturing corporations. In 2003, of 164 independent non-
executive directors of the six major chaebols, 76 (46.4%) were former 
government officers. 33 of them are from the departments which have close 
working relationship with the corporations (Citizens‟ Coalition for Economic 
Justice 2003). 
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What the chaebols want from the bureaucrats-turned-business executives is 
their knowledge in economic administration as well as their connections to the 
government. In fact, this network has been widely mobilized to facilitate 
intimate co-ordination and co-operation between state and business. The 
Citizens‟ Coalition for Economic Justice, an activist group, commented that 
„those directors are highly prone to become lobbyists rather than watchdog 
checking management activity‟ (Kyunghyang, 2 Sep. 2003). 
 
Informal social networks 
 
The emotional tie based on kinship is especially strong in Korean society. 
Among the elite groups, marriage has often been a way of cementing social 
alliances between two families. In the center of these “matrimonial alliances”, 
there are the chaebols‟ families. The chaebols‟ fervor for matrimonial alliances 
over the last 40 years has brought about an extensive kinship web of Korean 
elite families, including several former presidents, ministers, politicians and 
other members of chaebols families (PSPD 2004; Park W-B 1996). 
 
Research shows that 361 members of the 88 chaebols families are linked 
together by marriage (Chang D-J et al. 2006: 11). For example, LG, the third 
biggest chaebol, has an especially dense matrimonial connection with a lot of 
Korean chaebols, such as Samsung, Hyundai, SK, Hanjin, Doosan and Kumho 
etc. Former and incumbent Presidents also have matrimonial connections with 
chaebols families. A daughter of former President Roh Tae-Woo got married to 
a son of Choi Jong-hyun, the founder of SK chaebols. Roh‟s son also married a 
daughter of the founder of Shindongbang, a middle-sized chaebols. The 
President Lee Myung-bak is also the father-in-law to a son of Cho Suk-rae, the 
founder of Hyosung, an upper middle-sized chaebols. 
 
The chaebols have also made matrimonial connections with the powerful media. 
Samsung, for example, is connected with Dong-A and JoongAng, the highly 
influential Korean dailies. The incumbent chairman, Lee Kun-hee, is the 
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husband of a sister of Hong Suk-hyun, the chairman of JoongAng. Along with 
that, a daughter of Chairman Lee got married to the CEO of Dong-A. 
 
These personal connections through marriage have frequently facilitated 
collusion between the chaebols and the government. Many important decisions 
were made through direct personal contact, outside the public arena. For 
instance, when President Roh Tae-woo tried to introduce a “real name 
transaction system” to curb illegal financial dealing by the corporations in 1990, 
it was Choi Jong-hyun, the chairman of FKI at that time, who successfully 
lobbied against its introduction. Chairman Choi was the father-in-law of the 
daughter of President Roh (Kim A-Y 1995: 345). 
 
6.3.4 The culture and ideology of the chaebols 
 
In return for their fealty to the chairman, the staffs of chaebols‟ headquarters are 
rewarded with huge amounts of salary or rapid promotion.
 
Many of them have a 
high chance of promotion to become senior executives or CEOs. In this regard, 
their relationship with the chairman looks like that of a king and his retainers in 
the feudal system. In reality, the conflict between the two sons of the Hyundai 
founder Chung in 1999-2000 was dubbed the “revolt of retainers” or the war 
between the princes, by the media (ShinDong-A, 27 Sep. 2007). 
 
This patriarchal culture confers on the chairman omniscience. Often this culture 
stretches to the mystification of the chairman as a strategist, hardly allowing 
any objections or remonstrations. A former managing executive at Samsung 
stated that: 
 
„In the old days, when the founder Lee Byung-chul convened a meeting of 
the CEOs of the sister corporations, nobody dared to take off his suit during 
the session, even though it was a hot summer day. … Nobody asked about or 
commented on the topic chairman mentioned – in any way other than he/she 
was pre-designated to do. His son Lee Kun-hee, just after he succeeded to the 
chairmanship, suggested taking off their suits during the session. After a 
while, he ridiculed the CEOs, saying that even though the chairman 
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suggested it, taking off their suit without single exception is a kind of 
totalitarianism. I think this kind of uniformity is an enemy of creativity. After 
this episode, the atmosphere of the CEO meeting became a little dressed-
down. But the differences were just as great‟ (Interview, 10 Dec. 2008). 
 
The socio-economic vision of the chaebols is considerably skewed towards the 
liberal market and economic growth. Regardless of the changes in political 
power, the chaebols kept insisting that economic growth should be the foremost 
goal of government (Hong D-R 1998). In their economic vision, the chaebols 
are located at the centre as a “locomotive”. Particularly in the globalizing world, 
they posit themselves as a „national team‟ in the battlefield of economic warfare. 
Hence, the role of the state is best described not as a „coordinator‟ but as a 
„cheerleader‟ for business (Lee K-I 2003: 227). 
 
The drive for growth allows little room for liberal pluralism. Since they usually 
dichotomize distribution against economic growth, any form of collectivism 
(e.g. industrial action, the political ascendancy of labour groups) and welfare 
policies are thought to be mere hindrances to economic growth. It is notorious 
that Samsung, the largest chaebols, still maintains the policy of not recognising 
the trade unions in the business group.
39
 
 
The chaebols are also strong believer in the supremacy of the “free market”. 
They abhor government intervention, insisting that regulations usually suffocate 
market dynamism. The political leanings of the chaebols are highly 
conservative, mirroring their authoritarian organizational ethos. Because their 
ideological scope is so narrow, they frequently stigmatize liberal, social 
democratic groups and the trade unions as leftists. In Korea, a country that has 
long been confronted with communist North Korea, the term “leftist” has 
connotations of “communist” or “Stalinist”. 
                                           
39 Among 63 subsidiaries of Samsung, only 8 companies have trade unions. But seven of the 
trade unions except ChoongAng (Daily) are “ghost unions” with less than 10 members, which 
were established by the company to prevent the real unions from organising. Samsung‟s unique 
policy originated from the abhorrence of trade unions of the founder, Lee Byung-chul 
(Sisajournal, 12 Sep. 2005).   
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6.4 The Knowledge and Power of the Network 
 
No doubt, financial resources, lobbying and social networks are strong sources 
of chaebols power. But, they also enjoy a rather more tacit and permeating type 
of power. This lies in their ability to influence people‟s knowledge and 
perceptions. Since the mid-1990s, the chaebols, through their in-house think-
tanks and PR personnel, have actively engaged in the production of knowledge 
and information which support their immediate or long-term interests. This is 
power as „a form of pacification‟ through „privileging certain ways of 
interpreting the world, particular discourses, and disqualifying others‟ 
(Haugaard 2002: 185).  
 
6.4.1 Policy knowledge and chaebols think-tanks 
 
As the Korean political system was liberalized, knowledge and ideas became 
increasingly important for policy decision-making and political persuasion. 
From the pluralist‟s point of view, the production and consumption of practical 
knowledge in a society is comparable to the „ecological system of nature‟ (Kim 
S-B et al. 2007: 10). In the system, various private research institutes from 
business, trade unions and civil groups compete and cooperate with each other. 
Through this process of selection and accommodation, knowledge evolves. 
 
But what is often missed in the theory of “ecology” is the outright imbalance of 
the resources that engages in the circulation and authorization of knowledge. 
There are three categories of research community that produce policy 
knowledge
40
 and practical discourse in Korea: think-tanks funded by the 
government; think-tanks funded by chaebols; and think-tanks run by civic 
group. Governmental think-tanks such as Korea Development Institute (KDI) 
and Korea Institutes for Industrial Economics and Trade (KIET) had long been 
the central „brain power‟ for the state-centered developmental model. But it is 
widely accepted that their historic role has come to an end (Kim J-M, Sohn M-J 
                                           
40
 „Policy knowledge‟ means the information and expertise that is helpful for policy decision-
making of the government (Kim S-B et al. 2007: 4).  
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and Chang K-S 2008: 176). A restrictive research environment and bureaucratic 
red-tape kept discouraging the researchers, forcing them to seek a position 
within academia. For example, Lee Dong-gul, president of the Korea Institute 
of Finance, resigned from his position in protest at the restrictive intervention of 
the government. He spoke his mind in his resignation statement, in which he 
said that „Autonomy and independence of research was a mere luxury in so far 
as government usually considers the institutes as “mouth-tanks” rather than 
“think-tanks”‟ (Hankyoreh, 30 Jan. 2009).  
 
Think-tanks run by civic groups are still in their initial stages. Most of them 
were established in the early or mid-2000s. Examples are the Solidarity of 
Economic Reform, the Hope Institute, the New Community Institute and the 
Saesayeon. But their financial conditions are too meagre for them to hire 
competent researchers and to undertake ambitious research projects (Hankyoreh, 
2 Mar. 2010). 
 
By contrast, chaebol-affiliated research institutes prevail thanks to their 
considerable resources. The FKI itself established two think-tanks, the Korea 
Economic Research Institute (KERI) and the Center for Free Economy (CFE). 
And each chaebols has its own in-house think-tanks, such as the Samsung 
Economic Research Institute (SERI), the LG Economic Research Institute 
(LGERI) and Hyundai Research Institute (HRI). These think-tanks have shown 
a high degree of productivity, with hundreds of researchers, substantial research 
funds, and a business style top-down management system. For example, in 2010, 
SERI of Samsung has 220 researchers, including 100 Ph.D.s, while KDI has 
136 researchers, including 103 Ph.D.s
41
 In 2005, the total expenses of SERl 
were 86 billion won ($78 million), while those of KDI were 45 billion won ($41 
million). And the expenses per person were 250 million won ($227, 000) versus 
65 million won ($59,500) (Kim J-M, Sohn M-J and Chang K-S 2008: 181). 
  
                                           
41 SERI Homepage (http://www.kdi.re.kr/general/about/crew01.jsp, retrieved 4 Jun. 2010) 
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Though the think-tanks highlight “economy” in their names, the scope of their 
research is not limited to economic and management issues. They actively 
engage in various social and political issues, including topics such as education, 
environment, welfare reform, international relations and political changes. Their 
capacity reached its heights when the chaebols think-tanks devised a strategy 
aimed at the state and drove it forward through the discourse of the “national 
agenda”. Based on this practice, some critics suspect that the ultimate goal of 
the institutes is „state management‟ (Hong S-T 2007: 121). 
 
It appears that the information and knowledge which the chaebols‟ think-tanks 
produce also adapt to academic neutrality and objectivity. But as far as the 
chaebols‟ own interests are concerned, the think-tanks tend to stay silent or 
defend the status quo. For instance, the unique corporate governance system of 
chaebols is revaluated to be a „path-dependent‟ outcome which was „naturally‟ 
institutionalized while the corporations strived to survive in the exceptional 
socio-economic context of Korea (Kang W 2005: 37). Apart from the current 
interests of the chaebols, the think-tanks frequently promote specific 
perspectives which in the long run would be beneficial to big business. One 
example is the report on “A small but strong country” by SERI. In 2003, SERI 
introduced the small but strong country model of several European countries, 
including Sweden and the Netherlands, as an alternative socio-economic model 
between the traditional Asian model and the newly adopted Anglo-American 
model. Some critics argue that this position paper is also aimed at legitimating 
Korea-specific corporate governance. The position paper concludes that the 
government should „pay more attention to economic growth than distribution‟ 
and „invigorate entrepreneurship by deregulation‟ (Kim D-K and Oh S-K 2003: 
22). 
 
The influence of the chaebols‟ think-tanks was enhanced by their extensive, 
high-powered channels of the distribution of knowledge products. The SERI 
has 1.7 million members as of Oct. 2010, who log into websites and download 
research papers from the 2.5 million pages of archives (Hankyoreh, 9 Nov. 
2010). This is the largest research institute membership in the world.
 
What is 
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significant is that, according to Kim Yong-ki, a researcher in SERI, many of the 
members are intellectuals or so-called opinion leaders such as professors, 
journalists, government officials and politicians (Interview 5 Jun. 2007).  
 
The SERI publishes more than 300 position papers a year and distributes them 
freely to anyone who wants them (Kyunghyang, 15 Nov. 2006). For these think-
tanks, the internet is a very powerful platform for disseminating knowledge and 
discourse. Apart from sending position papers in bulk by e-mail, they actively 
organize and maintain a community of knowledge-blogs (Kyunghyang, 11 Jun. 
2007). Usage statistics show the overwhelming popularity of chaebol think-
tanks. In June 2007, SERI accounted for 72.8% of the traffic among research 
institutes followed by LGERI (8.3%) of LG, and CFE (7.1%) of FKI. The KDI, 
the most prominent government think-tank, accounted for only 3.8% (Ibid.). 
 
6.4.2 Trendy and handy issues that appeal to the media  
 
In terms of academic rigour, the position papers of the chaebols think-tanks 
may not be great. Kim Sang-jo, a civil group leader and economist, said in a 
newspaper interview that „most of the position papers and research papers of 
SERI would be rejected from academic journals because of their inconsistent 
logic and fallacies in their data‟ (Kyunghyang, 15 Nov. 2006). But their cutting 
edge lies in the selection of trendy research topics and the prompt supply of 
handy reports. Lee Won-jae, a former senior researcher at SERI, said that: 
 
„Selecting a research topic which the media might be interested in is very 
important. Thus, SERI does not recommend researchers to publish theoretical 
articles in academic journals … Trendy ideas come frequently from the 
executive level researchers or the president. … They seem to be the linchpin 
between the chaebols -- their network of information and high-ranking 
executives – and the research ideas of the institutes.‟ (Interview, 19 May 2007 
and 8 Dec 2008). 
 
This is why the media, intentionally or unknowingly, played a significant role in 
disseminating the discourses of the chaebols‟ think-tanks. Since the late 1990s, 
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Korean newspapers and broadcasts have come to rely heavily on the press 
releases and position papers of the chaebols think-tanks. According to a media 
watchdog report, eighteen Korean national newspapers (including the economic 
dailies) put out 251 articles sourced from SERI in October 2007. This means 
that, when we exclude government departments, the chaebol‟ think-tanks are 
the top news source with 14 articles a month for each national newspaper 
(Saesayeun, 2007). 
  
Along with the popularity of position papers, the researchers in the chaebol 
think-tanks have become frequently quoted commentators in newspapers and 
broadcasts. Although these comments are often simple and short, they often 
direct the tone of the article. A senior researcher in LGERI said in an interview: 
 
„…the phone rings without stopping (from journalists). We know that the 
comment is for just one line in an article, but we also know it is quite 
influential. … When I got to know a journalist from frequent telephone calls, 
we met for lunch or dinner talking about a lot of issues … I felt that this is a 
way of “tutoring” journalists‟ (Interview, 24 Dec. 2008). 
 
Journalists are not ignorant of the fact that the quality of the research papers is 
not high in terms of academic rigor. But they say they are trendy; they supply 
background knowledge which is handy for analytical articles. More than 
anything else, they are not too serious to dampen the journalistic interest. Park 
Hyun, a senior reporter at the Hankyoreh said: 
 
„The chaebol think-tanks seem to be geniuses in assembling the existing 
knowledge. … Frankly speaking, their reports are not very high in quality. … 
But the opportuneness is their great charm for journalists who need to file 
pieces on some difficult issues before deadlines.‟(Interview, 4 Dec. 2008)  
 
6.4.3 “Brain-sharing” 
 
However, far more direct influence on policy may come from the “brain sharing” 
between the chaebol think-tanks and the policymakers. Korean policymakers in 
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both government and parliament have become heavily reliant on the chaebol 
think-tanks in setting policy agendas and drafting policy options. This is in line 
with the decline of the governmental think-tanks, which had been the main 
supplier of policy ideas and knowledge. Kim Yong-ki, a research fellow of 
SERI, said: 
 
„We are really busy in supplying position papers which are privately ordered 
from the Presidential office, the Ministry of Strategy and Finance, the 
governing party etc. … They won‟t go to the KDI nowadays … Instead they 
just ask us for it through their acquaintances here. For example, we have got 
more than 15 of the same requests which seek brilliant ideas for solving the 
problem of unemployment rate hike, from different parts of the Presidential 
office in a year‟ (Interview, 15 Dec. 2008). 
 
It is widely acknowledged that the chaebol think-tanks have supplied many of 
the policy agendas of the Roh Mu-hyun government between 2003 and 2008. In 
February 2003, just before the inauguration of the new President Roh, the SERI 
secretly submitted a report, entitled “The direction of national policy and the 
agenda of the new government”, to the new government‟s task force. This 400-
page report had been prepared with the cooperation of 70 researchers in SERI. 
Many of the ideas in the report were later adapted by the Roh government, 
including the “Drive for $20,000 per capita income” and “The central state of 
East Asia”. Lee Kwang-jae, an MP and an influential advisor of president Roh, 
played a particularly key role in introducing SERI‟s policy ideas to the new 
government (Kyunghyang, 21 Nov. 2007). During this government, other MPs 
also competitively tried to introduce the ideas of the chaebol think-tanks to the 
parliament. This is partly because they wanted to make full use of favourable 
media coverage that the think-tanks obtained. 
 
The uncritical reception of the policy discourses with the “chaebols brand” and 
the practice of “brain-sharing” brought about frequent confusion between the 
interests of the state and the interest of the chaebols. Kwak Jung-soo, a business 
journalist at the Hankyoreh, said:  
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„What the policy makers always long for is the policy ideas. The chaebols are 
now making use of the policy ideas as bait. Inevitably, there are hidden 
interests of the supplier within the policy ideas and knowledge. The 
policymakers are saying they just borrow the ideas, but they, unknowingly or 
with conscious neglect, slide into becoming the agents of the chaebols. I 
heard an episode from a leading MP as following: one day a party sub-
committee held a meeting to discuss pending economic issues. Then I saw an 
MP having placed a position paper on his table. It was definitely from SERI. 
I realized this from the coversheet. He must have been in a hurry and have 
forgotten to take off the coversheet. The meeting was to discuss fairy sensitive 
issues to the interests of Samsung. I thought the MP had been tutored by 
Samsung beforehand‟ (Interview, 6 Feb. 2009). 
 
 
6.5 Communication in the Business Elite Network 
  
6.5.1 The chaebols’ strategic PR 
 
Communications in the chaebols‟ headquarters is amongst the most intensive in 
Korea. Every day, several hundred journalists cover the headquarters and 
affiliated corporations. For example, there are 200 listed journalist covering 
Samsung headquarters.
42
 Another several hundred PR staff in chaebol 
headquarters supply newsworthy materials and monitor news. 
  
As the importance of the chaebols has increased in the economy, so they have 
developed more systematic public relations. The chaebols have steadily 
increased their PR resources. What basically supports their PR activity is the 
fact that chaebols are the main advertisers in newspapers and broadcasts. The 
advertising expense of the four biggest chaebols (Samsung, Hyundai Motors, 
LG, SK) accounted for 19.4% of the total revenues of the Korean media (TV, 
Radio, Newspaper, Magazine) in 2006 (Solidarity for Economic Reform 2008).
 
 
Based on this structural advantage, the chaebols have developed various PR 
                                           
42
 Kwak Jung-soo (Interview, 6 February 2009) 
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resources. Consequently, the chaebols were pretty successful in passing their 
press releases off as “real news”. It is estimated that most of the economic news, 
from 67% to over 80%, is based on the press materials which the business 
community supply (Hankook, 16 Nov. 2006). In terms of the PR skill of turning 
press materials into news, the induction material for trainees of Samsung 
Electronics shows the strong confidence of the big corporations:  
 
„Many parts of articles in newspapers are the result of PR activities. Even in 
the case of the New York Times and the Washington Post, 60 percent of 
articles are from PR materials. … (If you have any) new, informative and 
interesting issues, let the PR department know. Then we can cook the news‟ 
(Mediaoneul, 28 Feb. 2007)
 43
 
 
Recently, chaebols‟ PR has frequently outstripped the ordinary practices of 
“defending bad news and promoting good news” for companies. The more 
sophisticated type of PR, dubbed “strategic PR”, has emerged since the mid-
1990s. It meticulously designs its processes, finely targets small numbers within 
the elite audience, and systematically organizes resources such as information 
subsidies. It often aims at influencing rivals or policymakers by changing social 
discourses. Strategic PR is also useful when corporations try to create a 
favorable mood to promote policymaker‟s decision-making, by enhancing the 
credibility of their argument. A managing director in the Federation of Korean 
Industry (FKI) said that: 
 
„When we try to persuade policy decision makers, it is far more effective to 
say that this is an issue that the newspapers covered previously, as you know. 
It is a matter of the credibility of the arguments. In this sense, the media play 
is like background music for government relations (GR)‟ (Interview, 23 Dec. 
2008). 
 
 
 
                                           
43
 “Educational material of Samsung Electronics for PR induction.” It was exposed by 
Mediaoneu, a weekly gazette for journalists. 
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6.5.2 Resources and tactics 
 
To achieve its goal effectively, strategic PR tends to take three points into 
consideration. Firstly, the chaebols fully make use of their superior information 
power. They systematically collect and manage information from both external 
and internal communications. Thousands of senior staff and executives of 
chaebols are obliged to submit information or rumours which they heard over 
lunch or dinner hour. Alongside this, senior staff and executives gather 
information from their broad range of social networks with politicians, 
government officials, journalists and other businessmen. A former managing 
director of Samsung said: 
 
„Information is garnered, synthesized and analyzed. The sensitive pieces are 
forwarded to the relevant subsidiaries. … The quality of the information is 
amazing. … If I do service with my heart to the elites that I am in charge of, 
then who do you suppose they will phone first when they have got 
information concerning my company? Definitely, we will be the first‟ 
(Interview, 10 Dec. 2008). 
 
Moreover, many chaebols operate a task force team which is solely dedicated to 
collecting in-depth information from various ranks of the social elites. With all 
these information management systems, the chaebols are said to have stronger 
information power than the national intelligence agency. One famous anecdote 
is that Samsung, in 1998, learned of the death of the Chinese leader Deng 
Xiaoping through their domestic and international elite networks, several hours 
before the first news flash from the global news agencies came out. Samsung 
was also said to have passed on this information to relevant government 
department immediately after they got it (Lee B-S 2006). 
 
Secondly, the success of strategic PR depends on establishing persuasive 
arguments. Apart from mobilizing in-house think-tanks, chaebols systematically 
manage influential intellectuals who often turn up in newspaper columns or 
debate programs on TV. For this purpose, the headquarters earmark 
considerable funds annually to support seminars and research projects of 
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various academic bodies. On the other hand, they invite leading academics to 
become advisors, or independent non-executive directors, with very high 
remuneration. This financial support has often made the intellectuals 
submissive to the chaebols. One professor said „there will be very few 
professors who would refuse to draw a conclusion in their report that the 
corporation wants them to draw if the company were to support a 30 million 
won ($27,100) research fund‟ (Kyunghyang shinmun 2008: 128). 
 
Thirdly, strategic PR makes full use of the national status of high ranking 
executives, to attract attention of the media. Since the mid-1990s, the remarks 
of the chaebols‟ chairmen have had great resonance in Korean society. The 
issues they raised easily turned into social discourses or policy agendas, with 
ample coverage from the media. For example, Park Yong-sung, the chairman of 
Doosan chaebols, has been a big newsmaker during his chairmanship of the 
Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KCCI). The media usually cover 
his arguments on deregulation or government reform with large headlines 
(Hankook, 17 Dec. 2004). Lee Kun-hee, the chairman of Samsung, also 
influenced a lot of agendas through his remarks almost every year, such as 
“Small but strong country” (2001), “The management of genius”44 (2002), 
“Sandwich discourse”45 (2007), and so on.  
 
Thus the contact between chairperson and the media is restrictively managed by 
the headquarters to maximize the effect of strategic PR. For example, chairman 
Lee of Samsung seldom spoke to the media. But whenever he did, he raised a 
sophisticated issue about the Korean economy. Accordingly, any remark he 
made caused a big sensation. One example was his proclamation of the New 
Paradigm of Management in 1993. At that time, he used the metaphor that 
Koreans should change everything except their wife and children in order to 
catch up with developed countries, as well as to cope with the vigorous 
                                           
44
 This is an argument that, economically, one genius is equivalent to 100,000 people in the 21
st
 
century. 
45
 This is the argument that the Korean economy has been sandwiched in between Japan, 
running away, and China, coming in pursuit. 
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challenge from China. His agenda, it is argued, was a catalyst for Korean 
businesses to turn their attention from the quantity to the quality of the product. 
 
6.5.3 Strategic PR and journalists 
 
The journalists are closely intertwined with the communication process in the 
sites of the chaebols. The Korean media are powerful political entities in 
themselves and are no longer afraid of political power (Cho D-M, Lee B-C and 
Song W-K 2008). But, when it comes to the power of capital, as illustrated in 
chapter 2, their autonomy considerably shrinks. Because of the worsening 
financial situation of the Korean media industry, a lot of media companies have 
abandoned the “principle of a fire wall” between editorial and advertising 
departments. Indeed, several media are closely related to the chaebols in their 
ownership structure. In this sense, journalists often mobilize “self-censorship” 
mechanisms in their reports. Very frequently, the PR departments of chaebols 
lobby directly to block unfavourable reporting. In most of these cases, 
according to the journalists who interviewed for this research, their attempts are 
successful (Kwak Jung-soo interview 6 Feb. 2009, for example). There are also 
direct financial incentives for journalists. For example, major chaebols support 
one year of overseas study of potential journalists and keep in contact with 
them under the name of a “fellow” after they return to their job. Between 1996 
and 2004, 115 journalists received funding from Samsung and 90 journalists 
from LG (PSPD 2005). 
 
However, apart from lobbying, the “mobilization of bias” also comes from 
journalistic routine. Most of the business journalists are stationed in press 
rooms which are furnished by the chaebols‟ headquarters and their umbrella 
associations. Hovering around the press room, journalists regularly have contact 
with the PR staff or senior managers of chaebols over their lunch or dinner 
hours. From time to time, PR departments organize conferences or tours in 
which several key managers from the chaebols‟ headquarters stay for one night 
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with journalists. A former journalist
46
 at Maeil Business Newspaper, stated that 
the frequency of the correspondence that journalists normally have with 
chaebols‟ staff hugely outweighs their meetings with managers in small and 
medium companies or the representatives of labor unions. 
  
As the competition between the media outlets has become intensified, 
journalists have to produce more pieces of news to fill the enlarged newspaper 
space. Hence, they have little time to try out in-depth stories or investigative 
pieces. Even worse, major sources in the chaebols are blocked from the media 
during ordinary times and journalists can hardly make contact with them 
without facing the gate-keeping role of PR staff. Song Tae-yup, a senior 
reporter at YTN, said: „There is a joke among journalists that reports can access 
only three rooms in chaebols‟ headquarters; the pressroom, the spokesman‟s 
room and the toilet‟ (Interview, 10 Dec. 2008). In this respect, the “information 
subsidy”, which is regularly supplied by the chaebols‟ PR departments or 
umbrella associations, is indispensable for business journalists. 
 
The similar routines of business journalists lead to a “pack journalism” in which 
most of the news from the media outlets is almost identical. More seriously, the 
journalists unknowingly internalize the perspectives and values of the chaebols 
through their routines in comfortable chaebol pressroom. Kwak Jung-soo, a 
business journalist, said;  
 
„The symbiosis between the media and capital has already advanced to the 
stage that the journalists internalize the perspective and ideology of capital. 
This means that journalists are not only reluctant to dare to address the issues 
which the capital power may not like. …but they also willingly fancy 
themselves to be mouthpieces of the capital power. Now, the Korean media 
works as a critical medium of the diffusion, empowerment and reproduction 
of the perspective of capital power‟ (Newspaper and Broadcast 2007: 14). 
 
 
                                           
46 Interview (3 Mar. 2009) 
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6.6 Case Study: The Chaebols’ National Agenda Setting 
This case material explores how the Korean business elites influenced the social 
and economic policy change of the new government of President Roh Moo-
hyun in 2003 through strategic PR and the dominance of policy discourses. The 
research especially pays attention to the communication practices in the 
network between chaebols headquarters, think tanks funded by chaebols and 
policy makers in government and parliament. The research was conducted 
mainly through the methods of media content analysis and interviews. The 
media texts were selected from the archive of KINDS with the key word 
searching process. Many parts of this case study came from the researcher‟s 
previous study for his MA dissertation
47
. 
 
Roh Moo-hyun, a candidate of the ruling but minority party in the parliament
48
, 
was elected as the 16
th
 president of Korea on 20
th
 December 2002. The little 
expected, hence dramatic victory of Roh was at the same time a crisis for the 
chaebols. Roh was believed, by the conservative ruling elites, to be a political 
maverick, with the image of a leftist or a radical (Dong-A, 13 Jan. 2003). Indeed, 
the campaign pledge of Roh suggested that there would be considerable shifts 
in socio-economic policies. The new paradigm set on an ideological base that 
pursued a balance between economic growth and distribution, equilibrium 
between capital power and labour power, and equity between social classes 
(Hankyoreh, 20 Dec. 2002). 
   
Expecting the sword of the reform policy would eventually fall on them -- on 
their nepotic corporate governance system -- the chaebols prepared a 
countermeasure before the beginning of the new government. Their “card” was 
the campaign for a $20,000 per capita income.
49
 Although the campaign 
                                           
47
 Goldsmiths, University of London. 
48 Korea has the Presidential system and it happens from time to time that the party which 
produced incumbent President loses the comfortable majority in the parliament.   
49
 In 1995, the per capita of South Korea had reached $10,000. But it fell again below $7,000 
during the financial crisis in 1997. Korea recovered to a GDP of $10,000 per capital in 2002 and 
it reached $20,000 in 2007, partly with the help of the appreciation of its currency.  
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claimed to be a united effort of every rank of people in order to advance an 
affluent country, in substance, it aimed to induce government policy ultimately 
to accommodate the interests of the corporate elites. 
 
The chaebols‟ in-house think-tanks and the media played a critical role in 
establishing the campaign as a significant social discourse. Most of the Korean 
press and broadcasters uncritically adopted the framework and arguments which 
the chaebols and their think-tanks had presented. Some of them actively drive 
the campaign toward a “change-everything” national movement. 
 
At first, Roh‟s government was reluctant to accept the campaign. But it was 
gradually persuaded by the all-out blitz of both the media and the chaebols. At 
last, six months after his inauguration, President Roh declared that his 
government would officially adopt the campaign as a national agenda and as an 
important reference point for socio-economic policy. From that time onward, 
the priority of economic policy had changed; weight was placed on economic 
growth, with the cooperation of the chaebols. At the same time, the President‟s 
pledge to support the poor and the weak has gradually lost ground. 
 
The success of the chaebols‟ campaign, however, leaves much room for critical 
evaluation. The chaebols‟ agenda almost entirely dominated the framework of 
reporting, while the critical voice was almost entirely marginalized. Few media 
covered the campaign from the points of view of the public interest. The policy 
elites, although they initially proclaimed themselves reformists, were also 
susceptible to the concerted policy agenda of the chaebols and the media. This 
resulted in the dumping of their own policy agenda, which the majority of the 
people had supported in the election just a few months before. Here, the big 
shift in policy was mobilized by the concurrence of interests among the 
corporations, the media and the policy elites, rather than the views of the public. 
 
6.6.1 The chaebols’ influence on the campaign 
 
Discord between the chaebols and the new government 
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Even before President Roh‟s official inauguration, the chaebols and the 
incoming government revealed their discord. Both sides had a deep-rooted 
distrust of each other (Munhwa, 13 Jan. 2003). Amid the chaebols‟ concern at a 
radical reform policy, the Federation of Korean Industries (FKI) held an 
executive board meeting and announced boldly that they were against the new 
government‟s policy on business (Korea Economic Daily, 29 Jan. 2003). In 
particular, they criticized the “three core reform policies”,50 arguing that these 
regulations would weaken the competitiveness of big corporations. The 
chaebols‟ mistrust reached its highest point when Kim Seok-joong, an executive 
director of the FKI, was quoted by the New York Times as saying that „It is 
likely that the ultimate goal of the incoming government is socialism‟ (Munhwa, 
29 Jan.2003). 
 
President Roh and his assistants kept emphasizing the need for vigorous reform 
of policy towards the chaebols. In a meeting with chaebols chairmen, Roh 
warned that „despite repeated reform pledges, several chaebols have yet to part 
with unsound practices, such as fraudulent accounting, stock manipulation and 
unlawful inheritance‟ (Korean Herald, 27 Mar. 2003). A senior secretary for 
President Roh gave the assurance that „even if the economy may further worsen, 
the Roh government will not consider compromising with the chaebols. Instead, 
the government will pursue transparency of the management without hesitation‟ 
(ibid). Some of the assistants of the President regarded a series of complaints by 
the chaebols as collective resistance to the new government. As a warning, they 
hinted that the FKI, the organization for chaebols, would be disbanded 
(Munhwa, 29 Jan. 2003). 
 
All-out efforts to spin a pro-chaebols policy 
 
For the chaebols, it was imperative to have the new government abandon the 
                                           
50
 Those policies were intended to enhance the transparency and accountability of big 
corporations. They were the introduction of securities-related class action lawsuits, the overhaul 
of the inheritance taxation system and the restriction of the use of customers‟ money in 
maintaining the chaebols chairman‟s governance. 
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reform policy. They initiated a campaign that was designed to re-orient 
economic policy from reform to growth. This was epitomized by the slogan: 
“Believe in a future with $20,000 income”. The FKI led the campaign with the 
concerted effort of the business lobbying organizations, prominent 
entrepreneurs and chaebols think-tanks. This could be described as all-out pre-
emptive aggression. Historically, chaebols have often succeeded in this kind of 
blitz. From Roh Tae-woo to Kim Dae-jung, each President pledged the reform 
of chaebols in the initial phase of his term. But, as time passed by, it ended in 
smoke in the face of lobbying by the chaebols. 
 
First of all, the FKI adopted the campaign as their main agenda at their general 
meeting in February 2003. Then they issued a statement that the big 
corporations would make every effort to increase the per capita income to 
$20,000 by 2007, in order to make Korea an advanced economy in the world 
(Korea Herald, 28 Jan. 2003). The FKI also proposed that the incoming 
government should set up a committee, over which the President would preside, 
to promote the campaign. Son Byung-doo, the executive deputy chairman of 
FKI, insisted that: 
 
„We hope that president-elect Roh can increase per capital income two-fold 
in his period in office. It is necessary for him not to bind his presidential 
election pledge for equity. Everything will become smooth only if his 
government concentrates on increasing people‟s income‟ (Maeil Business 
Newspaper, 5 Jan. 2003). 
 
Prominent business leaders such as Park Yong-sung, the chairman of the Korea 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KCCI), and Lee Soo-young, the chairman 
of Korea Employ Federation (KEF), frequently appeared in the media and 
reiterated similar stories. Lee Kun-hee, the chairman of Samsung, also played a 
pivotal role in promoting the campaign. In June 2003, Chairman Lee of 
Samsung insisted that Korea was trapped at the barrier of a $10,000 per capita 
income. He said to the media that: 
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„Korea should make bigger the economic pie until its per capita income 
reaches $20,000 rather than trying to enlarge individual gains. Now we are at 
the crossroads between the chance of jumping to affluence and the hazards of 
falling back to becoming a poor country again‟ (Hankyoreh, 6 Jan. 2003). 
 
His remarks were covered with considerable weight in the national press and 
broadcasts because he was one of the most important newsmakers in Korea. 
 
The LG Economic Research Institute (LGERI), a think-tank of LG, reported 
that the Korean economy could not reach a GDP of $20,000 per capita by 2020 
unless it gained a new growth momentum (Hankook, 13 Jul. 2003). Other 
chaebols think-tanks, such as KERI and SERI, also produced a lot of related 
issue papers. Those reports were frequently quoted in the national papers and 
broadcasts. 
 
Success in establishing the campaign as a significant economic discourse 
 
The bad economic conditions were fully appropriated by the chaebols in 
promoting the $20,000 per capita income campaign. At the turn of 2003, the 
business cycle went rapidly into a slump due to the credit card bubble in 
2001~2002.
51
 On top of that, the spread of severe acute respiratory syndrome 
(SARS) and the outbreak of the Iraq war made the economic situation even 
worse. In mid-2003, for the first time since October 1998 -- during the financial 
crisis -- economic production, consumption and investment indices 
simultaneously contracted (JoongAng, 29 Jan. 2003). Emphasizing this 
economic hardship, the chaebols argued that it was time to encourage the big 
conglomerates, rather than clamping down on them. President Roh was 
undeservedly blamed for the economic slump, even though he had assumed 
power only several months previously. 
 
                                           
51 After the financial crisis in 1997, The Korean government boosted household consumption 
by credit to cope with the economic downturn. It resulted in the huge amount of financial 
failure of household after 2003. 
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The main frame of economic news gradually changed from “reform” to 
“economic growth”, highlighting the need for job creation, investment and 
global competitiveness. As is illustrated in Table 6-1, $20,000 per capita GDP 
became an important agenda of the media around June 2003. Instead, the voices 
asking for thorough chaebols reform dwindled. 
 
Table 6-1: Frequency of Articles with Economic Discourse  
                                                (Dec. 2002~Oct. 2003) 
Discourse 
Number of Articles by Month 
12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
$20,000 per 
capita income 
15 54 62 33 96 28 149 346 278 155 131 
Economic 
Crisis 
167 134 130 275 162 143 163 114 95 79 90 
Chaebol 
Reform 
304 469 523 278 136 54 83 23 29 26 44 
 
* The keyword search method available at KINDS is used in counting the numbers of articles 
published in 8 national newspapers, 2 economic dailies, and 3 broadcast networks. The national 
papers are Dong-A, Hankook, Hankyoreh, Kyunghyang, Munhwa, Kookmin, Seoul and Sekei. 
The economic dailies are Maeil Business Newspaper and Korea Economic Daily. The broadcast 
networks are KBS, MBC and SBS. 
 
Figure6-1: Frequency of Articles with Economic Discourse 
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Using these data, the current researcher can obtain Figure 6-1. It shows that 
“chaebols reform” appears most frequently in news from December 2002 to 
February 2003, at the time of hopes (and concerns) about President-elect Roh‟s 
economic reform policies. But it was gradually replaced by the “economic 
growth” after June 2003. 
 
6.6.2 Capture of the media and policy elites 
 
The discourses that the media disseminated 
 
As far as the $20,000 per capita income campaign is concerned, most Korean 
media outlets uncritically followed the general frames of discourse that the 
business elites established. The discourses that the media disseminate can be 
categorized into three areas. They were logically inter-related and eventually 
served the interest of the chaebols. Table 6-2 shows the frame in which the 
Korean media reported the $20,000 per capita campaign. 
 
Firstly, the media contended that the government should pay more attention to 
economic growth than equity. Moon Hyung-pyo, a senior researcher at the 
Korea Development Institution (KDI), was quoted as saying „Now our per 
capita income is just over $10,000. If we overly emphasize distribution, it is 
highly likely that we will follow the (populist) path of the South American 
states‟ (Maeil Business Newspaper, 9 Jun. 2003). It was frequently argued that 
„the best welfare policy is creating jobs through economic growth‟ (Dong-A, 25 
Jul. 2003). 
 
Secondly, the media argued that the government should encourage 
entrepreneurs in order to achieve higher economic growth. To increase 
investment, the government should resolutely rescind regulations and stop 
frustrating big corporations with its business reform policy. One economic daily 
argued in its editorial that „Every government pledged chaebols reform policy 
in its initial stage as if it was a fashion. But it is doubtful how helpful those 
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promise were for the economy‟ (Financial News, 5 Jan. 2003). 
 
Thirdly, the media highlighted that the trade unions should be more cooperative 
with management in order to achieve robust economic growth. Employees were 
asked to refrain from demanding wage increases until the economy grew to the 
scale of $20,000 per capita income. The remarks of Ku Bon-mu, the chairman 
of LG, were widely quoted in the media: 
 
„Entrepreneurs are generally reluctant to invest where the labour union waves 
its flag. The productivity of China has reached 85 percent of Korean business. 
Nonetheless, their wages are just one eighth of those in Korea. The labour 
unions should learn something from this reality‟ (Korean Economic Daily, 23 
Jun. 2003). 
 
Table 6-2: The Frames of the Media Report about the $20,000 Campaign 
 
Point 
(Number of points) 
Frames 
(Number of arguments) 
% of 
tone 
What should be the keynote of socio-
economic policy? (71) 
Growth (65) 91.5% 
Balance (6) 8.5% 
What should be the keynote of business 
policy? (78) 
Encourage entrepreneur 
(68) 
87.2% 
Chaebol reform (10) 12.8% 
How could the conflict between social 
classes be solved? (55) 
Concession of labour 
(50) 
90.9% 
Strengthen social 
security (5) 
9.1% 
 
* The keyword search method available at KINDS is used in counting the numbers of articles 
published in 3 national papers and 2 economic dailies from 1 January to 15 August 2003. The 
three national papers are Dong-A, Hankook and Hankyoreh. They are conservative, liberal and 
progressive respectively in their political stances. The two economic dailies are Maeil Business 
Newspaper and Korean Economic Daily, which are two major financial papers in Korea. 
Among 144 articles that have the key phrase of $20,000 per capita, 204 points were analyzed 
according to the tone of the arguments. Articles with multiple points are counted more than 
once. 
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Cha Eun-young, a professor in economics, was also cited as saying that: 
„Economic policy is inclined to be overly pro-labour, but the government 
should realize that many of the demands of the labour union are excessive 
unless per capita income reaches $20,000.‟ (Korea Economic Daily, 25 Mar. 
2007). 
 
Fairly few journalists indicated that the policy shift was an abandonment of the 
campaign pledge of economic reform. One newspaper quoted an anonymous 
MP as saying that: 
 
„Targeting a figure such as $20,000 is an outdated mobilization strategy while 
it was once effective in the period of rapid economic growth. This type of 
policy is a deviation from the presidential election pledge that place more 
weight on a balanced society and quality of life than rapid economic growth‟ 
(Hankyoreh, 1 Jun. 2007). 
 
Kim Sang-jo, an economist at the PSPD, a civil group, was quoted as saying 
that: „A short-sighted stimulus measure without strengthening of economic 
fundamentals will result in an economic bubble. And the weaker in the society 
will suffer severe damage from the policy‟ (Hankyoreh, 4 Aug. 2003).  
 
The chaebols think-tanks, the media and the policy elite 
 
One notable aspect is the role of SERI, the in-house think-tank of Samsung, in 
the campaign for a $20,000 per capita income. Many journalists and policy 
makers believed Samsung designed the idea and orchestrated the overall 
campaign scheme. The FKI was considerably influenced in its policy and 
activities by Samsung, because Samsung was the biggest donor to its budget. Its 
executive deputy chairman at that time, Sohn, Byung-doo, was a former 
executive of Samsung.  
 
What provided a vigorous momentum for the policy ideas of SERI was the 
competition among the media to gain the initiative of setting the national 
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agenda. During the presidential election campaign period, the Chosun and the 
Dong-A, two influential conservative presses in Korea, competed against one 
another to propose a national agenda in their reporting and editorials. The 
purpose of their competition was to increase their influence by compelling the 
political elite to accept the agenda they had proposed (Mediaoneul, 4 Dec. 
2002). 
 
In relation to the campaign for a $20,000 per capita income, the Maeil Business 
Newspaper, the biggest financial paper, took the initiative. In early 2003, the 
Maeil set the campaign for a $20,000 per capita income as a main plank of its 
editorial policy, and promoted it in various ways, such as a series of in-depth 
reports, overseas case studies, interviews and conferences. 
 
What is significant is that the media was a direct conduit of influence between 
the chaebols and the policy elites during this campaign. The Maeil borrowed the 
campaign idea from SERI and then persuaded the policy elites to adopt their 
media campaign as a national agenda. A former journalist at Maeil Business 
Newspaper said: 
 
„I heard that the Maeil browsed broadly plausible ideas for its campaign at 
the beginning of the new government. Whenever the government changes, 
the media strives to set the new government‟s policy agenda to increase their 
influence. For this reason, the editorial staff in the Maeil kept in contact the 
SERI and got some hint of the campaign‟ (Interview, 15 May 2007) 
 
It is not unusual for the Korean media to contact chaebols think-tanks to get 
some information or an idea for their media promotion. Lee Won-jae, a former 
senior researcher at the SERI, said: 
 
„We occasionally coin policy ideas and bring them to the media outlets. It is 
true that a lot of the media campaigns were originally proposed by us to the 
media. The media do not have many ideas; they just ask Is there any idea that 
looks smart? Indeed, supplying the campaign idea is one of our important 
tasks‟ (Interview, 19 May 2007). 
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After getting the campaign idea from the chaebol think-tanks, the Maeil 
contacted a high-ranking presidential secretary to maximize the influence of the 
campaign. A former journalist of the newspaper said: 
 
„Even though the original idea may have come from Samsung, the Maeil took 
the initiative in the media campaign. Editorial executives of the newspaper 
met Kwon, Oh-kyu, a chief policy-planning secretary of President Roh, and 
asked whether the government would adopt the campaign as an important 
national policy agenda. Chief secretary Kwon eventually said O.K and the 
Maeil set forth a vigorous campaign drive‟ (Interview, 15 May 2007). 
 
Political calculation and policy shift 
 
Despite the all-out campaign by both the chaebols and the media, Roh was 
persistent for a while in his political stance. In February 2003, in his visit to the 
Federation of Korean Trade Unions, the biggest umbrella labor union in Korea, 
he pledged that: „While the business circle is stronger than any other social 
groups in their influence on public opinion, I now promise I will make the 
social power balance more equitable‟ (Hankyoreh, 17 Feb. 2003). Roh also 
insisted at the “Conference for the small and medium enterprise policy review” 
that „Targets such as a $10,000 or $20,000 per capita income must not be an 
excuse for sacrificing everything other than growth; and it cannot be a 
justification for inequality‟ (Korea Economic Daily, 22 Feb. 2003). 
 
But Roh became gradually persuaded by the arguments of the mainstream 
media and the chaebols. He fretted about the unfavourable appraisals of his first 
few months of office. Opinion leaders and the media attacked Roh‟s 
government as “unprepared” or “amateurish”, on account of some confusion 
and awkwardness in its economic policies. His approval ratings plummeted. In 
opinion polls from the Hankyoreh, the approval rate dropped from 71% (Mar. 
2003) to 57% (May 2003) and to 40% (Jul. 2003) (Hankyoreh, 19 Jul. 
2003).Roh could not help but worry about the forthcoming general election in 
April 2004. 
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President Roh needed political momentum with which he could show his 
leadership as a President. The economy was always the main concern of people. 
In this respect, Roh‟s government decided to accept the already-set media 
agenda of a $20,000 per capita income as its socio-economic policy agenda. Six 
months after his inauguration, President Roh declared that his government 
would officially adopt the campaign as a national agenda and as an important 
reference to socio-economic policy. President Roh also plainly admitted that: 
 
„The policy of becoming the economic hub of North-East Asia was the thing 
that I really want to pursue. Actually, I have studied it for a long time. But we 
have had difficulty in appealing to people, while the $20,000 campaign has 
stirred them up‟ (Korea Economic Daily, 24 Jul. 2003). 
 
By the time of this adoption, Roh‟s government rearranged its initial socio-
economic policy agenda under the umbrella of the $20,000 per capita income 
agenda. However, the acceptance of the $20,000 agenda was not just a change 
in appearance. The direction of socio-economic policy altered considerably, in 
favour of growth and the chaebols. Roh‟s government launched all-round 
supportive economic policies, including a revised supplementary budget of $3.9 
billion to invest in SOC (Social Overhead Capital), and a consecutive lowering 
of the short-term policy rate of the central bank to boost the economy (Dong-A, 
12 Jul. 2003). Step by step, Roh‟s government put distance between itself and 
the labour groups. The police crackdown on the railway workers‟ strike by the 
police in July 2003 showed the drastic shift of Roh‟s government to a restrictive 
stance (Dong-A, 3 Jul. 2003). 
 
6.6.3 The chaebols’ victory and the “broken promise”  
 
The adoption of the $20,000 per capita income agenda constituted a policy shift 
towards the interests of the rich and powerful. This was too simple a departure 
for the public, who had elected Roh as President several months previously 
only because he was progressive, reformist and supportive of the common 
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people. There was hardly any sincere deliberation on the change of the tone of 
policy. Around the acceptance of the $20,000 agenda, many of the progressive 
presidential aides were replaced by technocrats or conservative elites. Park, 
Joo-hyun, a former high ranking secretary of the president, was quoted later, 
looking back on this setback: 
 
„The forces of reaction resisted and charged tenaciously. The progressives 
should have done the same. We should have endured and stood our ground, 
once we hoped to build a new paradigm that was imperative for the new 
socio-economic environment. But, we couldn‟t….‟ (Kyunghyang, 25 Sep. 
2006). 
 
Roh‟s government could not return to the original pledge of its presidential 
campaign. And the result was the “broken promise” of a more equitable society. 
The inequality between the rich and the poor has been considerably exacerbated 
during President Roh‟s term in office. According to the National Statistical 
Office, the household income of the upper 20% was 8.4 fold that of the lower 
20% in Q1 2007. This ratio has worsened during Roh‟s term in office from 7.8 
(2004), 8.0 (2005), 8.2 (2006) to a historically high level in 2007 (Seoul 
Economic Daily, 9 May 2007). 
 
Contrary to the expectation that President Roh would “wipe away the tears” of 
the irregular workers, the weakest social class in Korea, they were treated even 
more harshly by the government. In less than 4 years, from February 2003 to 
November 2006, 832 workers were arrested and prosecuted amid the dispute 
between labour and management. This figures almost equaled the total of 892 
workers who were arrested and prosecuted during the 5 year term of the 
previous President, Kim Dea-jung. Among those arrested, 90% were irregular 
workers (Kookmin, 14 Dec. 2006). 
 
The chaebols reform policy almost went up in smoke. The chaebols‟ unlawful 
practices, such as the embezzlement of corporate property by owners‟ families, 
continued as before. Roh‟s government was increasingly captured by the 
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chaebols. The relaxation of the ban on fictitious financing by the chaebols‟ 
affiliates was a typical example of the “retreat”. PSPD, a leading citizen group 
which had been stalwart campaigners for the cause of economic justice, was 
quoted as saying: 
 
„The relaxation is the declaration of surrender of the chaebol reform policy, 
while the bad practices of the chaebols, such as creating multi-million dollar 
slush funds and the unlawful handing down of property, remained intact‟ 
(Kyunghyang, 16 Nov. 2006). 
 
 
6.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter investigated how the Korean corporate elites, i.e. the chaebols, 
influence government policy. Focusing on the cultural and communicative 
mechanisms of the chaebols‟ power, this chapter examined the unbalanced 
ecosystem of policy knowledge in Korea, which feeds the journalists and informs 
the policy makers. What we found here was that the practical knowledge and the 
discourses shared by the corporate elites, journalists and policy-makers are as 
influential as funds, lobby and social networking in advancing the interests of the 
corporate elites. 
 
In line with the political and economic liberalization, the government policy-
making increasingly turned to a game of knowledge and discourse. The corporate 
elites have developed an ability to produce and disseminate the practical 
knowledge that informs the policy makers. With ample material and personnel 
resources, the chaebols think-tanks produce a lot of timely position papers that 
raised, defined and analyzed the specific socio-economic issues and, as a matter 
of fact, presented policy measures from their point of view. The headquarters of 
chaebols also enhanced the impact of this knowledge and discourse by 
mobilizing strategic PR. They meticulously design its processes, finely targets 
small parts of elite audience, and systematically organize resources. 
 
155 
 
The journalists readily treated the corporate elites as a “primary definer” in favor 
of the trendy and handy information subsidy that their think-tanks fed. Along 
with the financial dependency of the media companies on the big advertisers, the 
journalists‟ routines, in which they normally spent whole working hours with the 
PR personnel in the chaebols‟ headquarters, have promoted the uncritical co-
option of journalists by the chaebols. The policy makers were not afraid of 
making use of the policy knowledge and discourses of the chaebols. For them, 
the ready-made policy knowledge of chaebols provides not only convenience, but 
also a defence against failure, because the business world and the media may 
possibly promote it. This suggests the existence of an „elite discourse network‟, 
in which the media mediates elites, who are the main sources and targets at the 
same time (Davis 2007: 55). 
 
This mechanism of influence or micro cultures helps to privilege the arguments 
of chaebols and impose certain interpretations as true, while disqualifying others. 
As was shown in the case study in this chapter, the domination of policy 
discourse has occurred to the extent that a reformist government shifted its 
political stance, after accepting the policy agendas which had been coined by the 
chaebols. 
 
The unbalanced ecosystem of policy knowledge and the dominant influence on 
policy of corporate elites raises concerns about democracy. As the unequal 
influence overwhelmingly advances the advantage of the corporate elites, the 
resource poor group or the poor have little room to influence the government 
policy.  
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7.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter documents the „growing influence of the capital market on firm 
and household behaviors‟ (Froud et al. 2002: 5) after the full liberalization of 
the Korean financial market. The purpose of this research is to illustrate how 
cultural and discursive factors are engaged in the exercise of neo-liberal 
financial power. 
 
The financial market in Korea changed considerably in its size and 
characteristics after the economic crisis in 1997. As the Korean government 
abolished most regulations, global financial capitalists have increased their 
presence in the equity, bond and foreign exchange markets. As a result, the 
market became more closely bound to the global financial system. Hand in hand 
with this, the financial market has increasingly intertwined itself with the daily 
lives of ordinary Koreans with the advance of “financialization”, i.e. the 
incorporation of the household savings into the stock market.  
 
This change was accompanied by the transformation of ideas, values and 
practices that were embedded in the market. The most notable change was the 
ascendancy of the “shareholder value” doctrine and a corporate governance 
system associated with shareholder value. Through the consistent endeavor to 
increase shareholder value, it was argued that firms and managements can 
benefit the whole economy. As a result, increasing share price became the 
supreme objective of corporate management.  
 
The sudden rise in the financial market and financialization gave financial elites 
greater control over ordinary savings and company managers. The share price 
informed the corporate management‟s action -- maximization of shareholder 
value by complying with the new financial rationale. The day to day change of 
interest rate and exchange rate in the financial market also had a disciplinary 
effect. The policy makers spontaneously complied with the policy paradigm 
that the market was fond of, e.g. monetarism, supply-side economics, 
deregulation and privatization. 
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To map out the mechanism of this influence, this chapter regards the financial 
market as a discrete elite field. The focus of research is placed on the localized 
cultures, ideology, metrological practices, and communication of the financial 
market. In this way, this chapter explores how routinized decision-making in the 
discrete sites of the financial elites gave incentives to, appraised, punished and 
disciplined the firms and households, and what social consequences this has 
generated. In the two case studies, this chapter tries to illustrate how the rise of 
a specific financial rationale, China momentum, in the financial market in the 
mid 2000s has influenced household savings and corporate management. 
 
 
7.2 Inside the Financial Market 
 
7.2.1 Actors and actions in the market 
 
Since the early 1980s, the financial market has been an all-important social 
institution. Finance, once recognized as a secondary economic institution 
assisting manufacturing industries, has significantly increased its power „to 
determine outcomes in production, consumption, and social welfare‟ (Knorr-
Cetina and Preda 2005: 3). 
 
Despite the recent rhetoric of „democratization of the market‟, i.e. the advance 
of “financialization” (Greenfield and Williams 2007: 416), the financial market 
is still a discrete elite field dominated by a handful of institutional investors and 
intermediaries. And the inner working of the market is normally „insulated from 
observation‟ (Abolafia 1998: 78). 
 
The traditional account of actors and social relations in the financial market is 
based on the neo-classical assumption of “homo economicus”: rational 
individuals exchanging goods with sufficient information to further their self-
interest and, in doing so, „increasing total utility‟ (Brue 2000: 299). The 
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Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), a decades-long hegemonic doctrine in 
both the academy and the trading room, constitutes the projection of the “homo 
economicus” idea to the financial market (Knorr-Cetina and Preda 2005). In 
this perspective, the global financial market comes to approximate the neo-
classical vision of the perfect market. 
 
But recurring boom and burst cycle and “herd behaviours” show that actors in 
the market are considerably influenced by other participants and by social 
relations. The “reflexive process” illustrated in Keynes‟ famous metaphor of a 
“beauty contest” demonstrates the collective nature of the market (Allen, Moris 
and Shin 2003). Thus, it would be more realistic to claim that „people are 
imperfect processors of information and are frequently subject to bias, error, 
and perceptual illusion‟ (Shefrin 2002: x). Actors, under uncertainty, often rely 
on a heuristic way of thinking (Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky 1982), and 
respond differently according to the way that a problem is “framed” (Shleifer 
2000; Weber and Daws 2005). They fall prey to over-confidence and “common 
judgement errors” (Shiller 2005). 
 
In the market, actors calculate and act within the locally shaped discipline or 
logic. For example, Abolafia‟s cultural approach (1998: 76) to the American 
financial market showed that constitutive rules, roles and local rationalities are 
„created by market makers and, in turn, come to shape their behaviour‟. 
According to Callon (1998: 23, 25, 26), calculative agencies in the market are 
formed by economics and by associated calculative tools (metrological devices). 
Here, economics and measuring tools do not merely observe or record a „reality 
independent of themselves‟, rather they play the role of „performation‟ 
(metrological performativity). In other words, „they contribute powerfully to 
shaping, simply by measuring it, the reality that they measure‟ and „contribute 
to the disciplining of behavior and decisions‟. For instance, as EPS (earning per 
share) emerged as a popular measuring tool in the stock market, Meyer (1994, 
in Callon 1998: 24) argues that, „managers adapted to it … by deferring 
maintenance, depreciation, research and development, expenditure and the like‟. 
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The approach of metrological performativity supplies a handy conceptual 
framework for researching the relationship between market and society. 
However, Callon‟s approach also omits many aspects of economic action. The 
market is not unique or simple and actors in the market are not 
straightforwardly guided by the principle of “performativity”. An empirical 
study of the London Stock Exchange (LSE) also supports the idea that the 
markets are „immersed in social relations that go well beyond the exchange act‟ 
and „calculation contains both metrological and non-metrological elements‟ 
(Davis 2006: 16). 
 
7.2.2 Shareholder capitalism 
 
Modern corporations operate in a complex web of stakeholders, including 
shareholders, lenders, employees, managers and local communities. The system 
in which firms organize their governance and resource allocation differs 
according to the pattern of capitalist development in each country. 
 
Over the past three decades, “maximization of shareholder value” became 
prevalent as a principle of corporate governance around the world. This 
originated from the agency theorists (for example, Jensen and Meckling 1976) 
who argued that the foremost mission of agents (managers) was the 
maximization of the interests of the principals (shareholders). Here, the rate of 
return on corporate stock was the measure of management performance. They 
also insisted on the need for a corporate control market by means of mergers 
and acquisitions (M&A), to discipline managers who perform poorly. 
 
During the 1970s, the idea of shareholder value received support from the 
rapidly growing number of institutional investors. The mutual funds, pension 
funds and life insurance companies „made possible the take-overs advocated by 
agency theorists and gave shareholders more collective power to influence the 
yield and market value‟ of the stock they possess (Lazonick and O‟Sullivan 
2000: 16). At last, this specific „business cliché and social mantra‟ (Froud et al. 
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2000: 81) became an established credo
52
 of the finance-led neo-liberal 
economy and growth regime, with its capability to change the priorities and 
behaviours of economic actors. 
 
Although most of the strategy of shareholder value was based on institutional 
investors‟ own interests, this is „set in an interpretative wrap that presents 
shareholder value as a benign revolution in corporate priorities with entirely 
beneficial consequences for the broader society‟ (ibid: 86). The “core-
competence theory” and “business process reengineering” were suggested as 
effective management strategies delivering improved performance in the 
interest of shareholders. Another key intermediary, consultancy firms, sold 
corporate managers value-based management measured by metrics such as 
EVA
53
 or MVA
54
. 
 
Corporate managers became increasingly sensitive to the rationale of the 
financial market. The shareholder value model implies „a new form of 
competition of all against all whereby every quoted firm must compete as an 
investment to meet the same financial standard‟ (Williams 2000: 6). For 
example, the financial media are able to compare managers‟ performance in a 
table, as the metrics supply powerful tools of ranking (Froud et al. 2000). 
Moreover, the management pay became closely tied to the share price of the 
company (e.g. stock options), as the agency theory suggested. As investors took 
profit projection seriously, market analysts successfully established their 
importance. As scrutiny of the market increased, „firms began to try to manage 
and manipulate analysts‟ projections‟ (Zorn et al. 2005: 281). 
  
The disciplining power of the shareholder value rationale led to considerable 
changes in corporate structure and strategy. In the U.S., the strategic orientation 
                                           
52
 In the “OECD Principles of Corporate Governance” in 1999, the OECD emphasizes that 
corporations should be run, first and foremost, in the interest of shareholders (OECD 1999). 
53
 Economic Value Added. This is the value created in excess of the required return of such 
investors as shareholders and debt holders. 
54
 Market Value Added. This refers to the difference between the capital contributed by 
investors and the current market value of a firm. If this measure is positive, the firm added 
value. 
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of top corporate manager has clearly shifted from „retain and reinvest‟ to 
„downsize and distribute‟ in the name of „creating shareholder value‟ over 
1980~1990 (Lazonick and O‟Sullivan 2000: 18). More importantly, this new 
financial regime has engendered clear socio-economic consequences like the 
shrinkage of investments and the weakening of job security. As the rhetoric of 
value management provides little practical guidance to managers, corporate 
restructuring or take-overs usually slide into the shedding of labour, the 
spinning off of peripheral departments and the selling-off of physical assets to 
push up the market value of the company‟s stock 
 
 
7.3. The Global Integration of the Market after the Crisis 
 
7.3.1 The entry of global financial capital 
 
The economic crisis in 1997 brought about a sea change in the Korean financial 
market. With the relaxation in investment regulations and liberalization of 
capital movements to overcome the crisis, the equity, bond and foreign 
exchange (FX) markets have considerably grown in both the size of transactions 
and their importance in the national economy. The market has integrated 
substantially into the global financial system, as a massive amount of foreign 
financial capital flowed into the Korean financial market. 
  
The increase of foreign investment in the Korean equity market was 
conspicuous while, before the crisis, the inflow of foreign capital was mainly 
bank loans. According to the Bank of Korea, for example, the portfolio 
investments of foreigners in Korea has rapidly increased from $ 14.1 billion 
(2005) to $ 30.4 billion (2007), and to $ 49.3 billion (2009) (Maeil Business 
Newspaper, 24 Jan. 2010). Accordingly, the share of the global investors in the 
Korean equity market has considerably increased. In the Korea Composite 
Stock Price Index (KOSPI), the main stock exchange index in Korea, global 
investors possessed 42% of aggregate market value at the end of 2004.  This 
was more than three times the 13.7% holding at the end of 1997, when the 
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economic crisis broke out. In terms of the amount of investment, foreigners 
possessed $163.5 billion of equity in the Korean financial market in 2003. This 
was the largest among the 16 emerging countries (FSS home page)
55
.  
 
Table 7-1: The Increase of Shareholding of Global Investors  
                                  (% of aggregated market value of KOSPI)  
Year 1992 1995 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Share (%) 4.9 11.9 14.6 19.6 21.9 30.1 36.6 36.0 40.1 42.0 
                                         Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) 
 
The global investors, in the main, have purchased shares of the best-sought 
Korean companies. In early 2006, foreigners owned 54.4% of Samsung 
Electronics Co., the biggest Korean manufacture; 85.8% of KB, the biggest 
Korean bank; and 46.4% of Shinsaegae, the biggest Korean retail chain. 
Foreigners possessed more than a 30% share in 76 corporations among 780 
listed in KOSPI in December 2010 (Maeil Business Newspaper 16 Jan. 2011). 
 
As the “fire sale” of ailing companies and the privatization of public enterprises 
mushroomed after the crisis, foreign capital has actively increased the 
management buy-out of corporations. The annual figure of FDI has risen to $15 
billion in 2000 from less than $2 billion in early 1990 (Ministry of Industry, 
Commerce and Energy 2005). 
 
Besides the inroads made by global investors, the growth of local financial 
capital was also conspicuous in the early 2000s as household assets were 
increasingly incorporated with equity investment, i.e. “financialization”. The 
mass investment culture which begun to blossom from around 2003~2004 has 
invited the rapid growth of indigenous equity funds. The trust money of equity 
investment funds has grown 16.32 times in less than 5 years (Korea Financial 
Investment Association home page)
56
. The number of so-called „giant‟ 
                                           
55
 Financial Supervisory Service (Financial Statistics Information System: http://fisis.fss.or.kr/)  
56
 Korea Financial Investment Association (http://www.kofia.or.kr/kofia/index.cfm) 
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indigenous equity funds, with trust money over 1 trillion won, ($900 million) 
reached 29 at the end of 2007 (Seoul Economic Daily, 12 Oct. 2008). The 
influence of these indigenous funds on share price and corporate management 
in Korea almost matched that of foreign capitalists by 2006. 
 
Table 7-2: The Growth of Fund Accounts and Trust Money 
 
 Numbers of equity fund accounts 
(million) 
Trust money of total 
investment fund 
(trillion Korean won) 
Dec. 
2003 
0.19 145 (9.4: equity fund) 
Dec. 
2004 
0.86 187(8.6) 
Dec. 
2005 
5.28 204(26.2) 
Dec. 
2006 
7.29 235(46.6) 
Dec. 
2007 
17.1 298(116.4) 
Dec. 
2008 
16.7 361(140.2) 
                                           (Korea Financial Investment Association) 
  
Well-established Korean financial capital also made inroad into overseas 
financial markets in such developing countries as China, India, Vietnam, Brazil 
and Russia. The number of overseas investment funds was 862 by the end of 
2007, a 5.5-fold increases in one year (Korea Economic Daily, 27 Dec. 2007). 
Their investment money has also mushroomed, attracting 70 trillion won ($64 
billion) as of November 2007. This rose almost two-fold in 7 months (Seoul 
Economic Daily, 10 Dec. 2007). 
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7.3.2 Global-national inter-subjectivity 
 
These changes have made the Korean financial market more sensitive to the 
global market and the world economy. Ever-intensifying connectivity and 
interaction between the global and local, along with the growing interchange of 
on-line financial information, facilitated both markets to move as one entity. As 
such, participants in both markets hold an identical investment rationale, and 
follow identical investment fashion. This was in line with the observation by 
Knorr-Cetina and Bruegger (2005: 265, 274) that, in the global foreign 
exchange market, „participants‟ reciprocal observation of the market on screen‟ 
in this highly disembedded social system, overcoming geographical separation, 
created an „inter-subjectivity, i.e. global we-relationship‟. 
 
Korean fund managers and analysts became increasingly responsive to the 
volatility of global financial and commodity markets. The first priority of the 
professional investors in the morning was, without exception, to monitor market 
movement in New York and Europe. Lee Jin-woo, an FX (foreign exchange) 
market analyst, said: 
 
„When I get up, my mobile phone informs me of last night‟s closing data of 
New York financial market. Then I turn on my PC and study what kind of 
economic indicators and events have influenced the market‟ (Interview, 16 
Jan. 2009). 
 
Professional investors have to keep watching global markets during their 
trading hours because the futures market in New York and Europe, such as 
NASDAQ 500, runs around the clock. As such, daytime movements in the 
Asian market, and night-time movements in the future index of New York and 
Europe, are reflexive. Ji Young-gul, a senior equity fund manager, said that 
„Markets in New York, Japan, China and Korea are all interlocked with each 
other‟ (Interview, 13 Jan. 2009).  
 
The global integration of local markets has facilitated the co-movement of the 
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Korean equity index with that of the New York stock exchange. According to 
Lee Chung-un (2002: 22), the coefficient of correlation of stock return between 
KOSPI and S&P 500 remained above zero since 1998 and rose to 0.6 in early 
2000s
57
. Figure 7-1 illustrates how the two markets have moved in lockstep 
since the economic crisis.  
   
       Figure 7-1: The correlation between KOSPI and S&P 500   
                                           (Since Nov. 1998) 
 
                                                (KIEF, Lee C-U 2002: 18) 
 
This co-movement can also be explained by the investment pattern of global 
financial institutions which increased their influence in the Korean market. The 
global investors tended to synchronize their “buying or selling” of Korean 
equity with the market mood and fashion of global financial centres. On top of 
that, the strong influence of global investors on price movement gave birth to a 
“me-too-ism” in which local traders vigilantly copied the views and portfolios 
of global investors. Kim Han-jin, a senior equity market analyst, said; 
 
„We should admit that the Korean financial market is just a part of the global 
system. It would be a vain effort if someone tries to evaluate Korean equity 
without understanding the rationale and hegemony of foreign investors‟ 
(Interview, 9 Jan. 2009). 
                                           
57
 The coefficient of correlation moves between minus one and plus one. The closer the 
coefficient approaches to zero, the weaker the extant of correlation is. But the closer it 
approaches to one (perfect correlation) or minus one (perfect adverse correlation), the stronger 
the correlation is.  
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7.4 The Exit Power of Financial Capital 
 
Global investors tend to expect roughly to gain „the same risk-adjusted real 
return‟ in every financial market (Leys 2001: 21). When a country offers 
significantly lower returns, the country will run the risk of massive capital 
outflows followed by sudden depreciation of the currency. What this implies is 
that policies that significantly influence the return of financial investments, 
such as fiscal programs and welfare budgets, are tightly constrained within the 
„golden straitjacket‟ of market sentiment (Friedman 2000: 101). 
 
Policies that analysts in the market dislike automatically cause a negative 
impact on interest rates and stock indexes. The credit rating agencies offer 
practical guidelines for the assessment of any new policy. Analysts regularly 
estimate a “political risk factor” for every country, expressed as an interest rate 
premium on the government‟s bonds. A possible political change, if it is thought 
to be unfavorable to capital, is normally a discount factor. Their surveillance of 
economic indicators, policies, and social and political change became so 
rigorous that „the international economy is seen as an all-powerful force that 
national politics cannot compete with‟ (Kantola 2001: 65). 
 
In Korea, after the economic crisis, the financial market has also emerged as an 
automatic surveillance machine of public policies. It was notable that 
macroeconomic policies became more and more dependent both on various 
economic indicators, global and local, and the interpretation of them in the 
financial market. In order to build confidence in the market, the government 
had to make it clear, through the policies they enacted, that they held market-
friendly values. Kang Myeon-mo, a director of Bank of Korea, the central bank, 
said: 
 
„(after the crisis) the attitude of the central bank toward the financial market 
has considerably changed. We vigilantly monitor the market and try to give 
them what they want. … We understand the importance of gaining 
confidence from the market. But building confidence is a long journey. 
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However, without this, no policy will be effective‟ (Interview, 5 Jan. 2009). 
 
In a similar vein, the government began to pay more attention to the foreign 
financial media, including Bloomberg, Reuters and AFX. The Korean 
government had painful memories of Bloomberg, the New York-based financial 
media company, triggering the full-scale exodus of foreign financial capital 
when the economic crisis was approaching in October 1997. Bloomberg 
uncovered the fact the central bank‟s foreign exchange reserve, available to 
defend against speculation, was dwindling rapidly. Lee Joo-hee, a former 
journalist in Bloomberg Korea, recalled:  
 
„After the crisis, the government began to post the spokesperson in charge of 
the foreign media and introduced regular briefing for them. In short, the 
attitude of the government toward foreign media has changed remarkably‟ 
(Interview, 10 Jan. 2009). 
 
At times, the sentiment of the financial market was appropriated by the 
government, or the business world, as a good excuse for structural adjustment 
policies that were particularly painful to the economically weak. For instance, 
resistance against the flexibility of labour, i.e. policies that increased discretion 
of the management over redundancy or on hiring casual(irregular) labours, was 
often condemned as recklessness, that would undermine the confidence of the 
foreign financial capital in the Korean economy (Seoul, 20 Jul. 2001). 
 
 
7.5 The New Law of the Market 
 
After the financial openness, „the law of the market‟ (Callon 1998) has changed. 
What was distinctive about global financial capitalists, in the eyes of Korean 
professional investors, was that they made investment decisions based on 
elaborate evaluation of the firms, mobilizing profit-oriented metrological 
devices. The new law of the market required local markets to leave behind the 
pre-crisis investment patterns, that rely on the charts of price movement or 
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insider‟s information (Dong-A, 10 Apr. 2001). 
 
The change of investment rationale that emphasized the earning potential of a 
firm has brought about a new consensus about measuring and regulating the 
market. A couple of metrological devices which corresponded with the 
valuation-based investment were introduced and disseminated. Such measuring 
tools as PER
58
 and ROE
59
 became prevalent, in line with the tightening of 
regulation on accounting practices and disclosure of management information. 
More meticulous measuring tools, such as EVA, MVA, ROIC,
60
 or 
EV/EBITDA,
61
 added precision to the earning-value orientation (Money Today, 
9 Nov. 2005). 
 
In the new measuring process, the most important factor in buying or selling 
shares was the earnings forecast in the forthcoming 6~12 months. This is 
because analysts and fund managers tended to estimate optimal share price by 
multiplying estimated EPS
62
 with compromised PER. Ji Young-gul, a senior 
fund manager, conformed that; „It is of the utmost importance to estimate how 
much profit the company will make in the coming twelve months‟ (Interview, 
13 Jan. 2009). This explains why analysts and financial journalists were so 
eager to get even small a hint on earnings prospects when they visit the 
company, or have conference calls with corporate managers. The application of 
PER, another crucial but  extremely subjective valuation tool,
63
 was also 
changed in favour of the earning potentials of the firm. A senior equity analyst 
was quoted as saying that: 
 
„Before the crisis, the compromised PER was determined mainly by the 
                                           
58
 Price Earnings Ratio 
59
 Return On Equity 
60
 Return on Invested Capital 
61
 Enterprise Value/Earnings Before Interest, Tax, Depreciation and Amortization 
62
 Earnings Per Share 
63
 The PER is determined mainly by qualitative factors such as growth potential of the industry. 
Thus it tended to be compromised among professional investors and there is no formal 
procedure to gauge it. For example, global investors have applied a low level of PER since 
1990s in valuing the Korean equity market than other emerging market countries on account of 
the so-called “Korea discount” factors, such as the menace from North Korea. 
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growth potential of the industry or firm. Now, the market leadership and the 
EBITDA determine the level of the compromise PER of the firm. It is true 
that the perspective of valuation has totally changed‟ (Money Today, 11 Apr. 
2006). 
 
The network of surveillance  
 
Valuation-based investment literally required scrutiny of corporate management 
within institutionalized settings such as specialist networks, impartial disclosure 
of management information and stricter regulation on corporate accounting. 
This consolidated further the “investment chain” composed of analysts, fund 
managers and corporate IR personnel with a new consensus of metrological 
discipline. 
 
In this investment network, the analysts played an important role in bridging 
professional investors and firms. After the crisis, Korean securities firms and 
asset management firms competitively strengthened their research capabilities. 
The number of analysts in Korean financial institutions rapidly increased from 
794 in 2004, to 934 in 2006 and 1115 in 2007(KFIA home page). Analysts in 
foreign financial firms enjoyed market leadership for several years after the 
crisis. Those analysts were believed to have a special eye for economic trends 
and valuation of companies, with assistance from their global networks. Ha 
Jung-min, a financial journalist, said; 
 
„For a while, the analyses from the foreign investment firms had a 
considerable impact on market sentiment. Accordingly, journalists were busy 
in putting out a news flash immediately after their reports were issued‟ 
(interview, 29 Jan. 2009).  
 
In around 2000~2003, a lot of big corporations strengthened their investor 
relationship (IR) activities by posting CFO
64
 and professional IR personnel. A 
                                           
64
 Chief Financial Officer. The main task of CFO was to manage stock price and market 
expectation. The CEO-CFO structure was introduced partly because this seemed to send a 
positive signal to financial markets that the company respected shareholders (Korea Economic 
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survey in 2002 showed that, among 301 listed companies, 142 (47.2%) had 
posted IR people and 78 (25.9%) had IR department (Financial News, 17 Sep. 
2002). The firms became more proactive in disclosing management information 
through quarterly earnings announcements, official publications and personal 
meeting with analysts. The CEOs, especially, came to the forefront of IR 
activities, participating regularly in conferences for their investors. A survey in 
2003 showed that 33% of CEOs identified IR as a top priority in financial 
management (Herald Economic Daily, 10 Feb. 2003). Kim Han-jin, a senior 
analyst, said:  
 
„When I was a junior analyst, (in early 1990s), I had to spend most of my 
energy in explaining why I was going to visit the company. They usually 
asked me why should we give you our information?. … Now, the climate 
considerably changed. Some CEOs even accompany analysts when they go 
abroad to have a road show‟ (Interview, 9 Jan. 2009). 
 
Investment decisions were made through continuous interaction between 
analysts, corporate IR managers and fund managers. Analyst visited investment 
firms and present their specific perspective and projections. If analysts‟ 
arguments and evidences were persuasive, fund managers gave an order to the 
securities firm in which the analyst worked, giving rise to considerable 
transaction commissions. Fund managers also evaluate the performance of 
analysts at a later date, based on the accuracy of their recommendations about 
specific shares. Analysts are sensitive to this evaluation because their salaries 
were directly linked to the evaluation. Other than portfolio investors, global 
private equity funds and hedge funds enhanced their influences in the Korean 
financial market with their “shareholder activism”. 
 
Discipline and adaptation  
 
The doctrine of shareholder value and the new law of the market turned out to 
be fairly effective in disciplining the corporations. More and more Korean 
                                                                                                                           
Daily, 1 Feb. 2002). 
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corporations have adapted their management strategy and style to the rationale 
of the globalized financial market. For the corporate managers, appraisal by the 
financial market by share price became very important because it determines 
the reputation of the company, the morale of their employees, and the extent of 
their vulnerability to a possible take-over bid. 
 
As many firms have linked the performance of the company to remuneration of 
the management, the share price became the key barometer for the top 
management. As a result, so-called “share price driven management” became a 
fashion among Korean corporations. During the researcher‟s career as a 
business journalist, it was not unusual to witness top bankers, or top corporation 
managers, set their desk-top screen to streamline the share price of their firm, 
and for them to look at it frequently throughout business hours. 
 
By responding to the law of the market, the corporate managers became 
increasingly sensitive to the signifiers related to the “earning value” such as 
operational margin, earning per share, ROE and ROA. As more and more 
Korean firms concentrated on increasing earning value by adopting value 
management orthodoxy, i.e. business restructuring and enhancement of core 
competence, their ROE has rapidly risen. The ROE of total listed companies in 
the Korean financial market was just 1.5% in 1997. But it rose to 5.7% (2001), 
12.7% (2002), and 15% (2006) (Economic Review, 30 Aug. 2007). This was 
dubbed „revolution of ROE‟ in Korea (Dong-A, 27 Mar. 2002). 
 
 
7.6 Culture and Communication in the Market 
 
Most of the headquarters of the Korean financial firms are concentrated in a 
small district, Yoeudo, in Seoul. The culture and communication of the 8.4㎢ of 
financial hub is as intensive, cohesive and exclusive as any global financial 
centers, e.g. City of London and Wall Street of New York. From this discrete 
and exclusive cultural and communication network, specific consensual 
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practices, belief and ideology emanate. 
 
7.6.1 The exclusive but intensive communication network 
 
Yoeudo is a small universe where most of the routine takes place within a web 
of professional investors. The bond market and foreign exchange market are 
operated by 200-300 active traders, brokers, analysts and financial journalists. 
The equity market has more extensive participants including individual 
investors. But, the share price is virtually determined by a critical mass of 
2000~3000, including 1,000 fund managers and another 1,000 analysts in local 
and global financial institutions (KFIA home page).65 
 
Literally, everything in the world, including political, economic and 
international affairs, is influential on the market. But, it is not until information 
is interpreted, and consensus is made by the market participants that these 
affairs influence the market. Practically, keeping continuous contact with the 
players in the market is the most efficient way of tracking the market, and hence 
improving the likelihood of good performance. In this respect, people in Yoeudo 
usually work, talk and eat together within small groups of players. Some of 
them even spend their weekends together, playing golf or going out fishing. A 
specialist language, code of practices and disposition for social events are 
shared via the frequent contacts with each other. Lee Kwan-woo, a senior fund 
manager, said „Although the degree of familiarity may vary, most of the players 
in Yeoudo know who is who in their field‟ (Interview, 6 Jan. 2009). 
 
It is a dizzy place, full of information and intensive communications. Almost all 
of the national and financial papers are subscribed in each office. Every 
morning, e-mail boxes are stuffed with hundreds of research reports from 
economists, strategists and analysts. The PC monitors ceaselessly pour out news 
flashes and economic data supplied by the specialist providers and the on-line 
financial media. During trading hours, the market produces another ton of 
                                           
65 Korean Financial Investment Association  
(http://www.kofia.or.kr/kofia/index.cfm?event=inf.fsi.page01, retrieved 12 Apr. 2010). 
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information, such as change in price, volume of transaction, the spread between 
bid and offer, and the movement of specific investors. A lot of information, 
interpretations and rumours are continuously exchanged through the instant 
messengers and the phone calls. Lee Jin-woo, a foreign exchange analyst, said 
„My job is to be immersed in news and information except during the hours I 
am sleeping‟ (Interview, 16 Jan. 2009). 
 
But these „informational cascade‟[s] (Oberlechner 2002: 408) in the Yoeudo, 
ironically, nurtures the need for a segmented communication network. With the 
global integration of the financial market and the development of information 
technology, news and information become commodities in the market. In other 
words, no matter how much news and information there is, it does not 
guarantee prominent investment decision. What is important is a sense of 
„trigger‟ that is obtained by „negotiating a series of data and a series of 
interpretations of a mix of data‟ (Sassen 2005: 27). Park Sung-jin, a senior fixed 
income trader, explained that:  
 
„I believe an insight comes suddenly when one systemically update 
information. … This arises like a spark but it is a flash aided by accumulation 
of knowledge. Thus, it is different from the gut feeling at the casino. … 
Talking to a group of intimate colleagues is crucial. Through the dialogue, 
my idea is developed and eventually it triggers a spark‟ (Interview, 15 Jan. 
2009).  
 
Many of the fund managers and analysts whom the researcher interviewed 
pointed out the importance of private communication as an incubator for a 
decision-making. Lee Jin-woo said again: „I have 5~6 friends whom I call my 
inner circle … Sometimes I feel they are as intimate as my family‟ (Interview, 
16 Jan. 2009). This illustrates that social connectivity still has a strong influence 
on the market movement, even though the market can be reached from 
anywhere through electronic systems (Sassen 2005).  
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7.6.2 Belief and ideology of the market 
 
As Yoeude became deeply integrated into the global market after the crisis, a 
belief that is friendly to market and shareholder value had thrived. The rise of 
the “financial market micro ideology” was in line with the internalization of 
specific value and practices that were presented as the “global standard” by 
Wall Street and the City. 
 
The growth of the financial market has reinforced the credo that placed the 
financial market above every social, economic institution. This “market 
centrism” assumes that the financial market was a prop of the national economy 
in which the idea and actions of each economic actor were judged by the “vote 
of price” day after day. Hence, it was argued that „the index of share price is a 
barometer which exactly reflects the political, social, economic and cultural 
potential of a country‟ (Money Today, 20 Dec.2002). 
 
This mode of thought was associated with the belief that what the market liked 
was beneficial to the public as well. And unbridled pursuit of profit is 
supportive to the market. In this sense, privatization, deregulation and low 
levels of taxation were welcomed. In contrast, political intervention, regulation, 
redistribution, collectivism and strong unions were shunned as anti-market and 
therefore anti-public. A senior fund manager was quoted as saying: 
 
„The government should enforce the law more strictly in order to revitalize 
market. … Labour union should now abide by law and order. … Only the 
competitiveness of private sector can defend the market principle against the 
interventionists‟ (Money Today, 20 Dec. 2002). 
 
In terms of corporate management, it was believed that the sound operation of 
financial markets could automatically distinguish between efficient and 
inefficient management. This belief gave birth to two radical doctrines 
regarding the relationship between shareholder and management. One was that, 
when a firm failed to develop a profitable business model, i.e. the rate of return 
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fell short of the “cost of capital” (WACC),66 it was preferable to distribute the 
cash reserve to shareholders as a form of dividend or share buy-back. This 
distribution of cash, market participants believed, would eventually enhance the 
overall efficiency of economy as the “invisible hand” redirects capital from 
incompetent managers to competent managers, or from a mature industry to a 
growth industry. Chang Ha-sung, a leader of shareholder activism, argued: 
 
„If a firm finds it difficult to venture into new business, then paying a 
reasonable dividend is better for the national economy. Retaining huge 
amounts of cash without a concrete investment plan may cause the firm to be 
undervalued at present and impair the growth potential of the national 
economy in the long run‟ (Chosun, 26 Sep. 2006). 
 
The other doctrine was that take-overs (M&A), including hostile ones, were an 
effective means of disciplining corporate managers when they were inefficient 
and the share price was considerably undervalued. Once a firm was taken-over, 
the financial market believed, new management could increase the value of the 
firm by restructuring the business, and this would increase the overall utility of 
the economy. 
  
7.6.3 The financial media: a market player 
 
The turn towards the market after the crisis was accompanied by the 
blossoming of financial journalism. The global financial media, such as Reuters, 
Bloomberg, Financial Times and Wall Street Journal, enjoyed a startling 
increase in Korean audiences thanks to the growing influence of foreign capital. 
Taking full advantage of the development of information technology, local on-
line financial newswires, including E-daily, Infomax and Money Today, had also 
sprung up. In line with the “financialization” of household assets, the national 
press and broadcasters also increased their coverage of the financial market. 
 
Although the coverage of the market has increased considerably, however, the 
                                           
66
 Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
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core part of the financial market was still outside public awareness. Usually, the 
mass media were alienated from the professional investors, whereas the 
financial media were detached from the public. Lee Jin-woo, a foreign 
exchange analyst, said that: 
 
„The economic sections of national newspapers and broadcasts are the least 
reliable information source in terms of promptness and depth. Most of their 
news cannot be described as information for the professional investors. 
Hence, the market people often regard news in the mass media as a reverse 
indicator‟ (Interview, 16 Jan. 2009). 
 
News of the financial media was circulated amongst a limited numbers of 
“market people”, who had considerable knowledge and interest in economy and 
finance. To engage with the financial news, one must be familiar with acronyms, 
technical jargons and coded terms which are sprinkled all around the articles. In 
this sense, financial journalism, as Wayne Parsons (1989: 3) put it, was a 
„unique interpreter, less of mass opinion than of the views and values of more 
limited and narrower elite‟.  
 
The behavioural and psychological particularity of the market positions the 
financial media as market participants. Firstly, they play the role of a mediator 
of „anticipatory reality‟ (Oberlechner 2002: 419). According to behavioural 
economists, it is not reality but expectation that moves price in the financial 
market. In the world of anticipatory reality, almost every important change 
takes place before an actual event happens or an announcement comes out. The 
main role of the financial media is thus, instead of setting a new agenda, to 
facilitate the integration of expectations and to confirm existing expectations.  
 
As shareholder value became the highest priority after the crisis, Korean 
financial journalists relentlessly pursued the information that could give a hint 
about the profitability of firms. Their main audiences -- analysts, fund managers 
and investment bankers -- all placed the highest priority in expecting and 
confirming the earnings of the firms. The firms which know well this 
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characteristic of the market tried to mobilize „interpretive politics‟ (Abolafia 
2005: 208) by managing the expectation of the market. Lee Joo-hee, a financial 
journalist, said;  
 
„When I interview the top-management of a company before the economic 
crisis, I asked about broader issues, such as growth potential, innovation of 
product and even his philosophy on management. However, after the crisis, 
the earning prospects of this quarter, the ratio of dividend and any 
prospective M&A became the first and foremost question as the financial 
journalists know what the market want to know‟ (Interview, 20 Jan. 2009). 
 
The financial media also play the role of building consensus in the market. 
Theoretically, this role is related to the reflexive nature of the financial market. 
In other words, financial investors are wary of other market participants‟ 
„assumptions and expectations‟ on specific issues or ideas (Allen, Morris and 
Shin 2003: 3). The financial media‟s role of consensus building has facilitated 
the penetration of the rationale, and metrological devices, of global investors 
into the Korean market in a relatively short period.  
 
7.6.4 The context of group psychology 
 
The professional investors in Yoeudo, as stated above, have developed discrete 
and cohesive culture and communication networks. They shared market 
information, a belief in neo-classical economics, and the credo of shareholder 
value. This homogeneity of market elites often increased the chance of one-
sided expectations and decision-making. If the reflexive characteristics of the 
market facilitate lop-sided expectations, market people plunge into herd-like 
behaviour. 
  
The financial media often accelerated herd behaviour and the financial bubble. 
The relationship between media reports and their sources clearly showed the 
circularity of collective information processing in the market. This is a situation 
where the source is the audience and the audience is the source at the same time 
(Davis 2007). This loop of information processing was identified as a root of 
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the “common judgment error” that leads to specific group psychology and 
group behaviour. As Michel Abolafia (2001: 24-25) noted, „market rivals make 
buy and sell decisions by watching each other‟. The “reflective reality” 
mediated by the financial media reinforces and snowballs specific valuations or 
attitudes, especially those of the dominant players in the market, as an 
interpretative short cut or main reference point. 
  
The Korean financial media was also accused of aggravating herd behaviour 
and the financial bubble, including in the late 2000s as will be stated in the case 
study section of the chapter. Financial journalism played the role of “cheer 
leader” when the bubble grew. Their optimism at the time of the financial 
bubble was a systematic error in which the financial media benefited from the 
growth of advertisement revenue and the demand of information that the bull 
market generated. Also, the market situation, where the sources were just a few 
professional investors, limited the watchdog role of the financial media, in that 
the journalists were reluctant to break ties with the key sources (Kim S-H and 
Ahn B-U 2007: 25-27). 
 
 
7.7 Social Consequences of the New Law of the Market 
 
The diffusion of shareholder value into Yoeudo was accompanied by the 
institutionalization of incentives, surveillance, and a system of discipline upon 
corporate management. This new system has considerably changed the priority 
and the strategy of the large corporations -- those of national economic 
significance. Following this change, a series of social consequences in relation 
to employment and investment became evident. 
 
As the shape of corporate finance has drastically changed, from a system 
centered on banks to the system centered on capital markets, firms realized that 
they had to maintain a high share price in order to obtain cheap finance. The 
spread of performance-based remuneration systems, such as stock options and 
profit-sharing, also encouraged managers to pursue the maximization of profit. 
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With the financialization of all things from household assets to equity 
investment, people became increasingly sensitive to the change of share price.  
 
Periodic evaluation through metrological devices, and comparison in league 
tables of performance, like the „Panopticon‟ of Jeremy Bentham (Foucault 1977: 
200), gave the corporate managers a feeling that they are watched and that they 
had to comply with the rule of the market. Otherwise, the punishment from a 
hostile M&A and shareholder activism would discipline the managers. In order 
not to become a victim, the firms have to maintain their share price as high as 
possible. 
 
What was notable with this change was that corporate managers increasingly 
slide into “short-termism”. In the face of “dual competition”, both in the 
financial market and in the product market, corporate managers became 
incessantly cautious about short term optimization of their business. As a result, 
after the crisis, business re-engineering, core competence and constant 
restructuring became mottoes of Korean managers. The “race to the bottom” of 
all firms, in terms of rate of returns and share price, has encroached upon the 
bargaining power of workers. This impacted disproportionately severely on the 
weakest parts of the corporation – workers in peripheral, unspecialized work; 
unorganized labor; workers in small and medium sized subcontractors, and 
older workers with high salaries. Along with the management fashion of 
outsourcing, business spin-offs and temporary contracts, the number of casual 
workers has rapidly increased. It has caused grim social repercussions, such as 
an increase in unemployment and the welfare burden of government.  
 
The culture of shareholder value in Yoeudo has also changed the investment 
pattern of the firms. Managers have become more cautious in assuming risks 
when they plan large scale investment. Accordingly, the robust dynamics of 
investment in the pre-crisis era have been considerably subdued and the Korean 
economy has undergone a chronic slump of employment (Lee K-K 2004). The 
cautiousness of firms in investment was evidenced from the fact that cash 
holdings of firms hit their highest amounts since Korea embarked on 
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“condensed growth”. At the end of 2004, the 1000 largest non-financial 
companies in Korea possessed a total of 65 trillion won ($59 billion) of cash, 
cash equivalents and short-term financial instruments. This was a significant 
increase from 24 trillion won ($21.8 billion) in the end of 1996 (Korea 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry 2006). One convincing explanation of this 
shrinking in investment is that the “patient financial capital” has withered, as, 
after the crisis, the main source of corporate financing has migrated from the 
bank to the capital market. 
 
 
7.8 Case Study 1: The Rise and Fall of the “China Momentum” 
 
This case study illustrates how the specific financial rationale, “China 
momentum”, emerged in the Korean financial market and influenced household 
assets and the whole economy. In around the mid-2000s, “China momentum” 
which emphasized the growth potentials of the rapidly developing Chinese 
economy had risen in the global financial market. In Korea as well, the “China 
momentum” gradually gained interpretative leadership after several local 
financial elites, especially in a leading fund firm Mirae, ardently advocated this 
financial rationale.  
 
With the market initiative of Mirae and unique communication processes in the 
discrete financial center, the “China momentum” became a dominant 
investment fashion. And this led to the rush to overseas financial investment in 
2006~2008. When the global financial market melted down in the late 2008, 
however, it became clear that these fund firms had gambled away capital on an 
irrational investment fashion. The local financial elites, who had enhanced their 
say thanks to the financialization of Korean household savings after the crisis, 
had effectively directed Korean savings towards profit-making goals for them, 
at the expense of the general public.  
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7.8.1 The financialization and growth of the fund industry 
 
The “financialization” led to the rapid growth of the local investment fund 
industry. The neo-liberal restructuring of the economy invited a collective 
uneasiness about a future in which life-time employment no longer existed. The 
sweeping “wannabe rich” syndrome, after the crisis, reflected this collective 
anxiety about job security and life after retirement. And Koreans saw the 
colossal transfer of household financial assets from savings into equity. This 
was accelerated by the historically low level of interest rates and the global 
equity market turnaround in 2003.  
 
The total trust money of equity investment funds in the Korean financial market 
has increased 14.9 times from December 2003 to December 2008 (see Table 7-2, 
2
nd
 column). Thanks to this investment boom, in around 2006, the local 
investment firms increased their influence on corporations, households and 
economic policies. The advance of local financial capital, along with still 
influential foreign capital, has further promoted the ascendancy of shareholder 
values, such as transparency, endless restructuring and distribution of profit. 
 
At the center of this change, there was a local asset management firm named 
Mirae (Future in Korean) Asset Group. Until 2002, Mirae was one of the 
smallest asset management firms. But it rose to become the leading player 
almost overnight, by successfully taking advantage of the financialization and 
the structural change of the market. Mirea, for example, was the first to 
introduce a “monthly reserving fund” in 2003; this was a big success, 
introducing an investment boom amongst Koreans. Mirae has also been the 
most aggressive in appropriating investment chances in the overseas financial 
markets, and has an outstanding track -record. The market share of Mirae, 
among the equity funds, soared from 1.2% in December 2000 to 5.8% in 2003, 
25.2% in 2005 and 33.7% in July 2007 (Hankyoreh, 14 Apr. 2005; Korea 
Economic Daily, 18 Jul. 2007). Thanks to the growth of fund money, by 2005, 
Mirae became strong enough to affect the share price index in the market. 
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7.8.2 China momentum: the rise of growth rationale 
 
In around 2003, the world financial market begun to recover from the shock of 
the information technology (IT) bubble crash in the early 2000s. The business 
cycle had bottomed out from the slump, concomitant with the rise of equity 
prices. This new cycle of economic expansion lasted for a historically long 
period, until it melted away with another debacle -- the sub-prime mortgage 
crash in 2008. What characterized the first half of this enjoyable prosperity was 
the “Goldilocks economy”. Similarly to the false prophecies of the “New 
economy” in the late 1990s, hopes mushroomed for a virtuous economic cycle, 
in which a pump-priming interest rate policy, alongside subdued inflation, can 
be prolonged. 
 
Along the way, a new rationality for financial investment has emerged in the 
global financial market. Its primary interest was the growth potential of a 
country or a region in the age of “global imbalances” between investment, 
production and consumption. The practical advice to financial investors was 
that the biggest returns would come from emerging economies, such as the 
BRICs
67
. At the heart of this rosy expectation, there was an emphasis on the 
role of China as both a growth engine and an exporter of disinflation. The 
brilliant achievements and unfathomable potential of the Chinese economy 
were enough to forge a forceful investment momentum in the first decade of the 
21
st 
century. 
 
In around mid-2003, the global financial market began to talk about the 
“Chinese dream”. Warren Buffett, the chairman of Berkshire Hathaway, 
triggered the momentum by purchasing a 14% stake in Petro China, the largest 
Chinese oil and gas producer and distributor (Herald Business, 3 May 2003). 
Financial gurus such as Jim Rogers, the chairman of Rogers Holdings, fancied 
himself as a preacher of “China momentum” claiming that „the 21st century will 
be an era of China‟ (Money Today, 23 Feb. 2004). 
 
                                           
67
 The BRICs stands for Brazil, Russia, India and China.  
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7.8.3 Mirae’s market leadership 
 
The rise of China momentum in Korea illustrated how the intensive, cohesive 
and exclusive culture and communication in the financial market could give 
birth to a sweeping consensual belief. It was observed that once an ardent 
advocate succeeded in establishing a financial rationale, it could rapidly 
develop into a dominant investment fashion through an “increasing spiral 
process” between the interpretative initiative and the price leadership. 
  
It was Mirae that actively introduced China momentum into the Korean 
financial market. According to the new investment rationale, Mirae mainly 
purchased stocks which seemed to have growth potential. The firms that had 
close business relationship with China, i.e. “China momentum share”, were one 
important selection criterion for Mirae. The price of these stocks generally rose 
after Mirae included them in its portfolio. Mirae was also a pioneer for overseas 
financial investment in such emerging markets as China, Vietnam and Russia. 
 
Once the trend had become established, its market rivals began to make buying 
and selling decisions by watching Mirae. This reflexive nature of the financial 
market resulted in still more reinforcement of the rationale of the China 
momentum. In the end, the stocks that had China momentum or growth 
potential had more possibility of passing the “beauty contest” of the analysts. 
As market analysts wanted to forecast the price of a specific share, they did 
their best to pry into Mirae‟s new portfolio. The instant messenger and the 
private communication between fund managers, traders and analysts were filled 
with the information and rumors saying that Mirae was interested in, or had 
bought, certain stocks. An Sun-hee, a business journalist, said that „A new 
phrase was even coined, the Mirae watcher, like the FED watcher
68
 in the 
bond market‟ (Interview, 11 Feb. 2011). The prices of these stocks were 
justified by applying inflated PER or by mobilizing new metrological devices. 
  
                                           
68
 The analysts who closely monitor any slight signal from the FED (Federal Reserve Board), 
central bank in the U.S.A. 
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To stand against this wind was not an easy task. An equity analyst admitted that 
„among analysts, it is an unwritten rule not to step on the feet of Mirae. In other 
words, not to issue negative reports on stocks that Mirae bought‟ (HanKook, 13 
Nov. 2007). Rather than resisting the trend, some analysts actively cooperated 
with Mirae‟s market leadership, in order to make his/her own selection look 
better. When they got important information or insight on specific stocks, for 
example, they let Mirae know earlier than any other fund managers. 
 
„As the analysts are appraised by the earning rates of the stocks that he 
recommends, it is vital for the analyst to persuade the main market maker to 
include the stocks that he/she recommends. Hence, it is not unusual for the 
analyst to give analysis reports to Mirae even before he provides them to 
fund managers in his own institution‟ (Financial News, 4 Jun.2007). 
 
It was, at least, reasonable for the managers in small or medium size funds to 
think that other fund managers would also buy the stocks that Mirae bought. 
Otherwise, they should run the risk of being labeled a maverick and of losing 
fund investors. Ji Young-gul, a senior fund manager, explained the reasons for 
this uncritical following-up: 
 
„Fund managers who run small sized funds are very keen on the investment 
of the dominant market player when its power has grown to the verge of 
controlling the market. In this instance, the stream of money is itself critical 
investment information‟ (Interview, 13 Jan. 2009). 
 
In short, a “circular loop” of information and influence has been established, 
where the analysts give critical information to the leading fund managers; 
whereas other fund managers were just copycats.  
 
7.8.4 The financial media: A facilitator 
 
During the establishment of Mirae‟s market leadership, the financial media 
played a critical role by promoting the “Midas touch syndrome”. Park Hyun-joo, 
the founder and the chairman of Mirae, was a legendary figure, who rose from a 
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general equity broker to a financial baron. At the threshold of the fund 
investment boom, in around 2003, Park began to act as a Korean missionary of 
China momentum. In many media interviews, Park insisted that Korean firms 
should adopt an aggressive growth strategy, in order to take full advantage of 
the opportunities that the Chinese economy has brought about. 
 
„Growth is the best strategy for increasing share prices. But the growth 
cannot be achieved without investment. So I advise firms to invest 
aggressively. Mirae will not support at the general shareholders meeting 
(GSM) those managements who are obsessed in distributing profit at the 
expense of reinvestment‟ (Hankyoreh, 22 Sep. 2006). 
 
The financial media made Park a hero authorizing his “interpretative power”. 
Table 7-3 shows the general inclination of the media reports about Chairman 
Park. In general, they were affirmative rather than being critical. Among 482 
articles, selected from 6 financial newspaper archives, a majority of the articles 
celebrated Park‟s genius.  
 
This favorable tone of the financial media was related to the fact that the 
investment firms had, by that time, become major advertisers. With the 
financialization of household assets, investment firms actively advertised their 
funds in order to attract individual investors. Park Tae-gyon, a business 
journalist, said: 
 
„… the media rode the bandwagon of hero-making because they (investment 
firms) gave them advertisement … Not a Korean media could be exempted 
from this delinquency. An interview piece of Chairman Park by a leading 
national paper on 1 Jan., for example, merely conveyed Park‟s belief that the 
share price would considerably soar again this year. But this turned out to be 
a nonsense‟ (Interview, 29 Dec. 2008). 
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Table 7-3: Analysis of Articles about Chairman Park 
                                               (1. Jan. 2005~ 31 Dec. 2007) 
Frame Contents 
Number of articles 
(total 482) 
Midas 
Touch 
„Park‟s success story from the scratch‟  
„The myth of investment history in Korea‟ 
126 (26.1%) 
Sage of the 
Market 
„Comparing Park to Warren Buffet
69
‟     
„Highlighting Park‟s belief in value investment‟ 
85 (17.6%) 
Global 
Leader 
„Explorer of Asian financial market‟  
„Comparing Park to Genghis Khan
70
‟ 
90 (18.6%) 
 
The articles were sought from KINDS. A total of 482 articles were selected, through the 
keyword of „Mirae and Park hyun-joo‟, from 1 January 2005 to 31 December 2007. The 
financial media included in this survey were Maeil Business Newspaper, Korea Economic Daily, 
Seoul Economic Daily, Herald Economic Daily, Financial News and Money Today. 
 
In terms of the financial media‟s share in the periodic financial crisis, former 
Observer editor Will Hutton, amid the global financial crisis in 2008, said that 
„General journalists, as well as business journalists, are really guilty in this. 
They have indulged madness in the last five years, we should have been better 
at whistle-blowing than we were‟ (Guardian, 21 Nov. 2008).  
 
As a consequence of this “hero making”, people rushed to branches of Mirae 
and just cried „I want to buy a Park hyun-joo fund‟ (Herald Economic Daily, 6 
Dec. 2006). One extreme case was the bustle around the “Insight Fund”, a 
mutual fund that was sold by Mirae in Oct. 2007. It attracted about 4 trillion 
won ($ 3.3 billion) in just 10 days of selling and grew into the largest fund ever 
established in Korea (Kyunghyang, 13 Nov. 2007). But this frenzy of 
investment resulted in the massive tragedy in just one year. 
 
 
 
                                           
69
 Because he „pioneered the shift of household asset from bank savings to equity investment‟ 
(Financial News, 6 Nov. 2007). 
70
 Because he „led the overseas advance of Korean financial institutions‟ (Herald Economic 
Daily, 28 Dec. 2007). 
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7.8.5 The consequences of the new financial rationale 
 
The “China momentum” provided a timely cause for Korean financial investors. 
More than anything else, it facilitated the overseas investment spree of local 
funds. As their funds grew, Korean financial firms became obsessed with the 
aspiration to make Korea leading regional power, by increasing its investment 
bank-style investment as well as its portfolio investment. The government 
policy agenda of finance-led development has also promoted this aspiration. 
The idea of a “Financial hub in North-Eastern Asia”, that the Roh Moo-hyun 
government proposed as an important policy agenda, is a representative 
example. The overseas portfolio investments into such countries as China, India, 
Vietnam, Brazil and Russia have mushroomed. The trust money of overseas 
equity investment funds has inflated to 50 trillion won ($45.5 billion) at the end 
of 2007 from 5 trillion won ($ 4.5 billion) just a year ago (Financial News, 3 
Jan. 2008).  
 
Thanks to financialization and the “China momentum”, the KOSPI eventually 
broke the barrier of 1,000 points and soared for the first time to over 2000 
points by the end of 2007. Local investment funds played a supporting role, 
sustaining KOSPI when foreign investors secured profits by massively selling 
Korean stocks during 2006 - 2008. Foreign investors have chalked up more 
than 76 trillion won ($69 billion) of net selling of Korea equity from early 2005 
to August 2008 (Money Today, 21 Aug. 2008). And the Korean financial 
industry enjoyed a huge amount of capital gains for the first time from overseas 
investment, until the sub-prime mortgage crash approached. 
 
But the finale of the new financial rationale was tragedy. As the global economy 
went into recession after the domino effect from the “sub-prime mortgage 
crisis”, the profit rate of the funds has plummeted drastically. During 2008, the 
funds which invested in the overseas equity have shown an average rate of 
minus 53.2 %. This was 15 percentage points worse than the profit rates of 
domestic equity funds. In most of the funds that were caught up in the Chinese 
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(growth) momentum, almost half of the trust money has evaporated (Munhwa, 
2 Jan. 2009).  
 
The worst was the so-called “China fund” that invested in the Chinese 
companies listed in the Shanghai and Hong Kong stock exchange, with a profit 
rate of minus 57.73 % in 2008 (Money Today, 31 Dec. 2008). The “Insight Fund” 
of Mirae, which was sold at the pinnacle of the Chinese momentum frenzy, 
showed a profit rate of minus 52.78% in 2008 (Kookmin, 31 Dec. 2008). 
Investors, many of whom were “wannabe rich” lay people, witnessed the 
disappearance of almost half of assets that they had invested in funds. The loss 
from overseas equity funds amounted to 34.6 trillion won ($31.5 billion) 
(Munhwa, 2 Jan. 2009). 
 
 
7.9 Case Study 2: The Disciplining of Samsung Electronics 
 
This case study examines how the Korean financial elites disciplined the 
management of the biggest Korean enterprise, Samsung Electronics, 
specifically through a financial rationale. The new consensual view in the 
market, “China momentum”, also generated big price differences between 
stocks, as it legitimized applying higher PER to the stocks of companies that 
seemed to have close business relationships with China. However, the stock of 
Samsung Electronics, was given the cold shoulder in the financial market, on 
account of the lack of China, or growth, momentum. Samsung, an early Korean 
adaptor of shareholder value management, was appalled by the prolonged lower 
performance of its own stock, as well as the bashing it received from financial 
market agents. Eventually, Samsung Electronic changed its business strategy, 
complying with the dominant market rationale. But this was not possible 
without social costs. 
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7.9.1 Samsung Electronics and shareholder value management  
 
Samsung Electronics, the biggest Korean enterprise, became an example of 
shareholder value management after the crisis, in response to growing pressures 
from both the foreign shareholders and the shareholder activism.  
 
In around the early 2000s, Samsung Electronics rose to become to the best 
“blue-chip” in Korean financial market as its products, such as the 
semiconductor, cellular phone and LCD display, have rapidly increased its 
global market share. As Samsung has made a good profit, so the number of 
foreign shareholders in the company has increased. The proportion of foreign 
shareholders soared from 29% in January 1998, to 50% in January 1999, and to 
60% on April 2004 (Munhwa, 10 Jan. 1998; Yeonhap, 10 Sep. 2006). The 
increase of foreign shareholders posed a latent threat of M&A to the 
management (Kookmin, 27 Oct. 2004). 
 
On the other hands, Samsung Electronics has been a major target of shareholder 
activism, as it was the flagship company of the Samsung business group, the 
biggest Korean chaebol. The activists in the PSPD, a citizen group that led 
Korean shareholder activism from the late 1990s, took part in the general 
shareholders‟ meeting of Samsung Electronics year after year. They asked top 
managements for the transparent disclosure of financial information, as well as 
the introduction of a management policy accountable to the general 
shareholders. This was a kind of media event that was designed to facilitate the 
diffusion of the credo of shareholder value management among Korean 
corporations (Dong-A, 20 Mar. 1999).  
 
As the managers acknowledged that higher share price could provide the 
company with various benefits in the globalized financial market, including 
defence against the M&A and favourable pricing in raising capital, Samsung 
proactively adapted to the new law of the market. They posted senior executives 
who were in charge of investor relationship and maintained regular contacts 
with financial analysts in the market. More than anything else, Samsung 
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distributed a considerable amount of its annual profits in the forms of share 
buy-back. Samsung, from 2000 to 2006, spent 13 trillion won ($11.8 billion) in 
a share buy-back scheme (Kookmin, 19 Mar. 2007). On the part of Samsung, the 
buy-back of shares had two purposes. First, by boosting share price, it satisfied 
foreign shareholders. Second, the increase in the firm‟s own stocks had 
provided the management for a “Pac-Man defense” against possible attack by 
foreign shareholders. 
 
7.9.2 Unable to ride on China momentum 
 
The rise of “China momentum” had a strong impact on share prices in Korean 
financial market. The geographical proximity and the close industrial 
connections of the two countries were believed to be a blessing, which would 
provide Korean businesses with unprecedentedly powerful growth momentum. 
The economists and analysts in the financial market have projected the future of 
Korean economy on the frame of the Chinese economy with a population of 1.3 
billion, that was expected to surpass the scale of the American economy in 
around 2041 (Wilson and Purushothaman 2003). Among others, the four “China 
momentum industries” of steel, marine transportation, shipbuilding and the 
chemical industry were expected to secure the largest benefits, because many 
Korean businesses in these industries already were competitive, or were a 
market leader in China. 
 
In the equity market, the share price of the “China momentum industry” has 
outperformed the market. For example, the PER of POSCO, the largest Korean 
steel maker, had risen to 13.63 in December 2007, from 4.41 in December 
2005.
71
 But the stock analysts could justify the higher PERs by seasoning the 
growth premium. One way of doing this was to compare the valuation tools 
with much higher indicators in the advanced, or the Chinese, financial market. 
A stock analyst put like this: 
 
                                           
71
 FnGuide (http://vip.mk.co.kr/newSt/price/price_corp_frame.php?flag=5&code=A005490) 
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„…the foreign investors are now buying Korean stocks as a substitute for the 
Chinese stocks. This is because the PER of the Chinese momentum stocks in 
Korean financial market is just 3~7, while the PER of the stocks in A-index 
of Shanghai or Shenzhen stock exchange is 25 and 27 respectively‟ (Korean 
Economic Daily, 5 Oct. 2004). 
 
The new investment fashion led to sharp differences of prices between shares 
with the China momentum and those without. The “China momentum shares” 
in such industries as steel, heavy machinery and chemicals rose by 2~5 times in 
less than a year period in around 2007. Interestingly enough, most of these 
shares were the “bricks and mortar shares” that were shunned during the 
information technology momentum period in the late 1990s. 
 
On the contrary, Samsung Electronics, the traditional information technology 
“blue chip” with the biggest aggregate market value in Korea, was given a 
thoroughly cold shoulders by the fund managers. Indeed, the slump of Samsung 
Electronic was mainly because of the cyclical slump of its main products, such 
as LCD, D-RAM and NAND flash memory. But a lot of analysts of information 
technology industry ascribed the slump to its lack of growth potential, i.e. the 
failure to develop a new growth engine. A survey conducted by Maeil Business 
Newspaper in April 2007 showed that 13 analysts unanimously indicated the 
lack of a new growth engine as the main discounting factor for Samsung. One 
analyst claimed that „In the latest investor relationship session, the top 
management of Samsung Electronics showed little will to develop a new 
growth engine, but simply stuck to consolidating the established strategy 
(organic growth)‟ (Maeil Business Newspaper, 27 Apr. 2007). 
 
7.9.3 The criticism of the corporation by share price 
 
The critical mood was led by the analysts and fund managers in Mirae, which 
was pioneering the growth momentum investment in the Korean financial 
market. They were especially disapproving of Samsung‟s strategy, which was 
monolithic with organic growth, excluding M&A, notwithstanding the fact that 
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Samsung has a huge amount of retained earnings. One former executive of 
Samsung Electronics explained: 
 
„After consecutive failures in overseas M&A investment in the 1990s, top 
managers almost became neurotic on M&A investment. But this caused 
discontent among the majority of overseas shareholders, because growth 
momentum such as M&A was always the best news for boosting share prices 
in a short period. Hence, we had no other option but to support share prices 
by buying -back outstanding shares with a considerable amount of 
operational profits and giving lucrative dividends at the end of each fiscal 
year‟ (Interview, 8 Dec. 2008).  
 
As the price of semiconductors approached a cyclical trough, the market kept 
pressing the management to use retained earnings to buy-out rivals or 
promising start-ups. The “bashing” of Samsung Electronics by the share price 
grew into skepticism about the current managements of Samsung. Indeed, this 
mood conformed to the rationale of the market leader, Mirae and chairman Park, 
framed in terms of the growth and China momentum strategy. 
  
The sluggish share price of Samsung Electronics clearly contrasted with the 
ascendancy of the Chinese momentum shares. In the end, POSCO, the world‟s 
5
th
 largest steel manufacturer, that had close business relationships with China, 
overtook Samsung Electronics and became the highest valued firm in Korea. 
Amid the zenith of the equity boom in 2007, the share price of POSCO rose to 
762,000 won on 2
nd
 October 2007 from 300,000 won one year previously, while 
Samsung Electronics staggered around the 450,000 ~ 550,000 won level, the 
same as that of 3 years previously.
72
 
 
Financial journalists largely joined in the “bashing” with uncritical reports. For 
example, when the aggregate market value of POSCO was expected to surpass 
that of Samsung Electronics in October 2007, most of the financial media 
issued “horse-racing style” reporting, admiring the “power-shift”. Among 20 
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 Paxnet homepage ( www.paxnet.co.kr , retrieved 23 Jan. 2010). 
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articles which covered that story in a month, 14 (70%) dealt with it in a horse-
racing style. In terms of the price movement, 13 (65%) quoted analysts with a 
“bullish view”, although POSCO had risen 69% in just five months. Just one 
piece of them was critical of the rapid price surge (5%).
73
 
 
7.9.4 Market discipline and social consequences 
 
The management of Samsung Electronics became increasingly concerned about 
the under-performance of its share price. One anecdote illustrated the 
disciplining power of finance and the change in power relations. In October 
2007, Joo Woo-sik, the vice-president of Samsung Electronics in charge of 
investor relationships, opened his heart by saying that he wanted to meet 
Chairman Park at Mirae to deliver a presentation on the management plan of his 
company. But Chairman Park turned down Joo‟s proposal in a roundabout way. 
The financial market and the media received this episode as a sign that financial 
capital had established a firmly superior position to industrial capital 
(Kyunghyang, 19 Nov. 2007). 
 
Amidst the anxiety about share price, the top management of Samsung 
Electronics started to revise its growth strategy from late 2007. Following the 
demand of the financial market, the management of Samsung adopted the 
growth strategy through the taking-over other company. In the end, it 
announced the buy-out of TransChip, a small size system LSI
74
 manufacture in 
Israel for $70 million in October 2007, after 13 years of inactivity (Hankook 
Economic Daily, 30 Oct. 2007). As a signal of resuming M&A strategy, Yoon 
Jong-yong, the executive vice chairman, said to the media that „there is no 
reason for Samsung to shun M&A‟ (Maeil Business Newspaper, 15 Nov. 2007). 
And Samsung Electronics made another full scale trial by bidding for SanDisc, 
the largest flash memory manufacturer in the world, for $5.85 billion in May 
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 A total of 133 articles from 6 financial newspapers, from 15 September to 15 October 2007, 
were sought with the key word search method at the newspaper online achieve, KINDS 
(www.kinds.or.kr). The key words were „POSCO & Aggregate market value‟ (117 articles) and 
„POSCO & Leader‟ (16 articles). Among these articles, 20 which had close relevance to the 
topic were selected and analyzed by the researcher. 
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 Large scale integrated circuit. 
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2008 (Maeil Business Newspaper, 23 Oct. 2008).
 75
 
 
This change of management strategy, basically conforming to the appraisal of 
the financial market, was done during a mounting sense of crisis. For example, 
Samsung announced in late 2007 that it would make its organization slimmer 
and more effective by reshuffling its management and laying-off five thousand 
(5.8%) staffs (Money Today, 11 Sep. 2007). 
 
 
7.10 Conclusion 
 
The most conspicuous aspect of neo-liberal economic globalization is the trend 
of the „opening and deepening of the financial market‟ (Pauly 2005: 176). The 
transformation of the Korean financial market after its full opening to the global 
market illustrates how neo-liberal economic globalization generates radical 
social change in a nation. Although the momentum of those changes was driven 
by global agents, it was through the interaction between the actors in global and 
local market that the specific neo-liberal financial rationality -- the upholding of 
shareholder value -- was presented and shared as a “common sense”.  
 
The elite network in the market, composed of institutional investors, market 
analysts, consultants, financial media and the like, formulated and promoted 
new management ideals such as “China momentum”. The cultural and 
communicative particularity of the exclusive financial market had facilitated the 
rise of a specific financial rationale and investment fashions. Distinct 
performances or practices of the market actors emanating from this financial 
rationality give signals, enacting disciplinary power, to various social agents, 
including corporate managers, policy-makers and households. 
 
But this change was accompanied by considerable consequences in Korean 
                                           
75 Samsung withdrew the bid in October 2008 as the financial crisis hit the global economy 
(Maeil Business Newspaper, 23 Oct. 2008). 
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economy and society. Financial elites have effectively directed Korean savings 
and industry towards profit-making goals for them at the expense of traditional 
industries and personal savings. And they gambled away capital as part of an 
irrational investment fashion. As managers have become more cautious about 
the figures of return on investment (ROI), corporations have been forced into 
relentless business restructuring and downsizing. As a result, Korean society 
has experienced higher unemployment, especially among young people, and a 
weakening of job security.  
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Chapter 8 
The Global-National Nexus: 
The Iron Triangle 
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8.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter documents the growth of financial advisory intermediaries
76
 as a 
mediator of the globalization of investment and production. The research 
focuses on the way in which these intermediaries operate in networks with 
global investors and the host government. In order to probe the mechanism of 
power that this global network exercises, the research explores the structure of 
connections, practices and communication of the network. Particularly, this 
chapter concentrates on the mode of communication with which this network 
garners its “invisibility” (Bobbio 1987) and explores its implication for wider 
society and democracy. 
 
In Korea, after the economic crisis in 1997, a form of global-national 
interconnection of experts was consolidated, with the advance of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and alternative investments.
77
 This was a business network 
between transnational corporations (TNCs), private equity or hedge funds, 
national or international advisory intermediaries, and policy-makers in 
government departments. In particular, the advisory intermediaries working for 
law firms, consulting firms and investment banks, after the crisis, have risen to 
be major mediators of the global-national nexus in the fully liberalized 
financial regime. 
  
After illustrating the advance of FDI and alternative investment after the 
economic crisis in 1997, the chapter examines the growth of advisory 
                                           
76
 In its original usage, “financial intermediary” includes such institutions as a bank, credit 
union, financial company, insurance company or brokerage company, which act „as the 
middleman between those who want to lend and those who want to borrow‟ (Business 
Dictionary.com www.businessdictionary.com  retrieved 18 Sep. 2011). But here ,“advisory 
intermediaries” refers to the organizations, such as investment banks (IB), law firms and 
consulting firms, or specialists, such as lawyers, public accountants, business consultants and 
investment bankers who actively engage in the overall procedures of an investment from deal-
sourcing to exit. 
77 An alternative investment is an „investment product other than the traditional investments of 
stocks, bonds, cash, or property. The term is a relatively loose one and includes tangible assets 
such as art, wine, antiques, coins, or stamps, as well as financial assets such as commodities, 
private equity, hedge funds, venture capital, and financial derivatives‟  
(Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alternative_investment Retrieved 10 Jul. 2011).  
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intermediary business in Korea. Then the researcher examines the formation of 
a symbiotic relationship between global investors, advisory intermediaries and 
policy-makers in the government. It is argued that not only the institutional 
connections but also the practices and communication of the network lead to 
the social consequences produced by the network. The discussion is followed 
by a case study that illustrates these processes, focusing on the privatization of 
a quasi-nationalized bank by a U.S.- based private equity fund in mid 2000s.  
 
 
8.2 The Reappearance of the Arcana Imperii 
 
A distinctive feature of globalization is that investment and production are 
organized globally. In the contemporary economy, TNCs and financial funds 
play the missionary role of global organizer of FDI or alternative investment. 
Especially in the countries that the economic crisis hit, including Korea in the 
late 1990s, FDI and alternative investment touched off a boom lasting some 
time. This is because, alongside the neo-liberal transformation of the economy, 
there were “fires sales” of the distressed assets, ailing corporations as well as 
privatization of the public corporations.  
 
In terms of the national political significance of the FDI and alternative 
investments, we can point out two general tendencies. One is that they have 
huge negotiation resources, stemming from the size of their business and 
diplomatic support from their home state. Thus they are sophisticated lobbyists, 
not only at the international but also national level of power. This is a situation 
where „the chief executive of a major TNC seldom has to wait long for an 
appointment with a minister‟. The other is that this political capacity, 
particularly in their negotiations with host governments, is often the major 
source of their returns to investment. In negotiations, these investors „can get 
regulations altered (or maintained) to their advantage‟ (Leys 2001: 17). 
 
As this investment and „regulatory arbitrage‟ involves sophisticated calculation 
as well as negotiation with many different national jurisdictions, the TNCs and 
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funds rely heavily on the technical experts in law firms, consulting firms, public 
accountants and investment banks (ibid: 10). Most of the investments are 
designed and proceed within the network of TNCs, funds and advisory 
intermediaries, empowered by information and lobbying at the national and 
supranational level. 
 
In line with the growing influence of foreign investment, the network of 
intermediaries has become a central domain of social and economic influence. 
The major restructuring and recapitalization of corporations, as well as 
privatization of state enterprises, could only be done through the enabling role 
of the network. The investment decisions of the network often have a 
considerable impact on companies, employees, subcontractors and local 
communities. 
 
Despite its extensive influence on society, however, most of the operations of 
the network are located outside the public observation. The exclusive and 
closed-door culture rendered this network private and self-contained. Deal-
making was deemed to be an arena of technocracy where financial, legal and 
managerial specialties prevailed. And it was conceived to be an entirely private 
domain, with the good excuse that it dealt with price-sensitive information. The 
watchdog role of the media was usually blocked by the curtain of expertise and 
the exclusive culture. 
 
Norberto Bobbio (1987: 18, 92, 93), an Italian political scientist, has pointed 
out that the survival of „invisible power‟ is a distinct symptom of the „broken 
promise‟ of democracy. He has stressed that the „visibility or transparency of 
power‟ cannot be eliminated from „the defining characteristics of democracy‟. 
But the „paradox‟ is the „reappearance of the arcana imperii (secret power) in 
the guise of technical experts and technocracy‟. Such a tendency, he continued, 
has been reinforced recently in the area of the management of the economy. 
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8.3 The “Fire Sale” 
 
The Korean economic crisis has left a lot of debt-ridden firms and distressed 
financial assets in its wake. For some time, foreign capital was the only source 
of “fresh money” for the recapitalization of ailing firms, because most of the 
national firms, including banks, were suffering from a credit crunch. Once the 
government lifted the financial restrictions, various forms of foreign 
investments, apart from the portfolio investment in the financial market, rushed 
into Korea to profit from the lucrative “fire sale”.  
 
The alternative investments were initially led by the private equity funds and 
hedge funds
78
 based in the U.S.A and Europe. And, around early 2000, the 
national wealth funds of Asian and Arab countries joined this market. The 
funds could be classified, according to the purposes or patterns of investment, 
as vulture funds, buy-out funds, corporate governance funds and venture funds. 
Though very few people may have heard them before the crisis, Koreans soon 
became familiar with such names as Carlyle, Lone Star, Newbridge Capital, 
Temasek, Sovereign Asset Management and Soros, funds that have actively 
invested in the Korean economy. 
 
Sometimes with the appearance of angels descending to help the Korean 
economy, sometimes with that of a cold-blooded raider, the foreign funds 
showed a vigorous appetite for distressed assets, commercial real estate, 
manufactures and financial firms. As Table 8-1 shows, the M&A deal by 
foreign investors among FDIs, accounted for $4.5 billion on average annually, 
between 1998 and 2005. Most of the investments were conducted by the foreign 
PEFs. Among others, the financial industry was the most conspicuous in terms 
of global investors‟ advance. As they took over several distressed banks amid 
economic restructuring, foreigners were able to control 22.4% of the total assets 
                                           
78
 The total assets of global hedge funds and private equity funds were estimated to be $0.82 
trillion and $1.2 trillion respectively, as of the end of 2002 (BOK 2005 : 7-8). Among the funds, 
around $60 billion of hedge funds and $64 billion of PEFs were mainly invested in Asian 
countries (The Office of Economic Secretary of the President 2005). 
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of Korean banks in 2004. In 1997, before the crisis, their share was just 8.5% 
(Bank of Korea 2005: 13). 
 
Table 8-1: Foreign Direct Investment and the M&A deals 
 
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
FDI 
(billion dollars) 
8.9 15.6 15.2 11.2 9.1 6.5 12.8 11.6 
M&A deals (%) 57.3 33.0 18.8 23.5 22.9 45.5 48.2 45.6 
                (The Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy; Jang K-Y 2006: 63-64) 
 
 
Table 8-2: Major Deals by Foreign Private Equity Funds  
                                                             (KOTRA 2007) 
Funds 
Amount of 
Investment  
(million dollars) 
Year 
Target 
Company 
Industry 
Newbridge 
Capital 
441.0 2000 Korea First Bank Finance(Bank) 
Carlyle Group 396.0 2000 KorAm Bank Finance(Bank) 
Affinity Equity 
Partners 
446.0 2000 
Mando 
Corporation. 
Machinery 
Warburg Pincus 370.0 2000 LG Card 
Finance (Credit 
Card) 
JP Morgan 
Partners 
470.0 2001 
Mando 
Merchinery 
Machinery 
CVC Capital 
Partners 
333.0 2001 Mercury IT 
UBS Capital 
Consortium 
410.0 2001 HAITAI Industry (Food) 
Newbridge-AIG 500.0 2003 Hanaro 
Tele-
communication 
Lone Star 1060.0 2003 KEB Finance(Bank) 
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Startled by the splendid gains of foreign funds, indigenous private equity funds 
and national industrial capital have increased the rate of deal-making since the 
mid-2000s. The indigenous private equity fund industry has mushroomed since 
the mid-2000s. The number of national PEFs increased from two in 2004, to 16 
in 2005 and 28 in 2006. According to the Financial Supervisory Agency, the 
amount of investment also totaled 2.5 trillion won ($2.3 billion) in 2006, a 
seven fold increase in a year (JoongAng, 26 Feb. 2007). The field was bustling 
with global and national deal-seekers. 
 
The returns that foreign private equity funds secured from investment just after 
the crisis were so enormous that they were admired widely in the global 
financial market. Each deal of Carlyle, Newbridge Capital and Sovereign, for 
example, has made a profit of two to four fold of the original investment in less 
than 3 years (Lee J-H 2006).  
 
 
8.4 The Growth of Advisory Intermediaries 
 
The “advisory intermediaries” of an investment are the organizations, such as 
investment banks (IB), law firms and consulting firms, which actively engage 
in the overall procedures of an investment from deal-sourcing to exit. The 
investment banker helps private equity or hedge funds to find opportunities for 
deals, and drafts out the structure of the deal as prime broker or lead manager. 
Many of the investment decisions are made on the basis of the „information and 
value assessments‟ of the investment bank (Sung H-P 2005: 75). Business law 
firms provide legal advice about the deal. Recently law firms have played an 
increasingly central role in the deal as they try to provide total solutions, 
including lobbing for policy change. Consulting firms, along with in-house 
accounting departments, design the logic of deals and provide managerial 
advice about the target company. 
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Thanks to the growth of the alternative investment market after the crisis, the 
advisory specialists have become particularly busy. A lot of foreign investment 
banks and consulting firms have made inroads into Korea. The local business 
law firms have also enjoyed an explosive increase in custom. The lead manager, 
an investment bank, normally charges a fee of 1~1.5% of the total investment of 
a deal, while the law firm and the consulting firm charge on an hourly basis. 
 
In line with the growth of demand for advisory services, these firms have hired 
many of the best talents in the field. Expertise and the social network are 
cardinal points in this business, and expertise and the network are not mutually 
exclusive. Many promising judges and public prosecutors have joined business 
law firms after abandoning the chance of promotion. These firms usually 
supplied the lawyers with an opportunity to study abroad, for example studying 
for an LL.M.
79
 in the U.S.A, to forge global contacts and link to networks. 
 
The local managers of funds, the investment bankers, the consultants and the 
accountants were soon full of the specialists who were Korean residents in 
America
80
 or Koreans from top-tier global MBA
81
 schools. These specialists 
have regular contact with each other, for example, at their joint alumni clubs. 
The advisory specialists also are on friendly terms with the foreign investors in 
such organizations as AMCHAM
82
 or EUCCK.
83
  
 
 
Being on the treadmill 
 
                                           
79 Master of Laws 
80
 A young Korean-American member of staff of Carlyle, in 1999, bragged about his „king-like 
life style‟ in Seoul as a foreign investor. But, his private e-mail correspondence with 11 friends 
in Wall Street was leaked to papers like the Washington Post and attracted a lot of attention. He 
was dismissed as a result of this scandal (Kookmin 23 May 2001).   
81
 Master of Business Administration 
82
 American Chamber of Commerce in Korea 
83
 European Union Chamber of Commerce in Korea 
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Though the management of private equity funds has emerged as a dream job,
 84
 
they are subject to a number of major investors (LPs), such as high net worth 
individuals, pension funds, insurance companies and university endowments.
85
 
As hundreds of PEFs and hedge funds compete to raise funds, investors 
normally maintain a superior position over their managers. The managers of 
PEFs need to present an attractive investment draft comprising the period, the 
expected rate of return and management fees. When the track record of the 
managers is not so impressive, fundraising is possible only after guaranteeing a 
lucrative minimum rate of return. The influence of an advisory pool or 
connection is also critical in this initial funding, not just in deal-making. 
  
After the fund is raised, the manager needs to display his ability to develop nice 
deals along with reporting regularly to the investment committee on the 
performance of on-going deals and exit strategies. With these constraints in 
mind, managers have few choices but to strive towards profit targets and the 
success of the deal. Kim Wan-ski, a former manager of the Lone Star Fund, said: 
 
„…by the way, it is a cast-iron rule that, once a manager has made a mistake, 
the investors never give him any money again. There is no trial and error. … 
It is like being on a treadmill. … That is why managers often quit when they 
are young. … The sense of oppression is awful. … A mistake may cancel out 
all the success stories until then…‟ (Interview, 4 Dec. 2009). 
 
The work in this field is very intense, not only because deals normally have 
time constraints, but also because the hourly rate of the specialists are so high. 
Hence, the ability to keep up with the tight schedule is thought to be another 
yardstick of expertise. Kim Sang-jun, a partner in a business law firm, said:  
                                           
84
 The manager of a PEF is either a general partner or a limited partner. In terms of jobs, PEFs 
became the most popular in Wall Street since the PEFs gives 5-6 times bigger salary than the 
investment banks (Korean Economic Daily, 2 Mar. 2007). 
85
 As the major investors are anonymous to outsiders, until recently, many suspected that the 
origin of the invested capital in PEFs might be dirty money, e.g. derived from arms transactions. 
But this “conspiracy view” faded away as a wide range of institutional investors, such as 
pension funds and university endowments started to put their money into PEFs. For example, 
pension funds for fire fighters, teachers and government officials in the western states in the 
U.S.A have been regular investors in the Lone Star, a Texas based PEF (Sung H-P 2005: 92). 
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„Usually deals have a timetable, such as a data-room opening, bidding… But 
usually the data are a truckload of files. … We, 3-4 members of a task force, 
have to analyze, summarize them and even prepare a bidding strategy. We 
usually sit up all nights for a whole week‟ (Interview, 2 Dec. 2009). 
 
However, one decisive criterion of selecting advisory firms is whether they can 
provide substantial solutions for the critical parts of the deal. The foreign PEF 
funds, especially, depend on the local advisory specialists notwithstanding they 
have to pay extra contingent fees. Hence, the actualization of a given deal, by 
all means within the constraints of the options and the time, is crucial for the 
firms in building up their reputations. It is a field where “the rich get richer, the 
poor get poorer”. Lee Dae-soon, a lawyer in a mid-size business law firm, said: 
 
„In many cases, the clients come with their own desirable structure of a deal. 
Then they ask the law firms to provide a total solution or tool… The solution 
includes every means from legal advice to detours… Considering the fierce 
competition in the advisory industry, lawyers cannot contract a deal with a 
client when they are idly saying this is legally possible and that is not. On the 
contrary, we were forced to try every means to help the clients get what they 
want‟ (Interview, 30 Nov. 2009) 
 
In these circumstances, the legal advice and consulting of the advisory firms 
have increasingly adopted expedients. It was widely accepted that competent 
lawyers and consultants were sailing very close to the wind. Among other 
factors, the ability to influence government decision-making has emerged as a 
critical aspect of competitiveness. 
 
 
8.5 The “Iron Triangle” of Korea 
 
After studying the Carlyle Group, a Texas based private equity fund, Dan 
Briody, an American investigative journalist, concluded that the connection 
between Wall Street, White House and the munitions industry is as solid as an 
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„iron triangle‟ (Briody 2003). In Korea, similar types of „access capitalism‟ 
(Sung H-P 2005: 84) between investment funds, advisory intermediaries and 
policymakers has burgeoned alongside the brokerage of the big deals after the 
crisis. 
 
The advisory intermediaries in Korea had strived to cultivate connections with 
government officials because so frequently it was policymakers who 
determined the fate of a deal. The economic crisis endowed policymakers with 
stronger discretionary power, especially in the economic restructuring program. 
At least, bureaucrats had the last word in the privatization of nationalized banks 
and public corporations. Spending large amounts of money, the funds and the 
advisory intermediaries did all they could in order to establish a strong 
influence with incumbent or former high-ranking policymakers. 
 
Dozens of policymakers have joined law firms or consulting firms as advisors 
just after quitting their posts in influential departments, such as the Ministry of 
Strategy and Finance, the Financial Supervisory Service, the Free Trade 
Commission, and the National Tax Service. Their ranking varied from directors, 
to minister, to prime ministers. Those policymakers shared a strong elitism and 
group consciousness, rooted in the extremely competitive recruiting system 
through state examination. For example, the Mofia (Ministry of Finance + 
Mafia) is a well known phrase that represents the cronyism of the elite officers 
in the Ministry of Finance. Conversely, this implies that once a core member of 
the group joins an advisory firm, he can effectively influence the decision-
making process of the government. A former senior officer of the Financial 
Supervisory Service said: 
 
„These former policymakers often drop into their previous workplace with 
their client‟s case. They advise former junior officers how to deal with the 
case over dinner or wine. In short, they are a communication or lobby 
channel between their client and the government‟ (Hankyoreh, 14 Aug. 2006) 
 
208 
 
What makes this connection more effective was the rich probability of their 
making a glorious return to the government departments. These former 
bureaucrats are often re-appointed by the President to a higher government post, 
for example, a minister or a deputy prime minister. For instance, Lee Hun-jae, a 
designer of the economic restructuring plan after the crisis, joined Kim & 
Chang, the biggest business law firm in Korea, as an advisor after his 
resignation from the finance ministry in 2001. However, three years later, he 
was appointed again as the deputy-prime minister administering the overall 
economic policies of the government. After quitting this post in 2005, he 
returned to the law firm. The ex-Prime Ministers Han Duk-soo
86
 and Han 
Seung-soo,
87
 and the ex-deputy prime ministers Jin Yeom and Yoon Jeung-
hyun are also cases in point, as the Table 8-3 indicates.  
 
Table 8-3: Advisors from High-Ranking Policymakers                
                                                   (As of Jan. 2009) 
Top-Tier 
Law Firms 
Advisors (ex-minister, vice 
minister or equivalent) 
Re-appointed policymakers 
after being advisors 
Kim&Chang 
7 including Koo B-Y (Senior 
presidential secretary for economic 
policy) 
Han S-S (Prime minister), 
Yoon J-H (Deputy prime 
minister) etc. 
BKL 
9 including Lee K-C (Director of the 
National Tax Service) 
Lee K-K (Head Judge of 
Constitutional Court) etc. 
Lee & Ko 
3 including Kim Y-D 
(Commissioner of Financial Service 
Commission) 
Kim J-C (Governor of 
Financial Supervisory Service) 
Shin & Kim 
6 including Kim Y-J (Minster of 
Commerce, Industry and Energy) 
Kim K-H (Minister of Justice) 
etc. 
YYKS & Y 
Her S (Secretary general of Fair 
Trade Commission) 
 
Yulchon 
2 including Lee J-J (Commissioner 
of Financial Service Commission) 
 
Sejong 
2 including Jin Y (Vice Prime 
Minister) 
 
                                     (Korean Economic Daily, 27 Jan. 2009) 
 
                                           
86
 He was a chief secretary of the President (Jul. 2002), advisor of Kim & Chang (Nov. 
2002~Jul. 2003), deputy-prime minster (Mar. 2005~Jul. 2006), prime minister (Apr. 2007~Feb. 
2008), and advisor of Kim & Chang (Mar. 2008~ ). 
87
 He was a deputy-prime minister (1996~1997), advisor of Kim and Chang (Jun. 2004~ Feb. 
2008), prime minister (Feb. 2008 ~Sep. 2009), and advisor of Kim & Chang (Oct. 2009~).  
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In Korea, the national assembly holds a confirmation hearing and scrutinizes 
the candidates when the President appoints the ministers. But there was little 
criticism, until the mid 2000s, of former policy makers shuttling between public 
and private posts. Since then, this blurring of the border between public and 
private has led to concern over a “conflict of interests”. But in practical terms, 
nothing has been done to prevent it. Rather, this blurring has become 
commonplace, as many high-ranking officers have linked their post-retirement 
plans to their advisory role at the firms. 
  
A symbiotic relationship between policymakers and the advisory firms is 
established when the connection of the “revolving door”88 is combined with the 
authority of the advisory firm as a top specialist in a specific field. This creates 
a situation where the government officials depend on the legal or managerial 
advice of the advisory firm to legitimize their decision. In the case of the take-
over of KorAm Bank by Carlyle and KEB by Lone Star, this type of influence 
from the law firm was pivotal for the accomplishment of the deal (Lee J-H 
2006). 
 
In order to build a connection with influential figures, the investment banks and 
consulting firms even hired the sons and daughters of the high-ranking officers 
and families of the chaebols (Seoul Economic Daily, 4 Apr. 2006). The foreign 
investment funds often appointed local managers who could make full use of 
the social network. For example, Carlyle employed the son-in-law of then 
Prime Minister, Park Ta-joon, as a country manager in 1999. With a full 
mobilization of this connection, Carlyle successfully took over the Koram Bank, 
the 6
th
 largest Korean bank. The local manager asked his father-in-law, the 
Prime Minister, for help in evading the regulations that prohibited the taking-
over of bank by the private equity funds. The former American President 
George Bush (Sr.), an advisor of Carlyle at that time, flew to Korea and met a 
series of high-ranking Korean policymakers (Briody 2003). Finally the deal was 
approved by the government, with the complicated structure being drafted 
                                           
88
 This refers to the phenomenon of the high-ranking policymakers shuttling between 
government posts and private companies, including law firms and consulting firms. 
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mainly by Kim & Chang and Shin & Kim, the two major Korean law firms. 
After the deal was done, the local manager proudly spoke to the Finance Asia
89
, 
a financial magazine published in Hong-Kong, saying that „I finally persuaded 
the troika of the Korean economy…‟ (Lee J-H 2006: 118; Im J-I and Chang H-
S 2008). 
 
 
8.6 Communications: Exclusive but Intensive 
 
In this network, communication is intensive but fairly exclusive at the same 
time. Internal and private communication is very active as information is almost 
everything in the network. However, public communication is limited and most 
of the activities and information are closed to outsiders. This private 
communication is a cradle of information and acquaintances, the two pillars of 
the alternative investment business. Ahn Dong-won, an executive of securities 
firm said: 
 
„As I am in an investment bank, my main business is to meet people. … The 
value-added information usually comes from the private communications‟ 
(Interview, 7 Jan. 2009) 
 
A deputy manager of the M&A department in the Korea Development Bank 
said in a media interview: 
 
„(the most important element in M&A is) the information. … Most of the 
M&A is arranged under the table … Without this information, the advisor 
cannot do business… (To get the information) the social network is crucial. I 
make so many telephone calls that I replace the battery of my mobile phone 
several times a day‟ (JoongAng, 8 Apr. 2008). 
 
Private communication is also significant when the advisory intermediaries 
mull over exactly what their clients want. In a way, consultation is a relentless 
                                           
89 August, 2001. 
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communication process with the client. According to Han Jae-jung, an 
accountant of a consulting firm: 
 
„Frequently, we find that clients know better than the consultants what the 
problem is and what to do. Nonetheless, they hire consulting firms for the 
sake of internal persuasion or consensus building through the voice of a third 
party….This implies that the first priority of the consultant is to communicate 
intensively with the client‟ (Interview, 22 Jan. 2009). 
 
The pursuit of information and access led to the multi-layered communication 
networks in the field. When it comes to the decision-making level, for example, 
the manager of a PEF, the partner lawyers and consultants, executives in the 
investment bank and high-ranking policymakers often develop overlapping elite 
communication networks within which they develop a symbiotic relationship. 
Lee Jin-hyuk, a country manager of a foreign bank said: 
 
„This is a small world and I have been here for 20 years. Though the 
newspaper is a useful source of information, it is the social networking that I 
get more useful information from. I would say the network is fairly extensive, 
including senior people in government and banks, decision makers in 
industry and so on. We meet at Japanese restaurants or golf clubs. The 
critical information comes out whilst we are talking about, for example, who 
is a prospective candidate for the next minister and in that case how the 
restructuring policy and the industry will be influenced. These tips are really 
helpful for us to map our mid- or short-term strategies‟ (Interview, 19 Jan. 
2009). 
 
But this type of communication is a one-way street that is closed to outsiders. 
This is a field of hermits where the actors hide behind the esotericism of 
expertise and the thick curtain of the “confidential agreement” that they sign at 
the initial stages of the deal. The lawyer Kim Sang-jun said again: 
 
„…along with this, we have a liability for confidentiality. … Certainly there 
is an atmosphere that puts the revelation of details of the client under a taboo 
212 
 
even after the deal is done. … It is a matter of the reputation of a firm as well‟ 
(Interview, 2 Dec. 2009). 
 
Journalists are, in general, blocked from activities and information in this field, 
though some deals have a considerable impact on employment and on the 
industrial landscape. The banker Lee Jin-hyuk also said: 
 
„Most of the global investment banks are negative about talking to the media. 
They hardly ever do that. .. They feel little need. … More than anything else, 
the clients do not want any disclosure that may move the price of the target 
company. … We often sensed that the media reports were very speculative. 
Often, their reports were complete fiction‟ (Interview, 19 Jan. 2009). 
 
Cho Hae-dong, a business journalist, said: 
 
„The foreign capitalists are usually unapproachable. The PR agents they hired 
have few insider stories other than supplying superficial press releases. Even 
worse, some of the foreign PEFs do not have a PR manager. … When the 
deal employs many expediencies, I think, the funds move more clandestinely, 
as this is advantageous to them. … In other words, they are undertaking 
double-sided operations where, on the one hand, they secretly establish 
connections with the decision makers in the government; on the other, they 
shun the media‟ (Interview, 21 Jan. 2009). 
  
Being a sanctuary 
 
One notable aspect of this field is that some of the specialists, with the 
combined forces of exclusive culture and influential social networks, have 
gradually cocooned themselves in a sanctuary that allows no surveillance from 
the outside world. For example, Kim & Chang do not fully disclose the location 
of their office building, although they are the largest Korean business law firm. 
There are not even any directional signs inside the building, or any signs in 
front of the building. Its annual turn-over and the personal income of the 
lawyers are behind a veil. It hires a lot of influential former high-ranking 
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government officials paying extraordinarily high salaries, but it never publicizes 
this fact, let alone explaining what exactly they are in charge of (Im J-I and 
Chang H-S 2008). 
 
Their privilege has reached the verge of being able to smother up any 
surveillance from politicians, the judiciary and the media. When they were 
forced to make public their suspicious deals, for instance, they mobilized the 
whole of their social network and expertise to evade these public checks. One 
former lawmaker recalled an occasion when he called the senior lawyers of 
Kim & Chang to a parliamentary hearing: 
 
„(in order to probe the alleged collusion between the law firm and the 
Ministry of Finance) I requested Lee Hun-jae, the former deputy-prime 
minister but an advisor of Kim & Chang at that time, and several lawyers at 
the law firm to attend the congressional committee. But none of them has 
turned up. Instead, the lobby was very fierce. … Many, including the former 
Minister of Justice, have exercised influence for the law firm. It was an 
experience that reminded me of the power of the law firm‟ (Im J-I and Chang 
W-S 2008: 13). 
 
When the media tried to do investigative reporting on the field, journalists were 
often faced a libel lawsuit from the advisory firms and funds. Most of the 
journalists could not overcome the menace of these powerful advisories 
equipped with abundant resources and expertise in law. Especially, the 
indemnities that the firms sought were so enormous that they could 
substantially threaten the survival of the small and medium sized media. The 
Weekly Kyunghyang, a magazine run by a medium sized national newspaper, 
was forced to issue a correction when it was threatened by Kim & Chang. Im 
Jong-in, a former lawmaker, said that „several journalists in the different media 
were compelled to write letters of apology after they put out a story about the 
firm‟ (interview, 12 Feb. 2009). Lee Jung-hwan, the journalist who wrote a 
story in a book about a large Korean consulting firm, Sam Jung, said: 
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„They hired a lawyer who specialized in libel lawsuits and, four times in a 
row, posted me recorded delivery mail asking me to delete the chapter. … I 
was still confident of the facts in the book … But all my acquaintances 
dissuaded me, saying that no attorney could win the case against their 
lawyers … In the end, I reluctantly agreed to the deletion of the chapter from 
the next edition‟ (Interview, 11 Dec. 2009). 
 
Chang Wha-sik, an activist in the watchdog civil group against speculative 
financial capital said that: 
 
„When the parliament, the judiciary and the government give up on 
surveillance, then the media become fairly helpless. … The media have 
limited access to these entities which often declined contact. … The result 
was the retrenchment of communication in the public sphere and the 
withering of the liberty and the rights of people. Meanwhile, the domination 
of the organized network of huge capital and specialists became consolidated‟ 
(Interview, 3 Feb. 2009). 
 
The strategic use of the media 
 
The other side of this exclusiveness is the strategic use of the media. It is also 
evident that these firms and funds actively approach the media when they need 
to spin for the sake of deals. The partner of Hermes, a U.K. based PEF, for 
example, hinted that it had an interest in taking-over Samsung Corporation, a 
subsidiary of Samsung, in an exclusive interview with the influential daily 
Chosun in 2004. But the fund cashed in all its shares just 2 days later as the 
share price rose thanks to the interview (Chosun, 1 Dec. 2004). Ha Jung-min, a 
business journalist, told that she had similar experiences when she covered the 
proxy fighting in 2003 between Sovereign, a Belgium based PEF, and SK, the 
fourth largest chaebol in Korea: 
 
„It seemed to me that a Korean member of staff of the advisory firm for 
Sovereign was shrewdly manipulating the information. One day, for example, 
he leaked a story to A newspaper. The next day he leaked another story to B 
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newspaper … The journalists put out the story with a similar frame of the 
source because the interviews with sources were very hard, while the 
journalists were thirsty for the information. The initiative was firmly in the 
hand of the advisory intermediaries. In this circumstance, journalists tend to 
be submissive to the source‟ (Interview, 29 Jan. 2009). 
  
The ingrained exclusiveness and strategic approach to the media, when 
combined, has rendered the field substantially “invisible” to the public. The 
public institutions that have the authority and resources to carry out surveillance 
of this field have quietly given up the fight. The media, at best, have walked up 
and down as self-invited guests or have fallen prey to the spin. The journalist 
Cho Hae-dong said: 
 
„When a country like Korea has just liberalized the financial market, not only 
is the financial sector in a state of underdevelopment, but also the media have 
little know-how and experience to watch the liberalized field …. As it is hard 
to cover the field, the journalists rely heavily on the word of mouth of the 
government officers who are engaged in a specific deal. But the hazard is that 
we usually get information that is dressed up from the point of view of 
officials, as crosschecking is almost impossible‟ (Interview, 21 Jan. 2009).  
 
 
8.7 Privatization of Profit and Socialization of Loss  
 
The advance of foreign alternative investors, and the concomitant growth of 
advisory intermediaries, signaled a distinctive change in Korea after the crisis. 
To be fair, this institutional setting has helped prompt the restructuring of the 
ailing finance and industry. With the help of vigilant deal hunters, the efficiency 
of the economy was enhanced to some extent. 
  
The underlying belief in the field was that the increased mobility of capital and 
the advance of alternative investors are beneficial, in the first place, to investors 
and shareholders and, in the end, to all the people in a country. This is a “win-
win situation”, it is argued, rather than a “zero-sum game”, because the 
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alternative investment helps a company to develop its latent value and, as a 
result, it increases the size of the overall economic “pie”. In this respect, the 
nationality of the capital or the amount of profit it appropriates should not be 
denounced in a nationalistic manner, as long as the foreign capital pursues its 
profits without breaching national regulations. This is all the more natural, 
because Korean financial capital is also trying to make inroads into such 
countries as China, Vietnam, Malaysia etc., looking for opportunities for 
investment. 
 
But this was not done without social costs. One notable social consequence was 
that these alternative investments have caused the relocation of wealth in both 
the international and the national economy. The foreign private equity and 
hedge funds have fully appropriated the weakness of the crisis-hit country 
where the value of overall assets was devastated. Considering the statistic that 
only 25% of global private equity funds can beat the average return of the 
equity market, their return of investment in Korea was huge enough to remind 
people of a windfall (Financial News, 13 Dec. 2005) 
 
For example, Sovereign, a Belgium based PEF, gained 779 billion won ($708 
million) of profit (4.3 times of the initial investment) in two and half years after 
it bought 14.99% of the share of SK Corporation, the largest Korean refinery. 
Newbridge Capital, a Texas based private equity fund, invested 500 billion won 
($455 million) in the Korea First Bank, a bank that was nationalized after the 
crisis, and gained 1,151 billion won ($1,046 million) of profit in 5 years (Lee 
C-K 2004). Moreover, most of these funds did not pay any tax on their capital 
gains because the real investment bodies were “paper companies” established in 
tax havens like Labuan, Cayman Islands (ibid).  
 
The advisory specialists were the other main beneficiaries of the alternative 
investment boom. The fees that these advisory intermediaries normally charged 
for their services, after the crisis, were high enough to frustrate ordinary 
Koreans. For example, Hynix, a distressed semiconductor manufacturer had to 
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pay 66.3 billion won ($6 million) to the consulting firm like Citi-Salomon 
Smith Barney (SSB) in just 6 months from December 2000 (Financial News, 1 
Sep. 2002). 
  
The investment and restructuring may have increased the efficiency of the 
corporations. And there may be many, though silent, Korean shareholders who 
have got benefits from the resulting increase of the value of corporations (Kim 
W-S and Yoon H-K 2006). But not a few PEFs have revealed their obsession 
with short-term profit maximization. Many financial or industrial corporations 
have dwindled as the new owners -- private equity funds -- shrewdly siphoned 
cash from the companies through unusual methods, such as the reduction of 
capital, payment of hyper-dividends, or liquidation. 
  
BIH, a Labuan based PEF, for example, reduced the capital of Bridge Securities, 
a small sized Korean financial institutions, three times in a row from 116.4 
billion won to 68.8 billion won in 2002~2003. After retrieving most of their 
investment by the reduction of capital, the BIH started to sell corporate assets 
such as office buildings to furnish cash for further capital decrease. When BIH 
departed the company, after 5 years of investment, Bridge Securities was left 
with almost empty hands. Kukdong Engineering & Construction (by the Lone 
Star fund), Orion Electronic Company (by the Metlin Patterson fund), Mando 
(by JP Morgan) and Meritz securities (by PAMA) are examples of firms with 
similar experiences (Lee J-H 2006; Im J-I and Chang W-S 2008). 
 
The more the private equity funds were eager for the retrieval of invested 
capital and return, the more the long-term viability of the corporation was 
neglected. Such industrial virtues as devotion to technology and innovation, the 
artisan spirit, and the social responsibility of corporations became obsolete in 
the face of the “money game” of the alternative investors. The three Korean 
banks, for example, discarded the role of “enduring capital” after they were sold 
to the private equity funds. They drastically withdrew their loans to 
corporations while increasing household loans and mortgage loans which were 
relatively safer in Korea (Lee J-H 2006). 
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These experiences illustrate the norm on which alternative investment was 
based on: „privatizing the profits while socializing the expenses‟ (ibid: 163). 
Almost without exception, the employees were the first targets of the 
restructuring in order to enhance the value of the company. For instance, the 
1,500 employees of the Orion Electronic Company, once the world‟s third 
largest display maker, suddenly lost their jobs when Metlin Patterson, an 
American based private equity fund, broke their promise
90
 and liquidated the 
company in October 2005. The 50 year old company was liquidated just 6 
months after the private equity funds took it over. The government‟s support for 
a deal that aimed to retain the employees was, in this instance, fruitless 
(Hankyoreh, 9 Feb. 2006). 
 
 
8.8 Case Study: Lone Star’s Buy-out of KEB 
 
This case documents the process of selling a quasi-nationalized commercial 
bank to a foreign private equity fund; Lone Star‟s buyout of the Korea 
Exchange Bank (KEB) in 2003. This deal shows clearly the significance of 
“invisible power” in the area of the economy. Although the large commercial 
bank was very importance to the national economy, almost every aspect of the 
take-over deal was outside the public sphere behind the culture of 
confidentiality. The media and the general public were at best uninformed 
bystanders or the subjects of strategic public relations (PR) from the elites in 
the network. 
 
Thanks to the fact that the deal has been a matter of concern for several years in 
Korea, this case study is able to make use of a broad range of official materials, 
                                           
90
 Metlin Patterson promised the labour union that it would not lay off employees for three 
years and would invest in research and development (R&D) when they took over the company. 
But Metlin Patterson sold the company to Oceanlink in Hong Kong immediately after the take-
over. The relationship between Metlin Patterson and Oceanlink was not clearly known, but 
Oceanlink insisted that it had no obligation to keep Metlin Patterson‟s promise.  
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including the reports from the Board of Audit and Inspection (BAI),
 91
 the 
indictment of the Supreme Prosecutors Office (SPO),
 92
 the judge‟s decision, 
as well as reports from civil groups, media coverage and several interviews 
with interested persons. Regarding the media analysis, a total of 211 articles 
were collected from the ten national dailies and two economic dailies. From 
these, 109 pieces were finally chosen for the analysis based on their relevance. 
 
8.8.1 From success to turmoil  
 
The U.S. based private equity fund‟s take-over of the fifth largest commercial 
bank in Korea was the biggest foreign buy-out, with over 1 billion dollars of 
cash investment since the economic crisis in 1997. The deal seemed to have 
been successful like several previous buy-outs of banks by foreign PEFs. 
 
In less than two years, however, Koreans were embroiled in a big socio-
economic controversy which was provoked by the deal. Frustrated by the 
300~400% of windfall-like returns of Lone Star in a relatively short time, many 
Koreans come to realize that something was wrong with the foreign investment 
funds‟ take-over of Korean industries. The media, reflecting this negative 
public sentiment, have framed the deal as being the apex of foreign attacks on 
the Korean economy. The Parliament, the BAI and the SPO consecutively set 
out to investigate the legitimacy of the sale. In late 2006, the SPO announced 
that there were serious breaches of regulations in the M&A deal, including an 
intentional undervaluing of KEB (SPO 2006). Around 20 government officials, 
foreign fund managers, bankers and advisory specialists were put on trial, 
charged with malpractice or a conspiracy to deceive. 
 
Considering the friendly treatment of Korean governments towards foreign 
investment, the official investigation of the deal was exceptional. Though the 
litigation has resulted in a mixed verdict, including several bitter blows to the 
prosecutor, it is significant that the investigation and subsequent litigation have 
                                           
91
 A government department which deals with official discipline.  
92
 A senior prosecutors‟ office in Korea which deals mainly with significant offences. 
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revealed the inside stories of the clandestine investment network. The 
multilayered connections between policymakers, advisory specialists, bankers 
and investment funds had crucial weight in the making of the deal. With these 
symbiotic connections, a seemingly impossible or arguably unlawful M&A deal 
was approved by the authority. 
 
8.8.2 The global-national nexus 
 
The “project knight” 
 
KEB was a commercial bank which was partly nationalized after the financial 
crisis. In 2002, KEB again fell into the red because its corporate lending was 
deteriorating due to the prolonged economic slump. The government and the 
top management were compelled to increase KEB‟s capital to prevent the 
capital adequacy ratio (BIS ratio) of the bank from sliding down to under 8%, 
the guideline that indicates the soundness of a bank. This exigency coincided 
with the desire of Lone Star which sought to buy a commercial bank in Korea, 
notwithstanding two previous unsuccessful efforts. 
 
The aim of Lone Star was clear from the start. It wanted to subscribe more than 
50% of the stakes, as cheaply as possible, for a maximum of $ 1 billion. The 
majority stake, Lone Star hoped, could give it the leverage to yield a better 
return from the investment. When the country manager of Lone Star spoke his 
mind to a local head of Citi-Saloman Smith Barney (SSB), according to the 
court statement, the veteran consultant thought to himself that „anyhow this 
man picked the right thing‟ (Spec Watch 2009: 251). But Lone Star‟s dream 
could not come true without overcoming several obstacles. 
 
Firstly, Lone Star had to persuade the existing major shareholders to sell their 
stakes because they, including the top management of KEB, just hoped to raise 
the due amounts of capital rather than inviting a new owner. Secondly, Lone 
Star was not entitled to purchase more than 10% of the stakes, because the 
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Korean “Law on the banking industry” does not allow non-bankers, e.g. PEFs, 
to become owners of a commercial bank. 
 
Lone Star recognized this restriction as the most critical issue at the final stage 
of the deal (the so-called “qualification issue”) and tried its best to work out a 
solution. One possibility was applying the “compelling reason” of the law that 
permits a non-banker to take-over a bank. This clause could be applied only 
when the bank is in such a dire situation that the Financial Supervisory 
Committee (FSC) ordered the bank to take compulsory restructuring measures. 
Yet, this was infeasible because KEB, even though its soundness was declining, 
was expected to retain a sustainable capital base according to the audit of the 
Financial Supervisory Service (FSS). 
 
To tackle these obstacles, Lone Star hired Kim & Chang as its legal advisor and 
SSB as a lead manager. The master plan of the deal, namely “Project Knight”, 
was drafted by the two advisory intermediaries at the end of 2002 as a first step 
towards carrying out a seemingly unachievable mission. 
 
PEF – Advisory specialists – Policy makers 
 
To state the conclusion first, “Project Knight” has succeeded. In the making of 
the deal, the government officials played a crucial role as a major stakeholder of 
KEB, as well as the regulator of the banking industry. The BAI and the SPO 
later concluded that, without their intimate collaboration, the M&A deal could 
not have been achieved (BAI 2007; SPO 2006). In particular, the Ministry of 
Finance and Economy (MOFE), and the Financial Supervisory Committee 
(FSC) ran the risk of stretching the financial regulations in Lone Star‟s favor. 
 
As the policy decisions are not made in a vacuum, it will be useful to examine 
the social connections or the network around the policymakers. Through this, 
we can discover what influenced their attitudes and decisions. Throughout the 
deal, one official in the MOFE, Byun Yang-ho, played a critical role in 
coordinating various parties of the deal. Byun, a director of financial policy, 
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virtually managed the deal in close consultation with the president Lee Kang-
won of KEB, the law firms and the consulting firms. Due to his role in the deal, 
director Byun was indicted for malpractice in late 2006.
93
 
 
Byun had several important connections. For example, he had two friends who 
were graduates in the same class in Kyongi high school and Seoul National 
University, the two most prestigious schools in Korea. One is Kim Eun-sang, a 
country manager (president) of SSB, a lead manager of this deal. Kim told later 
that his main duty was to persuade two intractable directors, i.e. Byun in the 
MOFE and Kim Seok-dong in FSC.,
94
 to take a favorable view of the structure 
of the deal which Lone Star had proposed --buying over 50% of the shares 
(Spec Watch 2009: 252). 
 
The other key person was a lawyer named Ha Jong-sun who was hired by Lone 
Star. He was also an old schoolmate of director Byun. His main duty was to 
persuade Byun to accept Lone Star‟s solution to the “qualification issue”. His 
role was so crucial that it determined the success or failure of the deal. 
According to the SPO indictment, Ha secretly received $ 1.05 million in 
commission from Lone Star, with the compliment that he had played a „key‟ 
and „valuable‟ role (Spec Watch 2009: 227). He was also accused of illegal 
brokerage in late 2006. 
 
However, it was argued that there might be stronger overarching influences on 
the officials, as well as the top management of KEB, from senior officials such 
as the deputy prime minister or the secretary of the president (Ohmynews, 4 Dec. 
2006). Because of these influences, the role of Kim & Chang, the legal advisors 
on the deal, attracted particular attention. Civil groups accused the law firm of 
having provided not only the logic of the deal but also the connections for the 
lobbying. At the center of this accusation, there was a former finance minister, 
                                           
93
 After three years of litigation, he was declared not guilty at the higher court. But the 
litigation, as a matter of process, was not able to decide whether there were any invisible 
influences or not. 
94
 Director Kim Suk-dong in FSS played relatively passive role, compared with Byun, in the 
deal. But his role was not minor, since he was a director of the government committee which 
had the right to approve the takeover of a bank.  
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Lee Hun-jae, who was then a councilor of Kim & Chang. Lee was believed to 
have a wide range of connections and to have considerable influence on 
financial industry and policy networks emanating from his career as a minister 
of MOFE and a commissioner of FSC. Indeed, he was appointed again to the 
deputy Prime Minister of the MOFE in early 2004. There were several media 
reports, after the deal began to be questioned, that raised questions about his 
advisory role in the deal (for example, Hankyoreh 18 Jun. 2006; Chosun 3 Nov. 
2006).  
   
   Figure 8- 1: The Global-National Network of the KEB-Lone Star Deal 
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Indeed, President Lee of KEB was reported to be one of the key members of 
“Lee‟s boys” (Maeil Business Newspaper 20 Jun. 2006; Weekly Kyunghyang 30 
Jun. 2006). He was praised by Lone Star as an „unusual seller who actively 
supports the buyer‟ (SPO 2006: 37). In return for this support, he teased Lone 
Star for guaranteeing his post as president (Ibid: 29). Apart from these 
connections, there were several other government officials and advisory 
intermediaries who were connected with each other around this deal. Figure 8- 
1 is the diagram that shows these connections. 
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8.8.3 A snap shot: decision making within a closed circuit  
 
Unusually, thanks to the public investigation, the black-box like features of the 
M&A deal could be exposed. Among various anecdotes, one snapshot showed 
well how the network of the “iron triangle” operated within a closed circuit of 
communication. 
 
When the so called “qualification issue” arose, in June 2003, the deal was 
approaching a critical phase. By that time, however, only a handful of people 
knew that Lone Star wanted to buyout KEB. This was because several key 
negotiators had monopolized the information and deliberately misled the other 
interested parties. Director Byun, for example, did not provide detailed 
information even to the relevant directors in his department. His office 
deliberately misled other departments by calling the deal, in its official 
documents, an “increase of capital” instead of a “buy-out”. President Lee of 
KEB also did not report fully to the board of directors, even after an important 
decision had already been made (SPO 2006). 
 
As the negotiations continued, however, the deal could not be finalized without 
settling the “qualification issue”. The country manager of Lone Star, Stephen 
Lee, with his lobbyist Ha Jong-sun, continually lobbied director Byun and 
President Lee of KEB to apply the “compelling reason clause” in the financial 
supervisory regulations, which exceptionally permits PEFs to take-over a bank 
only when its situation is dire. But the obstacle was that the KEB was not 
insolvent, hence it did not fall under this provision. 
  
The expedient that the Lone Star found was to construe the compelling reason 
clause to suit its purpose. Kim & Chang prepared legal advice that the 
compelling reason could apply to a bank which was expected to become 
insolvent in the near future. Lone Star persuaded the director Byun with this 
legal advice and finally succeeded in getting his promise to help. After deciding 
to give the green light, ironically enough, Byun‟s office justified its decision by 
reference to a secret document named „Concerning Lone Star‟s qualification for 
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taking -over KEB‟, which was provided by Kim & Chang themselves (Im J-I 
and Chang W-S 2008: 13). 
 
Once the plan of the deal was prepared, the next step was to provide a financial 
projection which could highlight the miserable future financial condition of 
KEB. The top-management of KEB prepared different versions of BIS capital 
adequacy ratio projections supplied by accounting firms. In order to force the 
government to give special permission, they provided the „worst possible 
scenario‟ when the recipient was the Ministry (BAI 2007: 41). 
 
Having prepared the legal analysis and the financial projections, Byun arranged 
a secret meeting with several officials from the relevant departments and 
persuaded them to accept the solution that Lone Star had proposed. When the 
FSC preliminary session was held on 25 July 2003 in order to discuss the deal, 
the final decision was virtually made by the working-level officials and 
lobbyists. The outline of the price of the bank, for example, was drafted by  
Byun, the country manager Lee of Lone Star and the lawyer Ha „over a private 
dinner table‟ as long as four months before the FSC meeting was scheduled (Im 
J-I and Chang W-S 2008: 137). Without sufficient evidence to oppose the deal, 
the FSC helplessly gave it a “rubber stamp”. 
 
8.8.4 The economic power behind the “private fence” 
 
Closing of the public debate 
 
Since KEB was a big commercial bank with a lot of industrial and household 
borrowers, the possible change of ownership rightly deserved public attention. 
Media coverage of the deal, however, suffered from the culture of 
confidentiality. Though the journalists may have competed with each other to 
get some scoops, the information available was scarce and often inaccurate. The 
analysis of press reports shows that several clusters of reports intermittently 
relayed the progress of the deal, relying on official announcements or 
unidentified sources. But the reports, in terms of their timing and accuracy, 
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generally missed the critical pending issues of the deal when they are compared 
with the real progress of the deal that was later revealed to the public by the 
prosecution. 
 
For instance, the most critical issue -- qualification --, which might have broken 
the deal during the final phase, was almost never covered by the media. 
According to the later investigations, there were a lot of interactions between 
Lone Star, advisory firms and government officials, from early June to the end 
of July 2003, to find a solution to the qualification issue. 
 
Table 8-4: Media Coverage of the KEB-Lone Star Deal  
                                                 (Dec.2002~ Jul. 2003) 
 
Dec.  Jan
.  
Feb
. 
Mar
. 
Apr
. 
May Jun. Jul. 
Major 
issues 
of the 
deal 
Kick
-off 
the 
deal 
---------- 
Sell 51% or 
just a 
capital 
increase. 
Price issue 
Qualification 
issue 
Governme
-nt 
decision 
was made. 
Media  
cover-
age 
----------------------- 
Kick- 
off the 
deal (2 
~3Apr.) 
No 
price 
issue 
Sell 51% 
or not (17 
May~4 
Jun.) 
No 
qualificatio
n issue 
Vice 
minister 
gave green 
light (23 
Jul.) 
 
1) Pieces from newspaper about the KEB-Lone Star deal were analyzed in comparison with the 
BAI investigation reports and SPO indictment.  
2) In order to draft Table 8-4 and 8-5, a total of 211 articles were collected from the ten national 
dailies and two economic dailies. Among these, 109 pieces were finally chosen for the analysis 
on the basis of their relevance. The articles were collected from KINDS entering keywords for 
both KEB (Weihwanenheng) and Lone Star (Lonestar). The pieces from Chosun and ChungAng 
were collected from their own websites. The period of collection was between 1 December 
2002 and 31 August 2003, which was from the start of the proposal for the deal to the contract. 
The titles of the newspapers were Chosun, ChungAng, Dong-A, Hankyoreh, Hankook, 
Kyunghyang, Munhwa, Seoul, Sekei, Kookmin, Mail Business Daily, Hankook Economic Daily. 
 
However, among 109 articles, not a single piece at that time managed to unravel 
the interplays that, two years later, would provoke such major controversies 
over the legitimacy of the deal. Only ten pieces questioned whether the private 
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equity fund‟s takeover of the commercial bank was legitimate or not (Segye, 29 
Jul. 2003; Kyunghyung, 30 Jul. 2003; Seoul, 6 Aug. 2003, for example). But 
these articles were just calling attention to the financial principles without 
knowing the seriousness of the issues among the parties of the deal. There was 
also no media coverage of the two unofficial meetings of government officials 
in July, where the decision to give Lone Star special permission was virtually 
made. In this sense, the journalists were almost completely blocked from any 
information about the deal. 
 
The thick screen of confidentiality surrounding the network has effectively 
blocked outsiders, including journalists, from obtaining this information. 
Journalists whom the researcher interviewed said that “no comment” or “there 
is no one here to answer the question” were the usual replies of the parties that 
were involved in the deal (for example, Im Dae-hwan, 18 Feb. 2010; Cho Hae-
dong, 21 Jan. 2009). Lone Star, as is usual in the case of PEFs, did not even 
have press officers on their staff until early 2005. 
 
As the information was almost completely blocked from the media, the 
investigative pieces or reports raising questions about the deal were rare. Table 
8-5 shows the analysis of the coverage. Most of the report normally relied on 
weak sourcing, using such phrases as “a senior official said” or “it is said to be”. 
But these reports were simply denied by the funds and the firms. Otherwise, 
attention was deliberately diverted in other directions, as we can see from the 
fact that the financial authority, until the last phase of the deal, called the deal a 
just share issue instead of management buy-out.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
228 
 
Table 8-5: Analysis of the Media Coverage of the KEB-Lone Star Deal 
 
Category Items 
Frequency 
(N=109) 
Proportion 
(100%) 
Type of reporting 
Straight news 80 73.4 
Analysis 26 23.8 
Investigative pieces 3 2.8 
Tone of the 
reporting (about 
the deal) 
Supportive 5 4.6 
Neutral 91 83.5 
Questioning 13 11.9 
Type of main 
sources 
Official announcement 43 39.4 
Named sources 11 10.1 
Unnamed sources 29 26.6 
Picking up other 
reporting 
13 11.9 
Others 13 11.9 
Main cue givers 
Government officials 17 15.6 
Lone Star 4 3.7 
KEB 51 46.8 
Assistants 
(Law firms, Consulting 
firms) 
0 0 
Others (a source in the 
financial industry etc.) 
37 33.9 
Main thrust of 
the pieces 
The deal is in process 53 48.6 
The scheme of deal 
(Capital raise or buy-out 
etc.) 
17 15.6 
The issue of price 10 9.2 
The issue of 
qualification 
10 9.2 
Others 19 17.4 
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Several media, for example the weekly Newsmaker (12 Dec. 2006), tried to 
carry out investigative reporting on the network. But they had to face 
intimidation, including the prospect of being sued for huge amounts for libel 
from the law firms or consulting firms (Im J-I and Chang W-S 2008: 183). The 
journalist Ha Jung-min said: 
 
„(not only foreign funds but also) Law firms and consulting firms are 
basically impregnable fortresses to the journalists. I often noticed that senior 
journalists were striving to contact them through every path of personal 
connections and begging them just confirm with a yes or no answer, please‟ 
(Interview, 29 Jan. 2009). 
 
Strategic use of the media 
 
While the process of the deal has scarcely come into the public awareness, 
some information was deliberately leaked to the media. This strategic 
management of the media has proved to be fairly effective, because journalists 
had little choice but to rely on such leaks because of the paucity of information. 
Crosschecking of the information was almost impossible. This was a similar 
situation to that of a war, where the sources have a firm grip on all information 
(Herman and Chomsky 2002). 
 
When the deputy Prime Minister Kim Jin-pyo of MOFE did an exclusive 
interview with Bloomberg on 22 July 2003, the closed-door deal emerged as an 
official policy agenda. He gave a hint that the government would allow Lone 
Star to become the owner of KEB, rather than just increasing its capital. He said 
that „we are now thinking of selling to Lone Star all or part of the shares (32.5%) 
that EXIM (a government-run bank) possesses‟ (Dong-A; Hankyoreh, 23 Jul. 
2003). This story ran, quoting the interview, in most of the mainstream Korean 
media, achieving considerable weight. 
 
But the suspicion mounted, when an FSC document on the deal was disclosed 
several months later, that this interview was a well-timed spinning of the deal. 
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The document showed that at that time Lone Star, fearing that they would lose 
the deal due to the qualification issue, kept asking the government for a “verbal 
assurance” of the eligibility of Lone Star as a majority shareholder (Shindong-A, 
1 Feb. 2005; KBS, 19 Mar. 2006). One report runs: „the question arises whether 
it was because of the importunate request of Lone Star that the vice prime 
minister, by means of interview with the foreign media, hurriedly publicized 
Lone Star‟s buying out (of the bank)‟ (Shindong-A, 1 Feb. 2005). 
 
In terms of timing, this interview which made the KEB deal into an established 
policy was carried out three days before the FSC meeting. In Korea, the deputy 
prime minister who was in charge of overall economic policy has considerable 
influence on other economic departments, including the FSC. His interview 
might or might not have had an influence on the FSC, but the committee gave 
confirmation to Lone Star that it would approve the deal „regardless of the 
qualification issue‟ (Lee J-H 2006: 46-48). It was also made known that several 
days before the interview, an advisor from Kim & Chang played golf with the 
deputy prime minister Kim as part of their lobbying efforts for Lone Star (Im J-
I and Chang W-S 2008: 160-161).  
 
Also strategic PR was mobilized when the network faced a crisis from around 
2005, due to the escalation of critical public sentiment in relation to the deal. It 
was carried out in a carefully administered manner, selecting the timing and the 
media. The law firms and consulting firms tried to make use of the media only 
when they needed them. Kim Kyong-wha, a journalist at Bloomberg Korea, 
said: 
 
„One day a senior lawyer phoned me and proposed to have lunch. His law 
firm was an advisor of Lone star. … I was surprised, because the lawyers 
have been incredibly difficult to contact by any means. But this time they 
phoned me first. … During our lunch, the lawyer devoted most of his energy 
in defending his client‟s position. … I felt that these guys move fairly 
strategically in dealing with the media. When we need them, they never 
answer. When they need us, they call us spontaneously‟ (Interview, 28 Jan. 
2009). 
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Lone Star later hired a local PR agency and defended its position by, for 
example, putting a column in the national press. Unusually, in mid 2007, the 
Chairman John Grayken of Lone Star had a series of e-mail interviews with 
several national media outlets. In these interviews, he insisted that Lone Star 
would reinvest in Korean industry for a long time, even after it would sell KEB 
(Yeonhap, 25 Jun. 2007; Reuters, 30 Jun. 2007). But these exceptional 
interviews turned out to be a prelude to its exit strategy, because not long 
afterwards it was disclosed that Lone Star had at that time begun negotiations 
with the HSBC, the world‟s largest bank, in order to sell KEB.  
 
8.8.5 The social consequences of the “iron triangle” 
 
According to textbooks of finance, to invest is to take risks. The amount of 
profit or deficit, principally, should be proportionate to the scale of the risks 
that one takes. However, it is also true that this principle does not always work. 
Lone Star can be said to have taken risks when it invested in an ailing KEB in 
2003. But the problem was that, for many Koreans, its returns looked 
disproportionate to the risk that Lone Star took. 
 
After the two years of the lock-in period elapsed, Lone Star started to grope 
towards selling KEB from the end of 2005. By that time, the bottom line of 
KEB had changed dramatically and it had begun to made an unprecedented 
profit, as much as 1.9 trillion won in 2005 ($1.7 billion), 1 trillion won in 2006 
($900 million) and 0.95 trillion won in 2007($860 million). Thanks to this 
drastic turn-around of profitability, KEB has attracted a lot of bidders from 
around the world, including KB, the largest Korean bank, and HSBC. And the 
return that Lone Star could secure was estimated to top 5 trillion won ($4.5 
billion) in the mid 2011, including the dividends that it has already garnered.
95
 
                                           
95
 The return has been further inflated because of the call option which was not publicized at 
the moment of the closing of the deal.  
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This splendid return from the investment could hardly be matched by any other 
financial investments (Dong-A, 4 Jul. 2011) 
 
What made this change possible in such a relatively short period? Indeed, Lone 
Star has tried to increase the corporate value of KEB. But this was largely based 
on the typical restructuring principle of PEFs -- the maximization of profit in 
the short term. The new managers of KEB cut 18% of its staff within less than 
one year of the takeover, when the bank had already started to make a profit 
(Kyunghyang, 13 Oct. 2004). And KEB has put more stress on its mortgage 
loans, which was a safer way of lending in Korea, while reducing its 
commercial loans to industry. The percentage of loans to small and medium 
sized industry by the KEB after Lone Star take it over was 34% of their total 
loans, while it was 51% in the banks that were owned by domestic capital in 
2005 (E-Daily, 2 Mar. 2006). The reduction in the number of staff, and the 
discarding of its “enduring capital role”, may have been the last thing that 
Koreans expected from the new foreign owner of a domestic bank. 
 
However, it was widely accepted that larger parts of their huge profit came 
from the upturn of the economic cycle. The recovery of the global economy 
from mid-2003, along with that of the Korean economy, has helped companies 
to boost their profits, and has transformed a lot of the non-performing business 
loans of KEB to lucrative assets. And it was argued that this upturn in their 
profits was duly anticipated at the height of the negotiations, as many pieces of 
evidence showed that the bottom line of KEB had already passed its worst point 
around the middle of 2003 (BAI 2007: 27-28).  
 
This suggests that KEB was sold at an unduly low price to private equity funds, 
which generally sought short-term profit maximization rather than devoting 
themselves to the substance of the business. Public sentiment has rapidly 
worsened towards foreign investment funds as many Koreans have become fed 
up with a series of casino-style financial investments since the economic crisis. 
Statistics show that a majority of people think that the deal revealed collusion 
between investment capital and government officials. An opinion poll showed 
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that 72% of respondents thought that the accused, i.e. key government officials 
and advisory specialists, should be remanded in custody due to the significance 
of the collusion.
96
 From another opinion poll, 77.6% of respondents answered 
that they thought there might be collusions between government officials and 
Lone Star in the M&A deal.
97
 
 
Regardless of the verdicts of the key negotiators, it was widely accepted by the 
people that small numbers of networked financial elites and their invisible 
decision making processes have alienated journalists and the general public 
from engaging in important issues in relation to their economic lives. 
 
 
8.9 Conclusion 
 
As is normal with the crisis-hit economies, the debacle made the Korean 
economy a lucrative “hunting field” for global investment forces. A lot of 
distressed assets, debt-ridden financial or industrial corporations came on the 
market in the “fire sale”. The Korean government lifted almost every restriction 
on capital movement and investment in order to foster business restructuring 
and to invite foreign capital. The FDI and alternative investments have flooded 
in, so that vulture investments, minority share purchases and buy-outs of a firm 
became, initially, the daily business of the foreign capital, and later of the 
indigenous capital too.  
 
Alongside this development, the discrete expert network consolidated around 
the common interest of the main participants in the field. The advisory 
intermediaries have played an active role in the network as they sought to 
furnish total solutions for their clients, including expedients based on social 
networking. When the network had inflated its power to the verge of controlling 
the decision-making of the government by way of its symbiotic relationship 
                                           
96
 This poll was taken by Realmeter (http://www.realmeter.net/), a polltaker, interviewing 711 
people around the country on 6 November 2006. 
97
 This poll was taken by Pol & Poll (www.polnpoll.com ), interviewing 2,000 people around 
the country on 26~27 April 2006. 
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with policymakers, e.g. through the “revolving door” practices, it resembled 
what is called the “iron triangle” in America, a connection between Wall Street, 
the White House and the munitions industry. 
 
Although the decisions of the investment network had an increasing impact on 
Korean economy and society, most of the activities of the network remained 
outside public awareness. The barriers of technical expertise and the culture of 
exclusiveness have prevented the general public and the media from accessing 
information about what was happening, because a lot of the deals and 
investments took place behind the scenes within a closed network of the Korean 
iron triangle. Apart from the major shareholders, the stakeholders were just left 
as bystanders. 
  
This “invisibility” was enough to raise concern about democratic accountability, 
as many of these activities have serious implication for the public sphere. A lot 
of the mega-deals, for example, were the sales of public property, such as the 
privatization of nationalized financial firms. The deep engagement of the 
government officials with the networks often incurred suspicion of “access 
capitalism”. This was all the more serious because the deals usually resulted in 
mass dismissals, closing-down of factories, and the outflow of a huge amount 
of national wealth. 
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9.1 The Purpose and Summary of the Thesis 
 
This thesis was initially inspired by the observation that the standard of living 
of ordinary Koreans has consistently fallen in line with the neo-liberal 
transformation of its economy and society, especially after its economic crisis 
in the late 1990s. From the literature review, it was hypothesized that the 
transnational market forces limited the scale and capacity of the democratic 
politics, which should ease the harshness of the market system that inevitably 
generates inequality and the deterioration of social cohesion.  
 
About the downsizing of the democratic politics, two distinct points were 
singled out from the literature. The one was the salient trend of “closing” of 
politics in which socio-economic domains were increasingly distanced from 
democratic governance. The other was the “colonizing” of politics, in which 
decisions with significant impacts on many people were frequently made by 
small numbers of economic elites who operate with minimal transparency, 
legitimacy, and accountability to the national public. Both tendencies, 
interlocked with each other, brought about a massive shift of resources and 
power toward transnational market forces, including managers of TNCs, 
financial capitalists, advisory intermediaries, and bureaucrats in Korean 
government and international institutions. 
 
Based on these theoretical considerations, this thesis set out to investigate the 
mechanisms and features of “downsizing of politics” in Korea, with particular 
interest in the “power value” of the media and communication. Specifically, the 
research aimed at clarifying the discursive and non-discursive process of power 
outside the public sphere, as transnational market forces often operate with 
minimal public accountability. This research aim led to the employment of an 
alternative approach that focused on the micro-process of power in four key 
transnational elite sites (or networks). In particular, this thesis investigated how 
the routinized norms, ideas, practices and communication in the sites repeatedly 
shaped decisions that had a considerable impact on the general public. 
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Chapter five investigated the discursive construction of “closing” of democratic 
politics in the context of Korea after the economic crisis. The diffusion of 
market fundamentalism and globalism, combined, led to the discourse of 
“economy first” in which various dimensions of society were to be subordinate 
to the imperative of the economy. From the discourse that sees politics as a 
“necessary evil”, a moral order has emerged that preferred the market to politics, 
experts to politicians, private to public, and efficiency to deliberation. 
Democratic politics, driven by the tenet of “separation of political and 
economic matters”, succumbed to the elite private interests. Throughout these 
processes, Korean economic experts in academia, government and the media 
played an active role as a pre-existing expert group or epistemic community, 
through which specific ideas and beliefs were communicated and legitimated. 
This was facilitated by their shared intellectual background of Chicago School 
economics, networked connections with the experts in the U.S.A., and 
exclusionism toward alternative intellectual concepts. 
 
Chapters six to eight documented the “colonizing” of the public and politics by 
corporate, financial and professional elites. Chapter six explored the mechanism 
of influences whereby the Korean business elites (chaebols) gain control over 
the government policy for their benefit. In addition to the traditional accounts of 
the business elite‟s influence on the state, e.g. educational background and 
regular exchange of personnel, this chapter focused on the cultural, media and 
discourse factors which dominated policy debate and knowledge of the 
economy. The chaebols produced the policy knowledge and controlled debate 
mobilizing their superior resources, including in-house think-tanks, strategic PR, 
and the co-opted journalists and policy-makers. By privileging their arguments 
while disqualifying others, the chaebols dominated policy decisions. The 
unbalanced ecosystem of policy knowledge and debates in Korea advanced the 
benefit of corporate elites to the detriment of the resource poor groups. 
 
Chapter seven documented the mechanisms of influence of the global financial 
market on firm and household behaviour. After the full liberalization of foreign 
investments, the neo-liberal financial rationality, which upholds share holder 
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value or growth momentum was introduced and constituted as common sense. 
Specific performances, practices, discourse and communication in private or 
mass form, emanating from this new management ideal, not only gave signals 
and incentives to but also appraised, punished, and disciplined the corporations. 
As corporate managers became more cautious about the evaluation of the 
financial market by such league tables as ROI or ROE, firms were forced into 
regular restructuring, downsizing and job shedding. Through the dominant 
financial rationality and metrological performances, financial elites have 
effectively directed Korean savings and industry toward their profit-making 
goals at the expense of traditional industries and household savings. 
 
Chapter eight investigated the process of power around the advisory 
intermediaries -- the mediators of the globalization of investment and 
production -- which operate in networks with the foreign direct or fund 
investors, and national government. Along with the “fire sale” of financial and 
industrial firms after the economic crisis in the late 1990s, the discrete expert 
networks were consolidated and increased their influences to the verge of 
controlling the government‟s decision-making. But most of the activities in the 
network were outside public awareness, as this site was an arena of technical 
expertise and of exclusiveness and secrecy. What was notable was the 
difference in the mode of communication between private and public: the 
network cultivated a symbiotic relationship with one, while garnering 
“invisibility” from the other. This invisibility raised concerns about democratic 
accountability because many of their activities, such as the sales of nationalized 
banks, have a major impact on the public sphere. Moreover, the deals often 
resulted in mass dismissals, closing-down of factories, and the outflow of a 
huge amount of national wealth. 
 
 
9.2 The Findings and Discussion  
 
9.2.1 The communicative practices of the elite sites 
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This thesis investigated the “power value” of the media and communications, 
mainly focusing on the private communicative practices of the powerful in elite 
sites. This is not because the mass form of media is no longer effective in the 
mediation of power, but because multiple and intensive forms of private 
communication have become increasingly influential in the neo-liberalized 
political space or public sphere that increasingly replaces democratic structures. 
These communication practices often take place outside the public sphere 
without reference to the majority of citizens. Deacon (2003: 214) rightly 
pointed out that „powerful institutions and individuals seek to exert influence 
and construct political discourses in arenas other than the media‟.  
 
In terms of shaping information environments, forms of elite communication 
strategies, such as policy planning, lobbying and the establishment of new laws 
on the financial market, were examined, The mass media was an important 
resource for such research, but, as Dinan and Miller (2009: 261) suggested, grey 
literatures, including trade, specialist and professional publications, was also 
given careful examination. 
 
Each elite site or network was characterized by an intensive communication 
environment, either in private or in public form. In these communicative 
spheres, news, data and information were gathered, shared, interpreted, and 
negotiated. In turn, an insight was extracted for the benefit of decision-making. 
The chaebols headquarters filed information obtained from various sources, 
including senior managers‟ private correspondence, in order to get tips in 
relation to business or to “hedge” against possible politico-legal risks. In the 
financial market, fund managers, analysts and economists relentlessly talked to 
each other in order to get a triggering insight. A lot of additional information, 
rumours and interpretations were concomitantly exchanged through instant 
messengers and phone calls. For the law firms, consulting firms and investment 
funds, it was communications with clients or policy-makers that enabled them 
to draw up a mental map for their consultations, thus gaining a critical edge 
about possible deals. 
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Several private and less visible forms of communication were observed to exert 
critical influences in the shaping of elite power in this research. As the 
government policy-making increasingly tuned into the game of knowledge and 
discourse, Korean business elites have developed ways of informing the policy 
makers via practical ideas and knowledge. While part of this policy planning 
was carried out by building public opinion through the mass media, it could not 
have been so effective without the ordinary provision of policy ideas, i.e. “brain 
sharing” between chaebols think-tanks and policy makers. The headquarters of 
chaebols also enhanced the impact of this knowledge and discourse by 
mobilizing strategic public relations (PR), in which they meticulously design its 
procedures, finely targets small numbers of the elite audience, and 
systematically organizes resources. 
 
The professional investors in the Korean financial market develop discrete and 
cohesive culture and communication networks. Here, private communication is 
an incubator for good decision-making. News of the financial media was 
circulated amongst limited numbers of market people who had considerable 
knowledge and interest in the economy and finance. The behavioural and 
psychological particularity of the market endows the financial media with the 
position of market participants. Through this closed communication network, 
specific management ideals, which are often narrow in their social vision, 
emanate from and are promoted by financial elites. Because they shared market 
information, a belief in neo-classical economics, and a specific rationality, 
market elites often slid into one-sided expectation and herd-like behavior that 
had serious impact on the whole economy and society. 
 
In the global network of financial intermediaries, internal and private 
communication is very active as information is almost everything in the 
network. When it comes to the decision-making level, for example, the manager 
of a PEF, the partner lawyers and consultants, executives in the investment 
bank and high-ranking policymakers often develop overlapping elite 
communication networks, within which they develop a symbiotic relationship. 
However, communication with the public is limited and most of the activities 
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and information are closed to outsiders. This is a field of hermits where the 
actors hide behind the esotericism of expertise and the thick curtain of the 
“confidential agreement” that they sign in the first place as part of the deal. 
Journalists are, in general, blocked from the activities and information in this 
field, other than when the actors in the network try to mobilize strategic PR. 
 
9.2.2 The process of power in the elite sites 
 
This thesis has documented the process of power that was in operation in the 
sites of liberal market forces. Among many aspects or dimensions of power, the 
researcher paid particular attention to the socially structured and culturally 
patterned behaviors that generates “mobilization of bias”. It was a mobilization 
of bias in the sense of, as Bachrach and Baraz (1970, in Lukes 2005: 21) put it, 
„a set of predominant values, beliefs, rituals, and institutional procedures (rules 
of the game) that operate systematically and consistently to the benefit of 
certain persons and groups at the expense of others‟. This is in line with the 
understanding that „localized or networked actions and decision-making have 
wider social impacts‟ (Davis 2007: 170). Four types of power were observed in 
operation. 
 
The first type of power involves the global imposition of the dominant political 
economic paradigm, for example, neo-liberalism. The international diffusion of 
free market orthodoxy has never been just an imposition because it was 
normally observed that the pre-existing expert group or epistemic community in 
a country played a missionary role. They reflected external constraints and 
reshaped them in accordance with the national context and political ends. Hence, 
the course and features of the internalization of the neo-liberal paradigm varied 
according to the “diffusion of the diffusers”. 
 
In Korea, the America-trained economists in academia, the government and the 
media played the diffuser‟s role. Based on their shared academic background, 
they had an intellectual affinity with American mainstream economics. A 
majority of influential economic experts in Korea obtained their MAs or Ph.D.s 
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in American universities and shared Chicago -style pro-market economic 
perspectives. They worked as a hub that linked the domestic and global spheres 
of economic discourse with their close connection to the American experts in 
academia and in supranational institutions, such as the IMF, the OECD and the 
World Bank.  
 
They were also the main Korean recipients of the economic news and academic 
journals from the U.S. and the U.K. The monolithic academic culture in the 
community led to an intellectual inbreeding that gave anybody with an 
alternative perspective a wide berth and led to the academic community‟s 
voluntary co-option to the intellectual hegemony of the neo-liberal centre, i.e. to 
America. Thanks to this intellectual co-option, the interpretation of the 
economic crisis and subsequent policy measures, that shunned state intervention 
and democratic politics in economic matters, which were authored by the IMF, 
the American intellectuals and the media, have penetrated deeply into the 
Korean economy and society. 
 
The second type of power involves controlling the scope and the options of 
policy measures through governing ideas and knowledge. With democratization 
and liberalization, the policy decision-making process, which had long been 
dominated by the state apparatus, evolved increasingly into a field of contention 
between the various participants. What is important here is the policy ideas and 
knowledge that help decision-makers in government and parliament to 
comprehend and deal with the issues properly. In an ideal situation, therefore, 
the policy-making process constitutes an “ecosystem” where policy knowledge 
is produced, circulated and consumed through an active interplay between, for 
example, think-tanks, the media, civil groups and policy-makers.  
 
This ecosystem, however, works lopsidedly when a group with disproportionate 
resources dominates the process. The corporate elites, the chaebols in Korea, 
with their concentration of information, superior research capacity, strategic PR 
and dense web of social networks, command the process by privileging specific 
ideas and knowledge while ignoring others. The pro-business think-tanks, 
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especially, gain the interpretative initiative over various policy issues through 
their capacity to provide timely and handy policy knowledge. As policy-makers 
are co-opted into the intellectual leadership of corporate elites, the interests of 
business are generally advanced with only a passing consideration of counter-
arguments or ideas.  
 
The third type of power involved the growth of arcana imperii (secret power) in 
the guise of technical experts, which facilitated the squeeze of regulatory 
arbitrage from the national countries. In the investment of foreign financial and 
industrial capital in a national economy, it was normally observed that they 
extracted regulatory arbitrage based on their superior negotiating power. As this 
investment and regulatory arbitrage involved sophisticated calculation, as well 
as negotiations with many different national jurisdictions, the TNCs and funds 
relied heavily on the technical experts in law firms, consulting firms, public 
accountants and investment banks.  
 
Alongside this development, a global-national network of investment emerged 
and rose to become a central domain of social and economic influence. The 
major restructuring and recapitalization of corporations, as well as the 
privatization of state enterprises, was carried out mainly through the facilitating 
role of the network between global capital, advisory intermediaries and the 
policy-makers. Their influence originated both from the technical expertise with 
which they could draw up so-called total-solutions, and the cohesive 
interactions from which they obtained information, advice and, sometimes, 
political favours. What made the networks even more powerful was their 
exclusive and exclusionary culture which made possible self-contained 
detachment from social responsibilities. The deal-making was deemed to be an 
arena of technocracy as well as an entirely private domain where financial, legal 
and managerial specialties prevailed.  
 
In Korea, the investment networks inflated their influence to the verge of 
changing law and policy due to their superior expertise and their symbiotic 
relationship with the policymakers, e.g. the “revolving door” practices. But the 
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consequences of this development were not even, as deals often resulted in 
mass dismissals, closing-down of factories, and the outflow of a huge amount 
of national wealth. 
 
The fourth type of power is engaged in the disciplining of corporate, 
government and household behaviour by the dominant set of investment ideals 
and related metrological devices in the globalized financial market. In the 
market, economics and measuring tools which are contingent to the dominant 
financial rationale play the role of “performation”. This denotes that, rather than 
simply recording a reality independent of themselves, they powerfully shape 
reality and “discipline” the behaviour of those who are measured. 
 
After the financial crisis in Korea, neo-liberal financial rationality -- the 
maximization of shareholder value -- was introduced and shared as common 
sense. The fund managers, analysts, consultants and financial media formulated 
and promoted it as an alternative management ideal to the despotic corporate 
governance system of the chaebols. Specific performances or practices 
emanating from this financial rationality, for example the emphasis on ROA 
and ROE, give signals, enacting disciplinary power, to corporate managers and 
employers. The appraisal by the financial market as a form of share price came 
to determine the reputation of a company, the morale of the employers, the 
vulnerability of a company to a possible take-over bid, as well as the 
compensation package (e.g. stock options) of the corporate managers.  
 
This financial rationality turned out to be fairly effective in disciplining the 
corporate management, but this was not without consequences for the overall 
economy and society. As managers became more cautious about the “bottom 
line”, firms were forced into relentless business restructuring and downsizing. 
Ever higher unemployment, especially among young people, and the weakening 
of job security, was an acute consequence, among many others, of the new 
rationality of the globalized financial market. 
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9.2.3 The media, politics and democracy 
 
The study of the media and politics generally revolves around the theme of 
public opinion or consent. The legitimacy and the accountability of democratic 
politics are readily linked to the soundness of the interactions between the elite, 
the media and public. But, in the age of neo-liberal globalization, when the 
scope and the capacity of democratic politics are being downsized, this 
conventional interpretative framework struggles to explain the role of the media 
and communication in sustaining unequal power relations in society. Instead, 
this research paid more attention to the „closed communicative processes of 
strong public‟ that are „increasingly replacing democratic structures under neo-
liberalism‟ (Dinan and Miller 2009: 261). 
 
By employing an alternative approach to inquiry into the media and politics, 
this thesis discovered that there has developed a more complex and subtle form 
of political communication in recent decades, in line with social and economic 
changes. Economic elites in Korea have influence over the whole society not 
only because they always mould public opinion through the media but also 
because they inhabit the sites of power. In the site or field, the “mobilization of 
institutional bias” has a considerable impact on other areas of society. Thus, in 
their explanations, the media are not necessarily mobilized to inculcate ideology 
or to brainwash the public. Sometimes, far from forming public opinion, 
journalists are excluded from what happens in the elite sites or networks, as we 
emphasized in chapter eight. 
 
A hegemonic global paradigm, such as neo-liberalism and the Washington 
Consensus, may be imposed on a country via an unequal flow of global 
economic news and its uncritical co-option by the local media and intellectuals. 
But the number of Koreans who regularly read the global news is small, let 
alone those who read the financial news. It is also difficult to detect any form of 
public opinion being formed in response to the global economic news. Rather, 
the dissemination begins from the shared preferences and ideas of economic 
elites in local countries, which are rooted in their educational background and 
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social networks. The media and communications here help them to spread ideas 
and discourses, and to consolidate the global-national epistemic community. 
 
Business circles can still control policy decision-making by influencing public 
opinion with their considerable resources. The influence of the Korean chaebols 
on the media texts, through their control over ownership and advertisements, is 
always increasing. But the community of policy-knowledge which is mediated 
by the journalists can also provide a stable platform of influence for the big 
corporations. In ordinary times, the scope and angles of the policy are pre-
determined within the narrow policy circle without any proper reference to the 
public sphere. 
 
In the world of investment, financial elites can influence the text of economic 
news and general investors through their source power and advertising expenses. 
The financialization of household assets, e.g. the fund investment boom in the 
mid-2000s in Korea, illustrates well their public influence. But, other than that, 
the financial market and the investment network are basically discrete sites 
which are inhabited by a handful of members of the elites. It is a professional 
world which is full of acronyms, technical jargon and coded terms. Thus, in 
Korea as well, financial news is a unique interpreter of the views and values of 
limited elites, not of mass opinion. It is almost as difficult for general investors 
or general news outlets to influence the decisions of the fund managers or 
traders. And the network of intermediaries who organize the investment deals 
usually block out the media almost completely, no matter how their decisions at 
times generate detrimental effects for the economy and the society.  
 
From this observation, it is obvious that, in many areas of Korean society after 
the economic crisis, the democratic politics of deliberation and will-formation 
were replaced by the technocratic rationality of experts and the cult of 
productivity and efficiency. The “broken promise” of democracy in Korea, i.e. 
the widening gap between the haves and the have-nots as well as the 
degradation of the standard of living, is closely related to this weakening of 
democratic politics by the “closing and colonizing” of politics. All of these 
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points suggest that the study of the media, politics and democracy should 
employ further the alternative or complementary paradigm that pays attention to 
this micro-process of power, instead of automatically presupposing the elite‟s 
indoctrination of the public. 
 
 
9.3. The Contribution of this Thesis 
 
This thesis has tested, through the analysis of the Korean experience of neo-
liberal transformation, the emerging theoretical paradigm about the “power 
value” of the media and communication. Apart from the traditional approach, 
this thesis tried to broaden the issue of communication and power beyond the 
role of the mass media institution in power relations. Instead, it addressed the 
role of think-tank, epistemic community, policy planning, financial market and 
investment networks. Then it looked into what different type of mediation and 
communication play a key role in the communicative strategies of the powerful. 
It found that power also emanates from patterned behaviours that are mediated 
by less visible, more exclusive forms of communication of the elites. This may 
broaden our understanding about the utility of the media and communication in 
sustaining unequal power relations. 
 
This thesis then linked these private forms of communication to the operational 
features of neo-liberal economic forces. Market liberalism, especially since its 
global advance in the 1970s, has narrowed the scope and scale of politics which 
is ideally characterized by participation, deliberation and will-formation. By 
“downsizing” politics, neo-liberal market forces relentlessly insulated power 
from democratic accountability. The growth of private and invisible forms of 
communication, and a technocratic esotericism that has been peculiar in the 
arena of economic life, evidently constitutes the neo-liberal governance of the 
present age. In this sense, an exploration of the least visible, most exclusive 
communication spaces is essential to the study of political communication in 
liberal democracies, where the importance of the parliamentary system is 
markedly declining. The analysis of the micro-processes of economic power, 
248 
 
including relevant case materials provided by this thesis, may be useful for the 
understanding of the dynamics of social relations in the period of neo-liberal 
globalization. 
 
Ultimately, this thesis attempted to answer the question of why many newly 
democratized countries during democracy‟s third wave, including Korea, are 
suffering from a “broken-promise” of democracy or the retardation of 
substantive democracy. This question was illuminated with particular attention 
to the dual liberalization of these countries, i.e. the rivalry between economic 
liberalization and political democratization. The implication was extracted that 
the remedy begins with strengthening the scope and capacity of democratic 
politics. 
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Appendix 1: List of Interviewees 
 
 
Ahn Dong-won,  an executive of Kium-Dot-Com Securities, 7 January 2009.  
Ahn Sun-hee,  a business journalist at the Hankyoreh, 11 February 2011. 
Baik Kee-seung,  a former standing director of the Daewoo business group, 10 
December 2008.* 
Chang Ha-joon,  a reader at Cambridge University, 16 December 2010 
Chang Wha-sik,  an activist in Spec Watch (a watchdog civil group), 3 
February 2009. 
Chang Young-soo,  a senior Manager of the SK business group, 17 December 
2008.* 
Cho Hae-dong,  a business journalist at the Munhwa Ilbo, 21 January 2009. 
Cho Mee-young,  a journalist at Thompson Reuters Korea, 16 January 2009.* 
Choi Gong-pil,  an executive director of Woori Financial Holdings, 28 January 
2009.* 
Choi Jae-hwang,  a director of labor policy in the Korea Employer‟s 
Federation, 9 December 2008. 
Ga Jae-hak,  a PR manager of Hanwha Galleria Co., 9 December 2008.* 
Ha Bok-yong,  a broker at Nonghyup Futures, 22 January 2009.* 
Ha Jung-min,  a business journalist at the Dong-A Ilbo, 29 January 2009. 
Han Jae-jung,  an accountant of Deloitte Consulting , 22 January 2009. 
(Hwang O O),  a managing director in the Federation of Korean Industry 
(FKI), 23 December 2008. 
Im Dae-hwan,  a business journalist at the Munhwa Ilbo, 18 February 2010 
Im Jong-in,  a former MP(The Uri Party), 11 February 2009.* 
Ji Young-gul,  a senior equity fund manager in the Plus Asset Management, 13 
January 2009. 
Jung Tae-ho,  a former Presidential secretary of political affairs, 11 February 
2009.* 
Jung Tae-in,  a former Presidential secretary of economic affairs, 20 February 
2009.* 
Kang Myeon-mo,  a director of the Bank of Korea (the central bank), 5 
January 2009. 
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Kim Han-jin,  a senior equity market analyst in the Fides Securities, 9 January 
2009. 
Kim Kyong-wha,  a journalist at the Bloomberg Korea, 28 January 2009. 
Kim Sang-jun,  a partner lawyer in Jipyung and Jisung (a business law firm), 2 
December 2009. 
Kim Sang-woo,  a fund manager in the Military Mutual Aid Association, 19 
January 2009.* 
Kim Wan-ski,  a former manager of the Lone Star (Private equity fund), 4 
December 2009. 
Kim Yong-ki,  a research fellow of SERI, 15 December 2008 and 5 June 2007. 
Kim Young-bae,  a business journalist at the Hankyoreh Shinmun, 22 May 
2007. 
Kim Young-sun,  an MP(The Grand National Party), 9 February 2009.* 
(Kim O O),  a manager of SK Telecom, 9 February 2009.* 
(Kim O O),  a managing executive at Samsung Electronics, 10 December 2008. 
Kwak Jung-soo,  a business journalist at the Hankyoreh Shinmun, 6 February 
2009. 
Kwan Oh-yong,  an executive vice-president of SK holdings, 11 December 
2008.* 
Lee Choon-jae,  a journalist at the Hankyoreh Shinmun, 23 November 2009.* 
Lee Dae-soon,  a lawyer in Jeongyoul (a business law firm), 30 November 
2009. 
Lee Hyun-suk,  an executive vice-president of the Korea Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry, 11 December 2008.* 
Lee Hyung-gun,  a partner lawyer in Kwangjang (a business law firm), 10 
February 2009.* 
Lee Jae-kook,  a journalist at the Kyunghyang Shinmun, 5 February 2009.* 
Lee Jin-hyuk,  a country manager in Calyon Bank, 19 January 2009. 
Lee Jin-woo,  an FX (foreign exchange) market analyst at Nonhyup Futures, 
16 January 2009. 
Lee Joo-hee,  a former journalist at Bloomberg Korea, 10 January 2009. 
Lee Jung-hwan,  a journalist at Media Oneul, 11 December 2009. 
Lee Kwan-woo,  a senior fund manager in the Asset Plus, 6 January 2009. 
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Lee Snag-jun,  a research Team Head at Golden Bridge Investment and 
Securities, 14 January 2009.* 
Lee Won-jae,  a former research fellow at SERI, 19 May 2007 and 8 
December 2008. 
Lee Won-ki,  a CEO at KB Asset Management, 4 February 2009.* 
(Lee O O), a former journalist at the Maeil Business Newspaper, 15 May 2007 
and 3 March. 2009. 
(Lee O O),  a senior researcher in LG Economic Research Institute, 24 
December 2008. 
Park Chan-hi,  a professor of economics in Chung-ang University, 30 January 
2009.* 
Park Hyun,  a staff reporter at the Hankyoreh, 4 December 2008 
Park Jae-ha,  a Vice President of the Korea Institute of Finance , 16 February 
2009.* 
Park Sung-jin,  a senior fixed income trader in the Samsung Securities, 15 
January 2009. 
Park Tae-gyon,  an economic journalist at the View and News, 29 December 
2008. 
Shim Sang-jung,  a former MP (The Democratic Labour Party), 9 February 
2009.* 
Shin Ju-hyun,  a Vice President of the Korea Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry, 16 December 2008.* 
Sohn Bok-jo,  a CEO at Taurus Investment and Securities Co, 12 January 
2009.* 
Song Jung-A,  a journalist at the Financial Times Korea, 3 February 2009.* 
Song Tae-yeop,  a staff reporter at YTN, 10 December 2008.* 
 
 
 
Note:  
1) The titles provided were accurate at the time of interview. 
2) 34 among the 58 were directly quoted in this thesis. Interviewees with * are 
the people who were not directly quoted. 
3) ( ) are the interviewees who asked to remain anonymous. 
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Appendix2: The Media used for Textual and Content Analyses 
 
 
Daily newspapers: Chosun-ilbo, Dong-A-ilbo, JoongAng-ilbo, Hankyoreh-
shinmun, Hankook-ilbo, Kyunghyang-shinmun, Segye-ilbo, Seoul-shinmun 
(Daehan-maeil), Kookmin-ilbo, Munhwa-ilbo, Korean Herald (English), Korea 
Times (English) 
 
 
Economic newspapers: Korea Economic Daily (Hankook Kyungjae), Maeil 
Business Newspaper (Maeil Kyungjae), Money Today, E-Daily, Seoul Economic 
Daily (Seoul Kyungjae), Herald Economic Daily. 
 
 
Weekly magazines: Hankyoreh 21, Sisa Journal, Mediaoneul (Media Today), 
Ilyoseoul 
 
 
Monthly magazines: Shin Dong-A 
 
 
Online newspapers: Ohmynews, Pressian. 
 
 
News agencies: Yeonhap News  
 
 
Broadcasting: Korea Broadcasting System (KBS), Munhwa Broadcasting 
Corporation (MBC), Seoul Broadcasting System (SBS), YTN 
 
 
Foreign media: Thompson Reuters, Bloomberg News Service, Guardian 
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Appendix 3 The Presidents of Korea and their Terms in Office 
 
Name From To 
Park Jung-hee 
16 May 1961 
(military coup d'état) 
26 Oct. 1979 
Chun Doo-hwan 1 Sep. 1980 24 Feb. 1988 
Roh Tae-woo 25 Feb. 1988 24 Feb. 1993 
Kim Young-sam 25 Feb. 1993 24 Feb. 1998 
Kim Dae-jung 25 Feb. 1998 24 Feb. 2003 
Roh Moo-hyun 25 Feb. 2003 24 Feb. 2008 
Lee Myung-bak 25 Feb. 2008 24 Feb. 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
254 
 
Bibliography 
 
 
 
Abolafia, M.Y. (1998) „Market as cultures: an ethnographic approach‟, in Michel 
Callon (ed.) The Laws of the Market, Oxford: Blackwell. 
Abolafia, M.Y. (2001) Making Markets, London: Harvard University Press. 
Abolafia, M.Y. (2005) „The interpretative politics at the federal reserve‟, in Karin 
Knorr-Cetina and Alex Preda (eds) The Sociology of Financial Markets, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Ahn Byung-young (1999) „Globalization and the changing role of the state‟, 
Sasang(Idea), (Autumn) : 88-117. 
Allen, F., Morris, S. and Shin Hyun-song (2003) „Beauty contests, bubbles and 
iterated expectations in asset markets‟, available at 
http://www.econ.yale.edu/~sm326/beauty.pdf 
Althusser, L. (1969) For Marx, London: Allen Lane. 
Althusser, L. (1971) Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essay, London: New Left 
Book. 
Ampuja, M. (2004) „Critical media research, globalization theory and 
commercialization‟, The Public, vol. 11 (3): 59-76. 
Amsden, A. (1989) Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Austen-Smith, D., Frieden, J., Golden, M., Moene, K.O. and Przeworski, A. (eds) 
(2008) Selected Works of Michael Wallerstein: The Political Economy of 
Inequality, Unions, and Social Democracy, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Bachrach, P. and Baraz, S. M (1962) „Two faces of power‟, American Political 
Science Review, vol.56: 941-952. 
Bank of Korea (BOK) (2005) „The issue of speculative foreign capital and the 
policy measures‟, January, Seoul. 
Barker, C. (2008) Cultural Studies: Theory and Practice, London: Sage. 
Barker, M.(2005) „Manufacturing policies: the media‟s role in the policy making 
process‟, Draft paper presented to the Journalism Education Conference, 
255 
 
Griffith University, 29 Nov.~2 Dec. 2005. 
Bennet, W. L. and Entman, M. R. (2001) Mediated Politics: Communication in 
the Future of Democracy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bobbio, N. (1987) The Future of Democracy: A Defense of the Rules of the 
Game, Griffin Roger (trans.), Cambridge: Polity Press.  
Bobbio, N. (1990) Liberalism and Democracy, Martin Ryle and Kate Soper 
(trans.), London-New York: Verso. 
Briody, D. (2003) The Iron Triangle: Inside the Secret World of the Carlyle 
Group, Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons.  
Brue, L. S. (2000) The Evolution of Economic Thought, 6
th
 edn., Mason, OH: 
Thomson. 
Bureau of Audit and Investigation (BAI) (2007) „The investigation into the 
M&A deal of the KEB‟, Seoul. 
Byrne, B. (2004) „Qualitative interviewing‟, in Clive Seale (ed.), Researching 
Society and Culture, London: Sage. 
Callinicos, A. (2005) „Imperialism and global political economy‟, International 
Socialism, 108, (Autumn).   
Callon, M. (1998) „Introduction‟, in Michel Callon (ed.) The Law of the Market, 
Oxford: Blackwell. 
Canovan, M. (1999) „Trust the people! Populism and the two faces of 
democracy‟, Political Studies, XLVII : 2-16. 
Cerny, P., Menz, G. and Soederberg, S.(2005) „Different roads to globalization: 
neo-liberalism, the competition state, and politics in a more open world‟, in 
Susanne Soederberg, Georg Menz and Philip G. Cerny (eds), Internalizing 
Globalization: The Rise of Neo-liberalism and the Decline of National 
Varieties of Capitalism, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Cetina, K. and Preda, A. (eds) (2005) The Sociology of Financial Markets, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press.  
Chang Deuk-jin and Kim Ki-hu (2006) Power Elite in Korea, Seoul: 
Hwangkeumnachimpan. 
Chang Ha-joon (1998) „Korea: the misunderstood crisis‟, World Development, 
26 (8).  
Chang Ha-joon (2003) Globalization, Economic Development and the Role of 
256 
 
the State, London: Zed Books. 
Chang Ha-joon (2007) Bad Samaritans, Seoul: Bookie. 
Chang Ha-joon (2010) 23 Things They Don’t Tell You about Capitalism, London: 
Allen Lane. 
Chang Ha-joon, Park Hong-jae and Yoo Chul-gyu (1998) „Interpreting the 
Korean crisis: financial liberalization, industrial policy and corporate 
governance‟, Cambridge Journal of Economics (22): 735-746. 
Cho Don-moon, Lee Byung-chun and Song Won-keun (eds) (2008) What is 
Samsung in Korean Society?, Seoul: Humanitas. 
Cho Hee-yeon (2009) „Political-social dynamics of democracy and socio-
economic inequality after 1987 in Korea‟, in Cho Hee-yeon, Kim Dong-chun 
and Oh You-seok, The Dynamic Transformation of Socio-Economic Inequality 
in the Korean Democratization: A Study on Reconstruction of Socio-
Economic Monopoly, Seoul: Hanul. 
Cho Hee-yeon (ed.) (2003) Politically and Socially Dominant Discourse in 
Korea and the Dynamics of Democracy, Seoul: Cobook. 
Cho Hee-yeon, Kim Dong-choon and Oh You-seok (2009) (eds) The Dynamic 
Transformation of Socio-Economic Inequality in the Korean Democratization: 
A Study on the Reconstruction of Socio-Economic Monopoly, Seoul: Hanul. 
Cho Hee-yeon, Park Eun-hong and Lee Hong-kyun (2009) (eds) The Dynamic 
Transformation of Socio-Economic Inequality in the Asian Democratization: 
A Study on the  Reconstruction of Socio-Eocnomic Monopoly, Seoul: Hanul. 
Cho Sung-hwan (2002) „A study on media ownership changes and the effects on 
the inner control of the perception of journalists‟, unpublished MA thesis, 
Korea University. 
Cho Young-chul (1998) „State entrenchment and the change of the Korean 
economic model‟, in Lee Byung-chun and Kim Kyun (eds) The Crisis and the 
Big Transformation, Seoul: Dangdae. 
Cho Young-chul (2007) Financial Globalization and the Future of the Korean 
Economy, Seoul: Humanitas. 
Choi Gong-phil and Lee Sang-jae (eds) (2002) The Policy Roundtable: 5
 
Year 
since the Economic Crisis, Seoul: SIAS. 
Choi Hyung-ik (2009) Substantial Democracy, Democratic Theory and Political 
257 
 
Change in Korea, Osan: Hanshin University Press. 
Choi jang-jip (1996) The Condition and Outlook of Korean Democracy, Seoul: 
Nanam 
Choi Jang-jip (2005) Democracy after the Democratization, Seoul: Humanitas. 
Choi Jang-jip, Park Chan-pyo and Park Sang-hoon (2007) What Kind of 
Democracy?, Seoul: Humanitas. 
Choi Ung-sun (1993) „Financial policy and big business in Korea; the perils of 
financial regulation‟, in Haggard, S., Lee, Chung H. and Maxfield S.(eds), 
The Politics of Finance in Developing Countries, Ithaca, New York: Cornell 
University Press. 
Chung Duk-goo (2008) In Retrospect of the Korean Economic Crisis, Seoul: 
SERI. 
Chung Seung-il (2004) „The implications of the maximization of shareholder 
value‟, in Lee Chan-keun (ed.) The Korean Economy is Vanishing, Seoul: 21st 
Century books. 
Chung Un-chan (2007) The Korean Economy, It Still has a Chance, Seoul: 
Namuwasoop. 
Citizens‟ Coalition for Economic Justice (2003) „Actual condition of the 
independent non- executive directors in 6 largest chaebols‟, September 2, 
Seoul. 
Clegg, S. R. (1989) Frameworks of Power, London: SAGE. 
Couldry, N. (2006) „Transvaluing media studies, or beyond the myth of the 
mediated centre‟, in James Curran and David Morley (eds) Media and 
Cultural Theory, New York: Routledge.  
Crenson, M. A. and Ginsberg, B. (2002) Downsizing Democracy: How America 
Sidelined its Citizens and Privatized its Public, Baltimore and London: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Creswell, J. W. (2003) Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed 
Method Approaches, London: Sage. 
Curran, J. (2002) Media and Power, New York: Routledge. 
Curran, J. (2006) „Media and cultural theory in the age of market liberalism‟ in 
James Curran and David Morley (eds) Media and Cultural Theory, New York: 
Routledge.  
258 
 
Dahl, R. (1971) Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition, New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
Dahl, R. (1985) A Preface to Economic Democracy, Cambridge: Polity. 
Dahl, R. (2000) On Democracy, New Haven and London: Yale University Press. 
Davis, A. (2002) Public Relations Democracy, Manchester: Manchester 
University Press. 
Davis, A. (2003) „Whither mass media and power? Evidence for a critical elite 
theory alternative‟, Media, Culture & Society, Vol. 25: 669-690. 
Davis, A. (2006) „The limits of metrological performativity: Valuing equities in 
the London Stock Exchange‟, Competition and Change, Vol. 10(1): 3-21. 
Davis, A. (2007) The Mediation of Power: A Critical Introduction, Oxon and 
New York: Routledge. 
de Vaus, D. (2001) Research Design in Social Research, London: Sage. 
De Vries, B. A. (1997) „The World Bank as an international player in economic 
analysis‟, in Coats A. W. (ed.) The Post-1945 Internationalization of 
Economics, Durham: Duke University Press.  
Deacon, D. (2003) „Holism, communication and conversation: Integrating media 
consumption and production research‟, Media, Culture & Society, 25(2) : 209-
231. 
Deacon, D., Pickering, M., Golding, P. and Murdock, G. (1999) Researching 
Communication, London: Arnold. 
Demetriades, P. O. and Faffouh, B. A. (1999) „The South Korean financial crisis: 
competing explanations and policy lessons for financial liberalization‟, 
International Affairs 75(4): 779-792. 
Dinan, W. and Miller, D. (2009) „Journalism, public relations, and spin‟, in Karin 
Wahl-Jorgensen and Thomas Hanitzsch (eds) The Handbook of Journalism 
Studies, New York and London: Routledge.  
Domhoff, W. (1990) The Power Elite and the State: How Policy is Made in 
America, New York: Aldine De Gruyter. 
Dryzek, S. J. (1996) Democracy in Capitalist Times, New York-Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Durham, F. (2007) „Framing the state within globalization: The Financial Times 
coverage of the 1997 Thai currency crisis‟, Critical Studies in Media 
259 
 
Communication, Vol. 24(1). 
Foucault, M (1977) Discipline and Punish, London: Penguin. 
Foucault, M.(1980) Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 
1972-77, Brighton: Harvester. 
Freedman, D. (2008) The Politics of Media Policy, Cambridge: Polity. 
Friedman, T. L. (2000) The Lexus and the Olive Tree, New York: Anchor Book. 
Froud, J., Haslam, C., Johal, S. and Williams, K. (2000) „Shareholder value and 
financialization: consultancy promises, management moves‟, Economy and 
Society, Vol. 29 (1): 80-110. 
Froud, J., Johal, S. and Williams, K. (2002) „Financialization and the coupon 
pool‟, Capital and Class, Vol. 26(3): 119-151. 
Froud, J., Savage, M., Tampubolon, G. and Williams, K. (2006) „Rethinking elite 
research‟, CRESC Working Paper Series, No. 12. 
Fukuyama, F. (1989) „The end of history?‟, National Interest (Summer): 3-18. 
Gandy, O. H., Jr. (1982) Beyond Agenda Setting: Information Subsidies and 
Public Policy, Norwood, NJ: Ablex. 
Gans, H. J. (1979) „Deciding what‟s news‟, in Howard Tumber (ed.) News: a 
Reader, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Giddens, A. (1990) The Consequences of Modernity, Cambridge: Polity. 
Gilpin, R. (2001) Global Political Economy: Understanding the International 
Economic Order, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Goldsmiths Media Group (2000) „Media organization in society; the central 
issue‟, in James Curran (ed.) Media Organizations in Society, London: Arnold. 
Gramsci, A. (1971) Selection from the Prison Notebooks, edited by Quintin 
Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, London: Lawrence & Wishart.  
Greenfield, C. and Williams, P. (2007) „Financialization, finance rationality and 
the role of media in Australia‟, Media, Culture & Society 29(3): 415-433.  
Griffin, E. M. (2006) A First Look at Communication Theory, 6
th
 edn., London: 
McGrewHill. 
Guillen, F. M. (2001) „Is globalization civilizing, destructive or feeble?‟, Annual 
Review of Sociology, Vol.27: 235-260. 
Ha Yeon-seob (2003) „Policy idea and institutional change: translating neo-
liberalism in Korea‟, Korean Review of Administrative Science 44, Vol.4: 1-27. 
260 
 
Haas, P. (1992) „Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy 
coordination‟, International Organization 46(1):1-35. 
Habermas, J. (1972) Knowledge and Human Interests, London: Heinemann 
Educational Book. 
Hall, R. (2003) „The discursive demolition of the Asia development model‟, 
International Studies Quarterly (47): 71-99. 
Hall, S. (1979) „The great moving right show‟, Marxism Today, January. 
Hall, S. (1988) The Hard Road to Renewal: Thatcherism and the Crisis of the 
Left, New York: Verso. 
Hall, S., Critcher, C., Jefferson, T., Clarke, J. and Roberts, B. (1978) Policing the 
Crisis, London: Macmillan. 
Harvey, D. (2005) A Brief History of Neo-liberalism, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Haugaard, M. (ed.) (2002) Power: a Reader, Manchester: Manchester University 
Press. 
Hay, C. (2005) „Globalization‟s impact on states‟, in John Ravenhill (ed.) Global 
Political Economy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hay, C. (2007) Why We Hate Politics, London: Blackwell. 
Hayek, F. A. (1973) Law, Legislation and Liberty Vol. 1, London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul. 
Hayek, F. A. (2001[1944]) The Road to Serfdom, London: Routledge.  
Held, D. (1996) Models of Democracy, 2
nd
 edn., Stanford: Stanford University 
Press.  
Held, D. and McGrew, A. (2003) (eds) The Global Transformations Reader-An 
Introduction to the Globalization Debate, Cambridge: Polity. 
Held, D., McGrew A., Goldblatt D. and Paerraton, J. (1999) Global 
Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture, Stanford: Stanford 
University Press. 
Herbst, S. (1998) Reading Public Opinion, London: University of Chicago Press. 
Herman, E. S. and Chomsky, N. (2002) Manufacturing Consent: The Political 
Economy of the Mass Media, New York: Pantheon Books. 
Hindess, B. (1996) Discourses of Power: from Hobbes to Foucault, Oxford : 
Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 
261 
 
Hira, A. (1998) Ideas and Economic Policy in Latin America: Regional, National 
and Organizational Case Studies, Westport, CT: Praeger. 
Holton, R. (2008) Global Networks, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Hong Duk-ryul (2008) „From a barrack society to a management society‟, 
Yuksabipyung(Critique of History), 84 (August): 68-99. 
Hong Ki-bin (2006) „Neo-liberalism, is it an ideology or a global standard?‟, 
Shiminkwasegae(Citizen and World), vol. 8: 397-415. 
Hong Seong-ku (2004) „Corporatistic class politics and the press, 
Unlonkwasahwei(Media and Society), Vol. 12( 4), November. 
Hong Soon-young, Chang Jae-chul, Kwon Soon-woo, Kim Yong-ki, Son Min-
jung, Yang Jun-ho, Chun Young-jae, and Choi In-chul (2006) Reconsidering 
the Korean Economy over the Last Two Decades, Seoul: SERI. 
Hong Sung-tae (2007) „SERI and ideology of Samsung‟, Shiminkwasegae 
(Citizen and World), Vol. 12: 113-128. 
Huntington, S. P. (1991) „Democracy's third wave‟, The Journal of Democracy, 
2(2): 12-34. 
Im Hyuk-baek (1994) Market, State and Democracy, Seoul: Nanam. 
Im Jong-in and Chang Hwa-sik (2008) The Law Firm: Kim & Chang, Seoul: 
Humanitas. 
Jensen, M. C. and Meckling, W. H. (1976) „Theory of the firm: managerial 
behavior, agency costs and ownership structure‟, Journal of Financial 
Economics, Vol. 3 (4): 305-360. 
Johnson, C. (1982) MITI and the Japanese Miracle, Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press. 
Jordan, G. and Weedon, C. (1995) Cultural Politics: Class, Gender, Race and the 
Postmodern World, Oxford: Blackwell. 
Kahneman, D., Slovic, P. and Tversky, A. (1982) Judgement under Uncertainty: 
Heuristics and Biases, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Kang Kyung-sik (1999) The Memorandum of the Korean Economic Crisis, Seoul: 
Munyedang. 
Kang Myung-koo (1994) „Economic crisis and media discourse‟, 
Unlonkwasahwei(Media and Society), Vol. 3 (Spring): 92-131. 
Kang Myung-koo and Park Sang-hoon (1997) „Political symbol and politics of 
262 
 
discourse‟, Hankook Sahweihak (Korean Sociology), Vol. 31:123-161. 
Kang Won (2005) „The role and performance of proprietary management‟, Seoul: 
SERI. 
Kantola, A. (2001) „Leaving public places: anti-political and anti-public forces of 
the transnational economy‟, The Public vol.8 (1): 59-74. 
Keane, J. (1991) The Media and Democracy, Cambridge: Polity. 
Kelly, M. (2004) „Research design and proposals‟, in Clive Seale (eds.), 
Researching Society and Culture, London: Sage. 
Kim An-young (1995) The Secrets of the Sixth Republic’s Economy, Seoul: 
Hangukmunwon. 
Kim Dae-jung (2008) „Inaugural speech of the President‟, 25 February. 
(http://www.pa.go.kr/online_contents/inauguration/inauguration09/inauguration0
92/1287458_2934.html#).  
Kim Deuk-gap and Oh Seung-Ku (2003) „The achievements and limitations of 
the European economic model‟, Seoul: SERI. 
Kim Dong-choon (2007) „The corporatization of society and the crisis of public 
spirit‟, Sahwebipyung (Critique of Society), 37 (December): 16-33. 
Kim Dong-choon (2009) „The class structure of Korea in the age of 
globalization‟, in Cho Hee-yeon, Kim Dong-choon and Oh You-seok (2009) 
The Dynamic Transformation of Socio-Economic Inequality in the Korean 
Democratization, Seoul: Hanul. 
Kim Dong-won (1998) „The cause of the economic crisis‟, in Lee Byung-chun 
and Kim Kyun (ed.) The Crisis and Big Transformation, Seoul: Dangdae. 
Kim Jin-young (2002) „Globalization and the constitution of state 
competitiveness‟, unpublished MA thesis, Seoul National University. 
Kim Jong-mok, Sohn Min-jae and Chang Kwan-soon (2008) Twenty Years from 
Democratization: The Death of the Intellectuals, Seoul: Humanitas. 
Kim Jun-kyong and Choi Paul (2008) „The definition and estimation of the 
middle class‟, KDI Issue Paper, 24, (August). 
Kim Jung-joo (2004) „Market, state and the model of capitalism in Korea‟, in 
Yoo Chul-kyu (ed.) Economic Development in Korea III: Contradictions and 
Transition, Seoul: Cobook. 
Kim Jung-woo (2005) „The change and the implication of the employment costs 
263 
 
for gross value-added‟, Labour Review (May), Korea Labour Institute. 
Kim Ki-won (2001) „The evolution and conflict of the chaebols system‟, 
Donghyangkwa junmang (Trend and Forcast) (Autumn). 
Kim Kyun and Park Sun-sung (1998) „Kim Dae-Jung government‟s economic 
policy and neo-liberalism‟, in Lee Byung-chun and Kim Kyun (eds) Crisis 
and Big Transformation, Seoul: Dangdae. 
Kim Sang-jo (1998) „Kim Young-Sam government‟s failure of reform and the 
economic crisis‟, in Lee Byung-chun and Kim Kyun (eds) The Crisis and the 
Big Transformation, Seoul: Dangdae. 
Kim Sang-jo, Yoo Jong-il, Hong Jong-hak and Kwak Jung-soo (2007) Looking 
for a New Paradigm for the Korean Economy, Seoul: Middle House. 
Kim Sun-bin (ed.) (2007) The Ecology of Policy Knowledge in Korea, Seoul: 
SERI. 
Kim Sung-hae (2005) Educating Public Opinion: Understanding U.S. Dollar 
Hegemony in the Age of Global News Media, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 
Pennsylvania State University. 
Kim Sung-hae (2007) „Shaped preferences: understanding South Korea's 
commitment to U.S. dollar hegemony through an intellectual leadership 
model‟, Jedowa-kyongjze (Journal of Institution and Economics), Vol. 1 (1). 
Kim Sung-hae and Ahn Byung-uk (2007) Understanding of Financial 
Journalism in the Age of Globalization, Seoul: Korea Press Foundation. 
Kim Sung-hae and Lee Dong-woo (2009) The World is not Flat, Seoul: 
Mineumsa. 
Kim Sung-hae, Kang Hee-min and Lee Jin-hee (2007) „Korea‟s structural 
transformation and media discourse – a case study about South Korea‟s 
adopting of the Anglo-Saxon model‟,  Unlonkwasahwei (Media and Society), 
Vol. 15 (4). 
Kim Wi-sang and Yoon Hae-kyung (2006) The Truth of Sovereign Fund, Seoul: 
Hongic. 
Kim Yong-rae (1990) Interest Groups and the Development of Democratic 
Politics in Korea, Seoul: Daewangsa. 
Kjaer, P. and Pedersen, O. K. (2001) „Translating liberalization: neo-liberalism in 
the Danish negotiated economy‟, in John L. Campbell and Ove K. Pedersen 
264 
 
(eds) The Rise of Neo-liberalism and Institutional Analysis, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Knorr-Cetina, K. and Bruegger, U. (2005) „Global microstructures: the virtual 
societies of financial markets‟, in Michel Y. Abolafia (ed.) Market, 
Chettenham: Edward Elgar. 
Knorr-Cetina, K. and Preda, A. (eds) (2005) The Sociology of Financial Markets, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Ko Kyong-whan (2009) „The trend of social welfare expenditure in 2007‟, Seoul: 
KiHASA.   
Kogut, B. and Macpherson, J. M. (2008) „The decision to privatize: economists 
and the construction of ideas and policies‟, in Beth A. Simmons, Frank 
Dobbin, Geoffrey Garrett (eds.) The Global Diffusion of Markets and 
Democracy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Korea Association of Journalist (2006) The Survey of Journalists 2006, Seoul: 
KAJ.  
Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry (2006) „The reserve of cash and the 
cash equivalent of the corporations‟, 23 February, Seoul. 
Korea Fair Trade Commission (2008) „Ownership structure of the largest 
conglomerate in 2008‟, 6 November, Seoul. 
Korea Press Foundation (2004) 2004 Audience Survey, Seoul: Newspapers and 
Broadcasting. 
KOTRA (2007) Private Equity Fund, Seoul: KOTRA 
Krugman, P. (1995) „Cycle of conventional wisdom on economic development‟, 
International Affairs 71(4): 717-732. 
Krugman, P. (2009) The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008, 
London: Allen Lane. 
Kyunghyang Shinmun (2008) The Demise of the Intellectuals after 20 Years of 
Democratization, Seoul: Humanitas. 
Lazonick, W. and O‟Sullivan, M. (2000) „Maximizing shareholder value: a new 
ideology for corporate governance‟, Economy and Society, Vol. 29 (1): 13-35. 
Lee Bong-soo (2006) The Media and Economic Crisis in Korea circa 1993 to 
2003, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Goldsmiths College, University of London. 
Lee Byung-chun (1998) „The Korean economic paradigm – a review and 
265 
 
prospect‟, in Lee Byung-chun and Kim Kyun (eds) The Crisis and the Big 
Transformation, Seoul: Dangdae. 
Lee Chan-keun (ed.) (2004) The Korean economy is vanishing, Seoul: 21
st
 
Century books. 
Lee Chung-eun (2002) „Stock returns co-movements between stocks in the U.S. 
and Korea‟, Seoul: KIEP. 
Lee Joon-woong (2005) „The cause of the crisis of the press‟, Seminar 
presentation organized by Mediaoneul. 
Lee Jung-hwan (2006) Korea: the Paradise of Speculative Capital, Seoul: 
Jungsim. 
Lee Kang-kuk (2004) „Financial liberalization, economic growth and crisis: 
Korean experience‟, in Lee Chan-keun (ed.)The Korean Economy is vanishing, 
Seoul: 21
st
 Century Books. 
Lee Kwang-il (2003) „The myth and dilemma of the ruling discourse of growth-
development‟, in Cho Hee-yeon (ed.) Politically and Socially Dominant 
Discourse in Korea and the Dynamics of Democracy, Seoul: Cobook. 
Lee Kyu-uck (1994) „Ownership-management relations in Korean business‟, in 
Cho Yee-jae and Kim Yoon-hyung (eds) Korea’s Political Economy: An 
Institutional Perspective, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. 
Lee Si-won (2002) „An analysis of the appointment of the minister in the Korean 
government‟, a paper presented for the summer seminar of The Korea 
Association for Public Administration.  
Lee Won-rak (2004) A Study on Changes in the News-making Routine Due to the 
Transformation of the Newspaper as a Power Institution, unpublished Ph.D. 
thesis, Seoul National University. 
Lee Yeon-ho and Kim Hyuk-rae (2000) „The dilemma of market liberalization: 
the financial crisis and the transformation of capitalism‟, in Mark Beeson, 
Kanishka Jayasuriya, Kim Hyuk-rae and Richard Robison (eds) Politics and 
Markets in the Wake of the Asian Crisis, London: Routledge. 
Leys, C. (2001) Market-Driven Politics: Neo-liberal Democracy and the Public 
Interest, London: Verso. 
Lindblom, C. (1977) Politics and Market: The World’s Political-Economic 
System, New York: Basic Books. 
266 
 
Lindblom, C. (1982) „The market as a prison‟, Journal of Politics, Vol.44. 
Lukes, S. (2005 [1974]) Power: A Radical View, 2
nd
 edn., New York: Palgrave. 
MacEwan, A. (2005) „Neo-liberalism and democracy: market power versus 
democratic power‟, in Alfredo Saad-Filho and Deborah Johnston (eds) Neo-
liberalism: A Critical Reader, London: Pluto Press. 
Martin, H. P. and Schumann, H. (1997) The Global Trap: Globalization and the 
Assault on Prosperity and Democracy, London: Zed Books. 
Mason, J. (1996) Qualitative Researching, London: Sage. 
May, T. (1993) Social Research: Issues, Methods and Process, Buckingham: 
Open University Press. 
Mayer, T. (2002) Media Democracy: How the Media Colonize Politics, 
Cambridge: Polity. 
McChesney, R. (1999) „The new global media‟, The Nation, 29 (November). 
McGrew, A. (2005) „The logic of globalization‟, in John Ravenhill (ed.) Global 
Political Economy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
McNair, B. (2003) An Introduction to Political Communication, 3
rd
 edn. Oxon: 
Routledge. 
Meyer, J. W., Boli, J., Thomas, G. and Ramirez, O. F. (1997) „World society and 
the national-state‟, American Journal of Sociology 103 (1): 144-181. 
Mills, C. W. (1956) The Power Elite, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Ministry of Health and Welfare (2011) „Fifteen people received prizes for their 
effort to prevent suicide‟, 5 September, Seoul. 
Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Energy (2005) „The trend of foreign direct 
investment‟, July, Seoul. 
Mittelman, J. (2001) „Globalization; captors and captives‟, in James H. 
Mittelman and Norani Othman (eds) Capturing Globalization, London: 
Routledge. 
Murdock, G. and Golding, P. (2005) „Culture, communications and political 
economy‟, in James Curran and Michael Gurevitch (eds) Mass Media and 
Society, 4
th
 edn., London: Hodder Arnold. 
Newspaper and Broadcasting (2007) „A forbidden ground of media coverage‟, 
March, Seoul: KPF. 
Newspaper and Broadcasting (2007) „Twenty years from democratization and 
267 
 
liberalization of press‟, June, Seoul: KPF. 
Norris, P., Curtice, J., Sanders, D., Scammel, M. and Semetko, H.A. (1999) On 
Message: Communicating the Campaign, London: Sage. 
Oberlechner, T. and Hocking, S. (2002) „Information sources, news and rumours 
in the financial market: insights into the foreign exchange market‟, Journal of 
Economy Psychology, (25): 407-424. 
OECD (1999) OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, Paris: OECD. 
Ohmae, K. (1990) The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Interlinked 
World, London: Collins. 
Othman, N. and Kessler, S. C. (2001) „Capturing globalization: prospects and 
projects‟, in James H. Mittelman and Norani Othman (eds) Capturing 
Globalization, London: Routledge. 
Palley, T. (2005) „From Keynesianism to neo-liberalism: shifting paradigms in 
economics‟, in Alfredo Saad-Filho and Deborah Johnston (eds) Neo-
liberalism: A Critical Reader, London: Pluto Press. 
Park Eun-hong (1999) „A review of the theory of the developmental state‟, 
International Political Review, Vol. 39 (3). 
Park Hong-jae (1999) The Chaebols and Economic Growth in Korea, 
unpublished Ph.D. thesis, SOAS, University of London.  
Park Seung-kwan and Chang Kyong-seob (2001) Media Power and the 
Dynamics of Agenda Setting, Seoul: Communication Books. 
Park U-sun (2006) „A study on the changing nature of globalization discourse in 
Korea‟, unpublished MA thesis, Seogang University. 
Park Won-bae (1996) „The marriage network of the chaebols‟, Shindong-A, 
October. 
Parsons, W. (1989) The Power of the Financial Press, Hants: Edward Elgar. 
Pauly, L.W. (2005) „The political economy of the international financial crisis‟, 
in John Ravenhill (ed.) Global Political Economy, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Pine, C. L. (1993) Ideology and False Consciousness: Marx and his Historical 
Progenitors, Albany: State University of New York. 
Polanyi, K. (2001[1944]) The Great Transformation, Boston: Beacon Press. 
Pole, C. and Lampard, R. (2002) Practical Social Investigation, Essex: Prentice 
268 
 
Hall. 
Protess, D. L. (1991) The Journalism of Outrage, New York: Guilford Press. 
Protess, D. L., Cook, F. L., Curtin, T. R., Gordon, M. T., Leff, D. R., McCombs, 
M. E. and Miller, P. (1987) „The impact of investigative reporting on public 
opinion and policymaking: targeting toxic waste‟, Public Opinion Quarterly, 
(51): 166-185. 
Przeworski, A. (2003) State and Market: A Primer in Political Economy, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Przeworski, A. and Limongi, F. (1993) „Political regime and economic growth‟, 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 7(3): 51-70. 
PSPD (2005) „Report on Samsung 2‟, 17 October, Seoul. 
PSPD (People‟s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy) (2004) „The marriage 
connections of the 30 biggest Korean chaebols‟, Seoul. 
Rodrik, D. (2011) The Globalization Paradox: Why Global Market, State, and 
Democracy Can’t Coexist, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Roh Han-kyun (2002) Changing Institutions in Korea: Corporate Governance 
Reform through Shareholder Activism, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University 
of Cambridge. 
Rubin, R. (2002) In an Uncertain World: Tough Choice from Wall Street to 
Washington, Random House Trade, Shin Young-sup and Kim Sun-ku (trans.) 
(2005) The Global Economic Crisis and the U.S., Seoul: Jisikenalkei. 
Saad-Filho, A. and Johnston, D. (eds) (2005) Neo-liberalism: A Critical Reader, 
London: Pruto Press. 
Sabatier, P. A. (1991) „Toward better theories of the policy process‟, Political 
Science and Politics,( 24): 147-156. 
Saesayeun (2007) „Media monitoring report‟, 31 October 2007. 
Sassen, S. (2005) „The embeddedness of the electronic market: the case of global 
capital markets‟, in Karin Knorr-Cetina and Alex Preda (eds) The Sociology of 
Financial Markets, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Schattschneider E. E. (1960) The Semisovereign People: A Realist’s View of 
Democracy, New York, Holt: Rinehard and Winston. 
Schlesinger, P. (1990) „Rethinking the sociology of journalism: source strategies 
and the limits of media-centrism‟, in Marjorie Ferguson (ed.) Public 
269 
 
Communication: The New Imperatives, London: Sage. 
Schudson, M. (2003) Sociology of News, New York, London: W.W. Norton & 
Company. 
Scott, J. (1991) „Networks of corporate power: A comparative assessment‟, 
Annual Review of Sociology, (17): 181-203. 
Seale, C. (2004) „Generating grounded theory‟, in Clive Seale (ed.), Researching 
Society and Culture, London: Sage. 
Shaikh, A. (2005) „The economic mythology of neo-liberalism‟, in Alfredo Saad-
Filho and Deborah Johnston (eds) Neo-liberalism: A Critical Reader, London: 
Pruto Press. 
Shefrin, H. (2002) Beyond Greed and Fear: Understanding Behavioral Finance 
and the Psychology of Investing, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Shiller, R. (2005) Irrational Exuberance, 2
nd
 edn., Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Shin Jin-wook and Kim Young-min (2009) „The structure and techniques of 
market populism discourse‟, Economy and Society, Vol.81(Spring). 
Shin Jung-wan (2004) „The collapse of the developmental state style relation 
between labour and capital, and pain for the new order‟, in You Chul-kyu (ed.) 
Economic Development in Korea III: Contradictions and Transition, Seoul: 
Cobook. 
Shleifer, A. (2000) Inefficient Market: An Introduction to Behavioral Finance, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Silverman, D. (2004) „Research and social policy‟, in Clive Seale (ed.), 
Researching Society and Culture, London: Sage. 
Simmons, A. B., Dobbin, F. and Garrett, G. (2008) (eds) The Global Diffusion of 
Markets and Democracy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Soederberg, S. (2004) The Politics of the New International Financial 
Architecture, London:      Zed Books. 
Sohn Ho-chul (1999) Korean Politics in the Age of Neo-liberalism, Seoul: 
Purunshup. 
Sohn Seok-choon (2006) „The substance of crisis and alternative proposals in 
journalism‟, Journal of Korea media and information, Vol.36: 42-77. 
Sohn Seok-choon (2009) „A critique of the critical communication studies and 
270 
 
journalism focused on neo-liberalism in Korea‟, Korean Journal of 
Communication and Information, Vol.45.  
Solidarity for Economic Reform (2008) „Economic reform report 2008-3‟, 27 
February, Seoul. 
Solidarity for Economic Reform (2009) „Economic concentration and business 
diversification of chaebols‟, Seoul. 
Song Ho-keun (1998) „In the age of the market and corporatism‟, Sasang(Idea), 
Summer. 
Song Won-keun (2008) „Multiple approaches for chaebols‟ reform‟, in Cho Don-
moon, Lee Byung-chun and Song Won-keun (eds) What is Samsung in 
Korean Society?, Seoul: Humanitas. 
Sparks, C. (2007) „What‟s wrong with globalization?‟, Global Media and 
Communication 3(2). 
Spec Watch (2009) „Economic forays of foreign speculative capital and the 
understanding of the Lone Star case‟, Seoul. 
Stiglitz, J. E. (2003) Globalization and its Discontents, New York: W.W. Norton 
& Co.  
Strange, D. (1991) „Adding social structure to diffusion models‟, Sociological 
Methods and Research (19): 324-353. 
Strange, S. (1996) The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World 
Economy, New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Sung Hyung-pyo (2005) Private Equity Fund, Seoul: Maeil Business Newspaper. 
Supreme Prosecutor‟s Office (SPO) (2006) „The provisional conclusion of the 
investigation into the M&A deal of KEB‟, Seoul. 
Thatcher, M. (2002) Statecraft, New York: HarperCollins. 
The Office of the Economic Secretary of the President (2005) „The influence of 
the inflow of speculative foreign capital and its remedies‟, February, Seoul. 
Thussu, D. K. (2000) International Communication: Continuity and Change, 
London: Arnold. 
Tunstall, J. (1996) Newspaper Power, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Useem, M. (1979) „The social organization of the American business: elite and 
the participation of corporation directors in the governance of American 
institutions‟, American Sociological Review, (44): 553-572. 
271 
 
Useem, M. (1984) The Inner Circle: Large Corporations and the Rise of 
Business Political Activity in the U.S. and U.K., New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
Walsh, D. (2004) „Doing ethnography‟, in Clive Seale (ed.), Researching Society 
and Culture, London: Sage. 
Watson, J. (2003) Media Communication: An Introduction to Theory and 
Process, 2
nd
 edn., New York: Palgrave.  
Weber, M. (1978) Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Weber, R. and Daws, R. (2005) „Behavioral economics‟, in Neil J. Smelser and 
Richard Swedbery (eds) The Handbook of Economic Sociology, 2
nd
 edn., 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Weiss, L. (1998) The Myth of the Powerless State, Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Williams, K. (2000) „From shareholder value to present-day capitalism‟, 
Economy and Society, Vol. 29 (1): 1-12. 
Wilson, D. and Purushothaman, P. (2003) „Dreaming with BRICs: the path to 
2050, Global Economic Paper No. 99, Goldman Sachs (October). 
Wimmer, R. D. and Dominick, J. R. (2006) Mass Media Research: an 
Introduction, 8
th
 edn., Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. 
Woo-Cumings, M. (ed) (1999) The Developmental State, New York: Cornell 
University Press. 
World Bank (1993) The East Asian Miracle, New York: Oxford University Press. 
World Bank (1998) East Asia: the Road to Recovery, Washington, DC. 
Yang Seung-mok (1995) „Democratization and the transformation of the media 
in Korea‟, in You Jae-chun (ed.) Social Change and the Media in Korea, 
Seoul: Sohwa. 
Yoo Chul-kyu (2003) „Polarization and the economic structure of the dismantling 
of national economy‟, Asia Research, Vol. 118: 23-41. 
Yoo Chul-kyu (2009) „The political de-monopolization and the change of 
economic monopolization‟, in Cho Hee-yeon, Kim Dong-chun and Oh You-
seok (eds) The Dynamic transformation of Socio-Economic Inequality in the 
Korean Democratization, Seoul: Hanul. 
Yoo Han-ho (1993) Theory and Practice of the Inner Freedom of the Press, 
272 
 
unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Sungkyunkwan University. 
Yoo Young-min and Kim Sung-hae (2007) „Discursive crisis of the labor 
movement‟, Korea Journal of Communication, Vol. 51(4): 226-251. 
Yoon Sang-woo (2009) „A review of the social policy and welfare policy after 
the democratization‟, in Cho Hee-yeon, Kim Dong-chun and Oh You-seok 
(2009) The Dynamic Transformation of Socio-Economic Inequality in the 
Korean Democratization, Seoul: Hanul. 
Zorn, D., Dobbin, F., Dierkes, J. and Kwok Man-shan (2005) „Managing 
investors: how the financial market reshaped the American firms‟, in Karin 
Knorr-Cetina and Alex Preda (eds) The Sociology of Financial Markets, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
